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turn had been taken from Senator Snowe's bill, and on language contained in the final Senate version of the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act, which had been amended by the Helms-Kerry amendment. The requirement that U.S. interests be deemed vital national security interests, which had been included in Senator Snowe's bill, was not included in the conference report. However, the waiver provision in the conference report did require that a waiver be made by the President for each instance such information was provided to the UN or for each document provided, as had been required in the earlier, more restrictive bills. The reporting requirement adopted by the conference report, which called for quarterly reports from the President to various Congressional Committees on the type, volume. and purposes of intelligence provided to the UN, was drawn from the two earlier, more restrictive bills rather than from the Helms-Kerry compromise amendment, which had contained a semi-annual reporting requirement. The requirement for an annex containing a counterintelligence and security assessment of the risks involved in providing intelligence to the UN was a new requirement.

On 12 March the House agreed to the conference report, and the report was subsequently agreed to by the Senate on 28 March. On 5 April, the bill was presented to the President, who vetoed the measure. The House failed to override the President's veto by a vote of 234-188.

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, H.R. 3259, was introduced in the House on 17 April 1996. On 22 May, Representative Sam Brownback (R-KS) introduced an amendment to the bill which would have restricted intelligence sharing with the United Nations. Representative Brownback's proposed amendment was identical to language contained in the final version of the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act that had been vetoed by President Clinton (H.R. 3259 Introduced).

The proposed amendment generated considerable debate on the House floor and was opposed by Representative Norm Dicks, (D-WA). Representative Dicks, in opposing the proposed amendment, stated that it would place:

new unworkable restrictions on the U.S. sharing information with the UN-even when it is in the national interest to do so. It would make it extremely difficult to provide intelligence support to these UN activities which are supportive of U.S. foreign policy goals.

The administration is opposed to the Brownback amendment. This amendment is identical to language contained in the conference report on the American Overseas Interests Act, which was vetoed by the President. As the President noted in his veto message, this amendment would unconstitutionally infringe on the President's power to conduct diplomatic relations and limit presidential control over the use of state secrets (H.R. 3259 Introduced).

Representative Dicks continued that the waiver process outlined in the amendment was too cumbersome to be practical, and that the amendment, like original versions of both the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act and the Contract With America, did not allow the President to delegate any provisions of the amendment. He concluded by stating that while he did not believe legislation to restrict the ability of the President to share intelligence with the UN was necessary, provisions regarding intelligence sharing with the UN contained in the Helms-Kerry amendment were certainly preferable to the amendment proposed by Representative Brownback.

Representative Combest (R-TX) spoke next, noting that while he agreed with the intent of Representative Brownback, he was concerned that the proposed amendment could prevent the timely sharing of intelligence with UN commands where U.S. troops were assigned and might, therefore, endanger American lives. He then proposed an amendment to the Brownback amendment. His proposal, identical to the Helms-Kerry amendment, passed on a voice vote and was incorporated into the bill. The bill passed the House on 22 May 1996 and was placed on the Senate calendar on 23 May 1996. As of August 1996, there had been no Senate action on the House bill (H.R. 3259 Introduced).

As the executive branch has continued to move forward with initiatives to expand intelligence sharing with the UN in support of peace operations, the Congress has become increasingly assertive on the issue, as evidenced by the evolution of congressionally sponsored legislation to restrict the ability of the executive to share intelligence with the UN from single-issue bills with little chance of passage, to provisions now included in major legislation.

Executive reaction to such Congressional legislative initiatives moved from simply ignoring such initiatives to active opposition and presidential vetoes. Following the intelligence breach in Somalia, the issue has become

so politicized that it is now impossible to achieve any bipartisan consensus for the administration's position. The administration has abandoned any attempt to articulate its position and simply uses the veto to protect intelligence sharing with the UN.

