and control of all UNC forces. It also requested that the U.S. provide the Security Council with reports on the course of action taken under the command (UNSC S/1588): 1).

North Korea initially enjoyed success in its surprise attack, taking control of Seoul, South Korea's capital, within 72 hours. UN forces were pushed to the southern tip of South Korea at Pusan, but rallied with the successful amphibious landing at Inchon. Under General Douglas MacArthur, UN forces pushed the Korean People's Army northward past the 38th parallel to the Yalu River. China responded to the threat to its border with Korea by augmenting North Korea's forces, and the struggle between the Chinese-backed North and the UN-supported South ensued, ending in stalemate.

Armistice negotiations took over 2 years and were conducted as hostilities continued. The Unified Command's negotiating team consisted of U.S. and ROK representatives sitting across from representatives of North Korea and the People's Republic of China. Negotiations were plagued by adjournments, arguments, and disruption, preventing any progress toward a cease-fire (Bailey: 74). On 27 July 1953, the Commander in Chief of the UN Command, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers finally signed the armistice agreement, which established the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and created a 4-kilometer buffer zone known as the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). With the cease-fire in 1953, the UNC's focus switched to preventing a return to hostilities and maintaining the institutional mechanisms created to supervise the implementation of the armistice agreement (UN Command: 5).

For the past 43 years, the UNC has had the mission of implementing and maintaining the Armistice Agreement, keeping watch over the situation in Korea. The UNC has "defended the ROK and executed crisis management... and war deterrence missions . . . in accordance with the Armistice" (S. Lee). The UNC also staffs the Military Armistice Commission, which investigates armistice violations and reports annually, and as needed, to the UNSC.

Today, the UNC continues its "role of deterring war and maintaining security of the Korean peninsula" (S. Lee) while it attempts to implement the Armistice Agreement. The breakdown of relations between the

north and south makes it difficult for the UNC to communicate with the North Korean People's Army, though it continues attempts to re-establish military-to-military communications (UN Command: 9,14). It maintains around-the-clock presence in Panmunjom to answer any calls from the north. The UNC monitors activity along the DMZ through special investigative teams and continues to report to the UNSC annually, and the commander provides periodic testimony before the U.S. Congress.

The Armistice Agreement, while still in effect, has lost much of its relevance over the years due to non-compliance and changing regional and peninsular conditions. The current situation dictates a move toward a comprehensive peace settlement between North and South Korea and reunification.

The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

With the institution of a unified command, UNCOK became obsolete. A new commission was formed to continue work on Korean unification issues and to assist the unified command in handling relief and support operations. On 7 October 1950, the United Nations General Assembly established the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) (UNGA Res 376(V)).

Initially, UNCURK consisted of seven nations: Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey. Chile and Pakistan eventually withdrew in 1970 and 1972, respectively. In addition to taking over UNCOK's missions, UNCURK turned its attention to the war in Korea. The Unified Command, under General Douglas MacArthur, had been established in July 1950 and had entered into war with North Korea. UNCURK assisted the Unified Command with civilian population relief and support operations. During its tenure, UNCURK was never able to achieve Korea's unification, though Canada suggested that it be “reorganized in a way acceptable to both South and North Korean governments” (C. Park: 158). With its unification mission unfulfilled, and with no further need for relief operations, UNCURK was disbanded in November 1973 (UNGA A/9027: 24).

The Military Armistice Commission

On 27 July 1953, representatives of North Korea, China, and the UN Command signed the Armistice Agreement. Twelve hours after the

signing, the cease-fire went into effect. The following day, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) held its first meeting. Established by the Armistice Agreement, the MAC is not a UN organ but a vehicle by which the UNC maintains military-tomilitary connection with North Korea. The MAC consisted of ten senior officers: five appointed by the Commander in Chief, UN Command, and five appointed by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the

