Research Section of the Disarmament Division, the Space Applications Information and Research Section The functions of the Information and Research Section illustrate how pervasive the Secretary-General considered his political involvement in the actions of the Security Council. ... [C]ollects relevant information concerning disarmament . . . Pre- The Information and Research Section remained under the Director of the Political Affairs Division until 1974. On 1 August 1974, SecretaryGeneral Kurt Waldheim moved it into the Office of the Under-SecretaryGeneral and later, in 1975, merged it with the Unit for Coordination (UNSec f). Each successive reorganization brought the unit closer to the personal control of the Secretary-General's office. The Space Applications Section of the Outer Space Division illustrates how concerned the UN Secretary-General was about the technical collection of information. The primary function of the section was to assess the use of space for peaceful means and to coordinate the activities of the growing U.S. and USSR space programs. However, the official description of the section's function specifically uses terms that refer to the gathering of information from space platforms. It states: [The Space Application Section] gathers information and compiles reports as required on the current state of space technology in the survey of earth resources by satellite, monitoring and control of the environment, space communications, education and training in the practical applications of space technology and possible future developments in space technology in general (UNSec c: 5). Both the Information and Research Unit and the Space Applications Section were small, poorly staffed offices, but their development demonstrates how the Office of the Secretary-General-originating with Dag Hammarskjold-used its authority to reshape the Secretariat. They established organizational precedent for later reforms designated to eventually create an information network. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar pushed this concept to its political limits with the creation of the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI). Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Windhoek, Namibia, July 1989, on a tour of The Office for Research and the Collection of Information UN photo by M. Grant On 1 March 1987, ORCI was established. It consisted of three major subordinate units: a Planning and Early Warning section, a News Distribution Section, and a Drafting Service (UNSec h: 1-2). The Assistant Secretary-General for ORCI, in contrast to the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, reported directly to the UN Secretary-General with no formal relationship to the Security Council. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar wanted a separation between the Security Council's role of addressing threats to the peace and the Secretary-General's role of predicting (or preventing) threats to peace (Rivlin and Gordenker: 274-275). Additionally, he wanted to underscore the importance of early warning in the pursuit of preventive diplomacy (which he perceived as his primary function under the authority given to him by Article 99 of the Charter). This is clearly demonstrated within the official description of some of ORCI's primary functions: ■To assess global trends. To provide early warning of developing situations requiring the [To identify and coordinate] research on the issues on which long- responsibilities of the Secretary-General under the Charter of the [To provide] substantive advice, in conjunction with other The capability of ORCI to perform these functions was severely limited by the political realities associated with the UN. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar was frustrated by the complexities of Cold War politics and the often strong opposition to his concept of executive authority over UN operations. He also was hindered by the bureaucratic difficulties associated with funding his proposals and organizational changes. The Secretary-General has the authority to make organizational changes, but if they require additional funding they must be approved by the General Assembly - a daunting task in light of the UN's poor financial condition. ORCI was not exempt from these realities. It was largely understaffed, had little automation support, and did not have the ability to "electronically connect" to outside information agencies as intended (Rivlin and Gordenker: 275). The development of ORCI was an attempt at creating a "global watch" under the direct control of the Secretary-General. It was intended to be an organization that would systematically address the concept of early warning and solidify the role of the Secretary-General under Article 99 of the Charter (Simma: 1046). Although short-lived (five years), it did forge the infrastructure for later reforms by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Both Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar and the incoming Boutros-Ghali, in light of the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, envisioned an "unchained" United Nations. With the vision and leadership of the Secretary-General, it would have the ability to address global issues in their infancy. Ironically, the post-Cold War world presented a host of complex problems that were exacerbated by the inability of the UN to implement its new-found freedom of action. Again, reform to enhance the capabilities of the Secretary-General was the first step taken to address the post-Cold War world and its challenges. And again, the focus of the reform was to create an information architecture to support strategic decisionmaking by the Secretary-General. BOUTROS-GHALI'S REFORMS: AN AGENDA FOR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS Concurrent with the end of the Cold War was a rise in expectations that the United Nations would be the focal point for solving international disputes. This expectation was reinforced by President George Bush prior to the Persian Gulf War, and the term "New World Order" became synonymous with it (Bush f: 2). In light of the "New World Order," the UN Security Council, pressured by the superpowers, asked the Secretary-General to address the changes required to enhance the capability of the UNespecially the UN's role in conflict prevention. Secretary-General BoutrosGhali responded by producing An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali b). An Agenda for Peace outlines the concepts and reforms required to bring the capabilities of the UN in line with its expanded role. The reforms he suggests, along with subsequent documents on UN reform, encompass nearly every aspect of the UN. However, the importance placed on the early detection of international crises is frequently underscored. For example, the first "aim" listed in An Agenda for Peace is “To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results" (UNGA A/47/277: 4). In 1945, the Secretariat had 2,450 employees. Today the Secretary-General has authority over approximately 10,000 employees dispersed around the world (Rivlin and Gordenker: 46). Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in March 1992, announced widespread organizational reform in the Secretariat. He reduced the number of Under-Secretaries-General from 16 to 8. He also decentralized the control of many functions that previously fell under the Office of the Secretary-General. His intent was to streamline the Secretariat by reducing redundancy. At the same time, he retained a large degree of control by assuming direct supervision over the Under-SecretariesGeneral - placing himself in a role similar to a Chief Executive Officer. The most significant reforms relevant to this study are the creation of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). DPA incorporated ORCI as well as other political bodies, including the Department for Disarmament Affairs. DPKO was created from the former Office of Special Political Affairs and then greatly expanded to facilitate |