THE CONGRESSIONAL

EXECUTIVE STALEMATE

AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The constitutional tension between the Congress and the executive over foreign policy has become reinvigorated following the end of the Cold War. The re-emergence of this friction has in large measure been driven by the disappearance of the strategic threat posed by the Soviet Union. Congress has generally been willing to defer to the President on foreign policy issues which involve a strategic threat to the U.S. During the Cold War a wide range of foreign policy issues were affected by the strategic threat from the Soviet Union. This enhanced the power of the executive relative to the Congress and tended to mute partisan debate over foreign policy issues.

For its part, the administration is frustrated with the constraints imposed on intelligence sharing by the current narrowly defined and restrictive concept of operations process. The administration would like to significantly expand intelligence sharing with the UN, not only to help ensure the success of peace operations, but as a means to influence the UN on a variety of issues. There is a recognition within the administration, however, that relations with the Congress on the issue have deteriorated to the point that a formal declaration of such a policy shift is impossible.

The problem for the Congress is that as a political issue, intelligence sharing with the UN is minor, obscure and generates little public interest. Therefore, despite congressional attempts to insert restrictive language into major legislation, the President's threats of veto remain effective, for the Congress does not want to be seen delaying important legislation for what is viewed by the public as a minor issue. However, the resulting congressional and public furor over any future compromise of intelligence in a UN setting could make even the administration's veto threats ineffective in stopping future legislation to restrict intelligence sharing with the UN.

Chapter 8

FUTURE ISSUES

The prospects for the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the potential role for intelligence in support of that objective, depend on the nature of the UN as an international organization of nation states. The tension between the quest for collective security and the interests of states remains. The end of the global confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR facilitated UN decisionmaking and made action possible but did not greatly alter the configuration of physical or political power in international relations. The future of peace operations and the role of intelligence in a UN context have changed significantly, but the conflict between national interest and multilateral process continues.

Major Crone analyzes the UN Charter as a basis for the expanded use of force in UN peace operations. He sees a post-Cold War change in the UN's responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and in any sovereign state's capability and right to use force. Analyzing BoutrosGhali's definitions of peacekeeping in terms of the UN Charter, Crone finds support for these concepts. The end of superpower paralysis has allowed the UN to assert authority to intervene for humanitarian purposes. However, the Charter also recognizes the state's right to self-defense and prohibits the UN from intervening in domestic affairs. Post-Cold War euphoria prompted UN activism, but results have been mixed. When the UN has used force in the context of civil wars, the power of nationalism has prevailed.

Margaret Mitchell employed a case studies approach to the problem of using UN peacekeepers for humanitarian intervention, looking at UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia, UNOSOM in Somalia, and UNAMIR in Rwanda. Impartiality is necessary for peacekeeping but cannot be maintained when the peacekeepers use force. Neutrality is the first

casualty in a humanitarian intervention, and the UN becomes part of the problem. She concludes that humanitarian crises which require use of an external military force are man-made and cannot be solved by providing humanitarian aid.

Intelligence in a UN context contains inherent opportunities and risks. Lieutenant Commander Quigley shows how intelligence assets may be applied to enforcement of international environmental law. The intelligence tool can become a deterrent on behalf of an international legal regime, but at some cost: some resources are no longer dedicated to the supporting country's defense. Captain Hudgins looks at the weakness of the IAEA safeguards regime and the counterintelligence risk of relationships between the IAEA and intelligence. Iraq and North Korea were successes, but the next generation of proliferators have been put on notice. Intelligence sharing with the IAEA is useful, necessary, and difficult. It should be a component of the U.S. intelligence role in nonproliferation but should not replace a unilateral capability. Lieutenant Allen cautions that it is unrealistic to expect U.S. intelligence provided to the Security Council or to the UN bureaucracy to outweigh the political pressure to approve UN missions with flawed mandates. Even so, the U.S. and other members of the Security Council should employ their national intelligence agencies to assess the prospects for a proposed UN operation and vote against those with little chance for success.

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