by acting to alleviate the roots of conflict and intervene before the crisis develops into conflict. However, in order for this approach to be effective, the causes of conflict must be identified, a mechanism must be in place to discover where those causes are emerging, and resources must be available to execute the actions to alleviate them. Such a methodology, labeled preventive diplomacy, is dependent on the prediction of crisis far enough in advance to formulate and execute a policy to prevent it from occurring. It depends on intelligence.

A great deal of literature exists on the requirements for and development of intelligence support to UN multinational forces, regardless of whether those forces are controlled by the UN or a member-state. Accordingly, the term intelligence, when associated with the UN, is used almost exclusively to refer to operational-level decisions—those that directly affect the forces in the field.' Conspicuously absent from literature on intelligence and the UN is the recognition that a strategic-level decision is made before field operations begin- the decision to use military resources to execute UN policy.

The focus of this research is the development by the Secretary-General of a quasi-intelligence architecture that supports UN decisionmaking— specifically, intelligence support of his role as a strategic decisionmaker. This research will address the origin of the Secretary-General's role in creating UN strategy, his administrative and executive power, and the specific reforms he enacted during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods that have established an intelligence architecture. However, the reader should be forewarned that the UN's intelligence architecture is not a clearly defined structure that can be illustrated on a single organizational chart. Rather, it is intertwined within one of the most complex bureaucracies in the world.

The terms and concepts associated with strategic decisionmaking and strategic intelligence unnerve many of those intimately involved with the UN. These terms imply a level of secrecy and executive authority that is contrary to the openness and spirit of collective decisionmaking usually

1 The Department of Defense, according to JCS Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, 5 May 1995, defines operational intelligence as: “Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives."

associated with the UN. In most circumstances, the terms intelligence and information are considered almost interchangeable concepts.

STRATEGY AND THE UN

To gain a clear understanding of where strategic intelligence fits into the UN structure, one needs a sense of the type of strategic decisions being made and who makes them. I asked U.S. and UN officers: "Do you view a decision by the Security Council or the Secretary-General to use military resources to achieve a policy goal a strategic decision?" The answer was simply, "No, the UN doesn't create strategy." Officials mocked the idea that the UN deliberately attempts to create strategy in any form. I found their comments disturbing, because they dismissed the inherent tie between policy and strategy once military resources are employed.

Liddell Hart defines strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy" (Liddell Hart: 321). Liddell Hart expands his basic definition of strategy with the concept of "grand strategy," which seems almost tailor-made for the United Nations. For Liddell Hart, the role of grand strategy is to:

coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war— the goal defined by fundamental policy. . . . Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy — which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will (Hart: 322).

The UN attempts to use the resources of the international community, bound by the Charter of the United Nations, to obtain a political objective — the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN's recognition of a crisis, the evaluation of its severity, the formulation of options to address the crisis, and the coordination and execution of a policy intended to end the crisis are elements of UN strategy. When a proposed option includes using military resources to address the crisis, it clearly implies the formation of military strategy. UN strategy, especially military strategy, may often be vague and seemingly ill-conceived, but it must exist. The idea that the UN must perform this function has a historical foundation that begins with the Charter of the United Nations itself. The drafters of the

Charter went so far as to create an organization to develop military strategy — the Military Staff Committee.

THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

The drafters of the UN Charter clearly intended to give the UN a set of teeth to address threats to peace if diplomatic or pacific measures failed. They unanimously accepted the concept of using force, as described in the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement (the founding document of the Charter of the United Nations) (Hilderbrand: 987). Section B, Chapter 8, of that agreement became Article 42 of the UN Charter. Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to "take action by air, sea, or land forces to maintain or restore international peace and security." It permits the creation of permanent UN military forces (which are described in Article 43), and subsequently, the creation of a body to provide strategic direction for those forces—the Military Staff Committee (MSC). Article 46 of the UN Charter is the first place the MSC is mentioned. It states: “Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee." Article 47 then formally establishes the MSC and outlines its basic responsibilities. The drafters of the UN Charter expected the MSC to be the cornerstone of a global Department of Defense, through which the security of all nations could be assured. It was to be a supranational military bureaucracy responsible for military planning, operations, and arms control (Rostow: 109).

