■ Prepare the detailed requirements of new peacekeeping operations encompassing timetables, troop contributions, civilian police, personnel and logistics in close cooperation with the Field

Administrative and Logistic Division;

■ Prepare comprehensive operational plans for new peacekeeping operations and other field missions and, as required, revise and modify plans for current operations and ensure effective implementation (UNSec e: 7).

The information and staff support required to perform these tasks for complex peacekeeping operations such as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) far exceed the capacity of the Mission Planning Service. In these complex operations, the role of the Mission Planning Service is reduced to reviewing proposed operational plans (created by the U.S. in the case of UNOSOM) called "Option Papers." Often a member-state's option paper will be modified by the Mission Planning Service, briefed to the Under-Secretary-General, and eventually become a UN option paper for review and use by the UN Secretary-General. However, for less complex or less publicized UN peacekeeping contingency plans, the Mission Planning Service plays a greater role. For example, the Mission Planning Service created a contingency plan involving the deployment of UN personnel to Burundi to provide humanitarian relief. The contingency plan was created despite the fact that the Security Council did not issue a resolution addressing the crisis in Burundi. Members of the Mission Planning Service, in conjunction with other departments, deployed to Burundi on a "fact-finding" mission for the purpose of gathering relevant planning information. Assisting in fact-finding is a key responsibility of the Mission Planning Service and is an integral part of the information-gathering capability of the Secretary-General.

Information and Research Unit (DPKO)

The Information and Research Unit is not found on the official organizational charts produced by the Secretariat but is an essential component of DPKO operations. It is subordinate to the Situation Center and reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General. It serves as the focal point for information coming from the operational level (ongoing UN field operations) to the strategic decisionmaking level of the Secretariat.5 The Information and Research Unit is staffed mainly by military personnel and is

largely a product of U.S. recommendations and donations (including funding or providing personnel and equipment). The assigned functions of the unit illustrate the involvement of the Secretary-General in the planning and execution of peacekeeping operations. They also illustrate where and how operational-level information is transferred into UN strategic-level information. Some of these functions are listed below:

Maintain background country files and mission area files to support information requirements of the DPKO Planning Staffs and other analysts. Maintain a basic map and reference library;

Acquire background military, political and technical information to support the requirements of Field Missions and the DPKO Planning Teams;

Produce the "Daily In-Brief," an executive summary of Peacekeeping missions, related world events and [monitor elections] . . . [T]he "In Brief" looks at indicators of potential security threats to UN personnel and likely developing DPKO operations;

Put together the "Daily Information Digest." This is a combination of
Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) material,
Control Risks Assessments, Foreign Language Broadcasts (FBIS),
Internet material, NATO open material, and analytical papers. This is
circulated to Desk Officers in DPA, DPKO, DHA, and various
planning teams;

Write the "Secretary-General's Weekly Report on Peacekeeping."
This is a series of key events in each peacekeeping mission and
estimate of future intentions (UNSec d).

DPKO, more than any other department in the Secretariat, is concerned with the operational level of information collection, analysis, and dissemination. The operational information is transformed into numerous products used to evaluate past and current operations, plan future operations, create UN peacekeeping policy, and provide early warning to the Secretary-General for the purpose of decisionmaking. DPKO is the transition point between operational information and strategic information. It is also a conduit between UN decisionmakers and the UN operational command authority, if authorized by the Security Council.

5

The strategic-level decisionmakers of the UN are the heads of the major departments, normally Under-Secretaries-Generals, and of course the UN Secretary-General.

