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The complexity level of extensive peacekeeping operations in Bosnia is high. This scenario could easily be compared to the internecine combat that occurred in Beirut in 1982-83. The Muslim, Croat and Serb feuds have the potential to embroil many combatants and inflame the situation. Therefore, this complex operational environment would appear to be a negative factor.

Similarly, the assessment of host-country support, neutrality, use of force, and U.S. participation and force training levels would likely follow historical trends, resulting in the matrix shown above.

THE BOTTOM LINE

The weighted decision matrix total when using these weights and values results in an overall assessment that is moderately negative. This rating is very close to the overall UNTSO rating (yellow). UNTSO's overall mission accomplishment has often come into question. Therefore, by historical comparison based upon these criteria, one can expect a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia under the present conditions to experience some difficulties and to meet with only a limited degree of success.

Peacekeeping operations are sometimes undertaken merely to reduce casualties and provide stability to a region as further solutions are sought. It is common for various peacekeeping missions to be only partially successful. These realistic limitations concerning certain peacekeeping missions have been acceptable to the world community in the past, and may therefore be seen as an acceptable alternative in Bosnia. Hence, peacekeeping forces may still be committed with the understanding that they may not be able to fully realize the international community's goals of ending the conflict.

Chapter 2

INTELLIGENCE IN A UN CONTEXT

The purpose of the United Nations as defined in Article 1 of the Charter is to "maintain international peace," to take effective collective measures for the removal of threats to the peace, and to suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. The Security Council, which consists of representatives of member states, decides what action should be taken. The Secretary-General is empowered by Article 99 of the Charter to bring to the attention of the Security Council "any matter which in his opinion may threaten" international peace. He is also charged with staff support and is chief administrative officer of the organization. Article 47 of the Charter establishes a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and to be responsible for the "strategic direction" of any armed forces placed at the UN's disposal. Each of these crucial missions of the United Nations organization implies fact-finding, early warning, analysis, and assessment functions, which are performed by intelligence organizations of any of the UN's member states.

Superpower competition and internal bureaucratic posturing prevented the Military Staff Committee from assuming its proper role, and the Secretary-General gradually evolved support mechanisms replicating intelligence staff functions. The end of the Cold War allowed the Security Council to act in anticipation of threats to international peace posed by internal civil strife and humanitarian crisis. As the UN dispatched military forces all over the world for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcing and preventive diplomacy, the need for an intelligence role in the strategic direction of UN resources became apparent. Thus, when the Security Council invited Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to

make recommendations for the improvement of the UN, he responded with an agenda for intelligence collection and analysis.

The explicit integration of intelligence into the UN decisionmaking process was evolutionary and not revolutionary. Captains Timothy M. Sebenick and James D. Edwards and Lieutenant Robert J. Allen analyzed the UN Secretariat and UN High Commissioner organizational structures and found an existing intelligence architecture performing the following functions:

Fact-Finding

■ Early Warning

Assessment for Strategic Planning
Operational Support

As intelligence support for the UN from member states increases and the UN develops more sophisticated intelligence organizations, the existing intelligence architecture provides the necessary context for understanding the future role of intelligence in the UN.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND

THE UNITED NATIONS

Timothy M. Sebenick
Captain, U.S. Army
August 1995

[The General Assembly] welcomes the efforts of the SecretaryGeneral to take appropriate steps through preventive diplomacy and, recognizing the need for those steps to be based on timely and accurate knowledge of relevant facts, encourages him to strengthen the capability of the Secretariat to secure and analyze all relevant information from as wide a variety of sources as possible (UNGA Res A/RES/48/42).

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of UN resolutions responding to regional conflicts, ethnic strife, and mass human suffering. In 1990, the UN conducted five peacekeeping operations. In contrast, in 1993 the UN engaged in 24 peacekeeping operations comprising over 75,000 troops, 5,600 of whom were U.S. military personnel. The UN's ability to maintain this escalating trend of intervention is unclear, considering the current U.S. political shift toward limiting UN intervention. The shift may severely limit the UN's response because of its dependence on the U.S. for financial and military resources. But the U.S., as a permanent member of the Security Council and the leading military power in the world, will be under considerable pressure to undertake a principal role when the UN demands resources to address a threat to international peace.

In concert with this rise in UN activity is a rise in efforts to enhance the UN's ability to perform its function of maintaining peace and security. A common goal in this effort is to avoid large, costly, multinational operations

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