Chinese People's Volunteers. Their specific duty was to "supervise the implementation of [the] Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiation any violations" (Wellens: 230) of it, acting as intermediaries in transmitting communications between the commanders of the opposing sides. They were also responsible for marking the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) which served, and still exists, as the dividing line between north and south. The two sides were directed to withdraw at least two kilometers from the MDL, forming a 4-kilometer Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), to minimize the likelihood of incidents between the opposing forces and prevent the occurrence of further aggression. The MAC ensures the DMZ is sustained as a buffer zone, and is responsible for prescribing the number of civil police required to do so, as well as specifying the weapons the police are authorized to carry. The MAC maintains sole authority for granting permission for crossings of the DMZ. When unauthorized crossings occur, the MAC reports the violations or its corrective action to the commanders of both sides. The MAC can also dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate reported violations in the DMZ. The MAC usually meets five times a year in a formal setting at the Joint Security Area located within the DMZ at Panmunjom, Korea. Rather than negotiating on violations of the Armistice Agreement, however, the representatives end up making or denying allegations of violations (Bailey: 201),

which allows little progress toward open dialogue, much less unification. Of the commissions described, only the MAC still exists. It is a first-step measure in building trust through negotiations between the north and south, a trust that is required for any successful headway in the quest for unification (Clough: 32).

UN involvement in Korea began with a proposed general framework for achieving independence and reunification. Today the Unified Command is poised to prevent North Korean aggression, and the MAC provides opportunities for dialogue. The stalemate in Korea has been reflected in the United Nations, as East and West have faced off against each other. Now that East-West cooperation has begun, North and South Korea also need to free themselves of the chains of the Cold War. An agreement to cooperate with each other, as well as Russia, the U.S., China, and the rest of the world will enable Korea to develop as a nation. The international interest in and encouragement for a unified Korea implies an expanded UN role in the current post-Cold War era.

UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN
TRANSITIONAL REGIMES

The end of the Cold War brought an increased demand for UN peacekeeping and enforcement missions to deal with the rise in global instability and widespread violence manifested most often in local and regional conflicts. A comparison of the number of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) reveals that during the Cold War, between 1948 and 1987, the UN installed 13 PKOS; after the Cold War, in one-tenth that time (1988-1992), the UN established 10 PKOS (Liu: 38).

Why did the end of the Cold War cause the floodwaters of local conflict to overflow the dam? During the Cold War, the world lived under a "bipolar stalemate, imposed by mutual fear of nuclear war, establish[ing] a dangerous but rather stable deterrent to conflagrations of global magnitude" (Hoopes: 1). The bipolar powers had also suppressed local conflicts within their spheres of interest or taken sides in civil wars which were allowed to fester. It is not that these local conflicts did not exist, but that the end of the Cold War "simply removed the lid from many cauldrons of ethnic, religious, and territorial animosity” (Hoopes: 1).

With the end of the Cold War, the character of relations between the superpowers changed from competition to cooperation. The permanent members of the UNSC are shouldering increased responsibility within the UN and contributing forces for peacekeeping missions with more authority and a greater capability to enforce decisive measures. The Gulf War is a prime example of the success of the increased power of the Security Council. The UN effectively authorized a collective security force and conducted enforcement measures, involving 38 nations, against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait (Liu: 38). After defeating Saddam Hussein, the Security Council has maintained the pressure on Iraq to destroy its capability to use weapons of mass destruction and to protect the Kurd and Shi'ite minorities.

THE CHANGING DEFINITIONS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The increased demand for UN intervention has led to an expansion of the definition of UN peace operations. The UN had used PKOS to contain and control armed conflicts between two governments and their armies, and UN peacekeepers were basically lightly armed cease-fire monitors. In the post-Cold War era, the UN became involved in conflicts including not only legitimate governments, but factions, liberation movements, and other armed elements engaged in internal conflict. The increased number of players, coupled with their inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the UN, causes significant problems and makes PKOs much more complex.

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali introduced the most recent additions to the concept of UN peace operations in his An Agenda for Peace (UN b). He includes the UN in activities that apply directly to the intrastate conflict of the post-Cold War era. UN efforts to provide peace and security span the spectrum from pacific non-use of force measures to those achieved by military might (Duke: 386). Peacemaking and peacekeeping are closely interrelated— peacekeeping promotes peacemaking by creating on-the-ground conditions (Thakur and Thayer: 255) conducive to negotiations, while peacemaking provides hope for a peaceful resolution, motivating the parties to cooperate with a peacekeeping force. Peacemaking operations also aim to provide a peace "which will survive the withdrawal of the peacekeepers" (Thakur and Thayer: 240), further inducing a move toward cooperation with the UN. The concept of peace-building involves rebuilding a nation's institutions and infrastructure to create conditions conducive to peace, a goal similar to that of peacekeeping. Protective