Boutros-Ghali's attempts at enhancing the UN's capability to conduct Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Deployment were the catalyst for organizational reforms in the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). DHA was established in April 1991 and has continued to evolve and grow organizationally, technologically, and in status relative to the other departments. DHA is led by an Under-Secretary-General and further divided into two separate offices (located in New York and Geneva), each under the control of an Assistant Secretary-General (UNSec e). The role of DHA, according to the Secretary-General, is "to facilitate a coordinated and effective response by the United Nations, and the system as a whole, to emergencies, including complex emergencies involving political, military, humanitarian and other dimensions, as well as natural and man-made disasters" (UNGA A/49/336: 20). Historically, humanitarian relief functions were organized by the UN office in Geneva due to its proximity to the International Committee of the Red Cross and major European non-governmental organizations. But the increase in dynamic humanitarian operations, involving significant military resources for logistics and security, has heightened the scope and political sensitivity of humanitarian relief. In

response, the Secretary-General expanded the New York office to manage the information requirements, political policy analysis and mission planning, and coordination of these sensitive and complex operations.

An important element of the DHA operation is information collection and analysis, especially for the purpose of early warning. The early warning concept grew out of the Secretary-General's desire to rapidly respond to humanitarian emergencies. Here again the organizational reforms are based upon the Secretary-General's desire to gain information for the purpose of exercising his implied power under Article 99 of the Charter. In fact, the majority of reforms in DHA, especially those enacted after the creation of UNOSOM, are associated with information gathering and analysis. A statement by the Secretary-General pertaining to UN reforms in 1995 highlights the major changes in this area:

Recently, the internal structure of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs has been further reviewed in the light of experience, and its capability for responding to complex emergencies was consolidated into a single, unified desk structure under a Complex Emergency Branch in New York. That structure is intended to ensure clear lines of responsibility and accountability for addressing incipient and ongoing emergencies, on a country-by-country basis. It is also intended to enhance the Department's capacity to receive, analyze and act on early warning information, to advise the Under-Secretary-General and the Secretary-General on appropriate responses . [A] capacity in those areas will also be

maintained in the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNGA A/49/ 336: 22).

The information required for the Secretary-General to promote, plan, and coordinate a rapid and dynamic response to humanitarian disasters led to the creation of the Complex Emergency Division and the Early Warning Cell of the Policy Analysis Branch.

Complex Emergency Division (DHA)

The Complex Emergency Branch configuration is similar to the “desk officer" concept found in the DHA. It consists of four regional desks or sections (two oriented on Africa; one for the Middle East; and one encompassing Asia, Europe, and Latin America). Each has the responsibility for

monitoring and analyzing the humanitarian condition, preparing status reports, and providing advice about their respective regions through the Assistant Secretary-General to the Under-Secretary-General. In addition, the Division contains a Rapid Response Unit for conducting and coordinating the planning efforts of DHA, once a humanitarian crisis has been identified. The Rapid Response Unit is also incorporated into the Secretary-General's fact-finding deployments for the purpose of conducting onsite assessments. The Complex Emergency Division is an integral part of the UN Secretariat's information architecture. It is set up to monitor humanitarian concerns on a regional basis and provide information through the Under-Secretary-General to the UN Secretary-General.

Early Warning Cell (DHA)

Currently, DHA is the only department with a subordinate element whose sole function is early warning. The Early Warning Cell is subordinate to the Policy Analysis Branch and is located in the New York Office. The location and organizational subordination of the Early Warning Cell have been in a constant state of flux since it was created in 1994. The function of the Early Warning Cell indicates that it should be closely tied, if not subordinate to, the Rapid Response Unit in the Complex Emergency Division. However, because of unclear political circumstances, the cell falls under the control of the Policy Analysis Branch.

The Early Warning Cell and its functions will be discussed in detail because, more than any other component of the UN, it is associated with the tasks of a formal intelligence organization. Although the Early Warning Cell is a newly developing organization and is understaffed, it clearly represents the trend to create (through reforms in the Secretariat) an information collection system that is not subject to the control of a member state. The intent is to collect information specifically to provide advanced warning of developing crises and to make strategic-level decisions concerning those crises. The creation of the Early Warning Cell and its specified functions represent that intent. The primary tasks of the Early Warning Cell are summarized below:

Manage the overall Humanitarian Early Warning System.

■ Develop indicators of humanitarian crisis.

Develop and manage a data base of information (both statistical and textual) oriented on the indicators of humanitarian crisis.