The MSC, officially established on 4 February 1946, quickly drafted a statute and rules of procedure. On 16 February, the Security Council made three decisions that directly affected the MSC. First, it established a committee of experts to review the MSC's draft statute. Second, it instructed the MSC to operate under the provisions of the draft statute, pending its approval. Third, and most importantly, it issued the MSC its first task — to examine, from the military point of view, the provisions contained in Article 43 referring to the establishment of a UN armed force (R. Goldman: 27). The final draft of the statute and rules of procedure was submitted on 24 July 1946 and approved on 1 August 1946. The delay was a result of concern by Secretary-General Lie that the statute did not place enough importance on the role of the Secretariat. The exact details of the disagreement are not known, but supposedly a significant amount of correspondence was exchanged between the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the MSC prior to the submission of the final draft (U.S. DoD l: 2).

Ironically, the demise of the MSC began with its first official task. On 13 February 1946, the Security Council adopted a resolution on disarmament. In addition to the resolution, it issued a directive to the MSC to submit a recommendation (no later than 30 April 1947), regarding the basic principles that should govern the creation of permanent UN military forces (R. Goldman: 7). There was initial agreement among the permanent members of the MSC that such forces should not be autonomous and must be subject to Security Council veto. They also agreed with the spirit of the Charter that the preponderance of forces should be provided by the five permanent members of the Council. From that point forward agreements between the superpowers ceased. A consensus could not be reached on primary points of discussion. The most significant debate focused on the size of each member's contribution, the standby location of the contributed forces, and the source of supplies and funding to maintain the forces (Grove: 177).

On 30 April 1947, the MSC issued a report to the Security Council outlining both the agreements and disagreements between the permanent members of the MSC. On 10 August 1947, the MSC ceased debate about Article 43, and on 2 July 1948, a statement was issued to the Security Council indicating that no further agreement seemed likely (U.S. DOD 1: 5). The MSC was deadlocked. It has not produced a significant report to the Security Council since 1947. The MSC continues to meet briefly (a matter of minutes) every other week, deciding only the time schedule and agenda for its next session.

The inability of the MSC to perform its role of providing strategic direction to military forces did not deter the use of military force by the UN. Consequently, the lack of a central body to create strategy led to numerous adaptations within the UN organizational structure. It ultimately empowered the UN Secretary-General to devise his own apparatus to organize and control the use of military resources contributed to the UN.

BIRTH OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

At present, the UN lacks independent sources of information: its means of obtaining up-to-date information are primitive by comparison with those of states-indeed of most transnational corporations (UN m: 6).

Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and all five of his predecessors, have written extensively about the need to improve the capacity of the UN to gather and analyze information for the purpose of decisionmaking. UN decisionmaking encompasses both the identification of a crisis (and responding to it) and the creation of policy to improve the relationship of member-states within the international community (Kaufmann: 16). If information presented to the UN indicates a threat to international peace, the UN may decide to address that threat directly — increasing the demand for information in order to assess the seriousness of the threat and to formulate a response to resolve it. Information, in the context of the UN, as with information associated with the U.S. political system, is an indispensable asset-it is literally the conduit for power and influence.

The control of information, and the quest to improve the ability of the UN to gather information, led to organizational changes — especially in the Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary-General. These changes were made largely in response to the political climate of the Cold War and overt attempts by the Secretary-General to assert an executive role in international peacekeeping. The Secretary-General's reforms are an attempt to create a flow of strategic intelligence to support the concept of “early warning," simultaneously enhancing the power of the Secretary-General and the potential responsiveness of the Security Council.

Information about foreign countries, analyzed for the purpose of forming strategy, policy, or military plans, is the very definition of strategic intelligence in its basic form (U.S. DoD a: 8). Ironically, the term intelligence is nearly forbidden in context with UN operations. Many contend that the UN by design has no enemies and, therefore, has no need to collect intelligence against identified or potential adversaries. However, this narrow view of strategic intelligence is clouded in semantics. No one would claim, when the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research provides assessments on foreign countries to the Secretary of State, that it is not providing strategic intelligence. The UN, in contrast,

2 In this context information control is the ability of the Secretary-General to hold back or emphasize information for political reasons. This control is afforded to the Secretary-General by nature of his position as head of the Secretariat. This is analogous to the control of information afforded Cabinet heads and senior members of the White House Staff. They inherently have the power to hold back or emphasize information going to the President of the United States.