statements and where the teams are located on a coordination flow chart, it is possible to speculate on distinguishing factors.

Fact-finding (and Preparatory Fact-Finding) Teams

Fact-finding is often the first active measure taken by the UN to verify reports of events that threaten peace and security. The initial reports of these events come from an almost unending list of sources. The most common are: public news media, Non-Governmental Organization reports, diplomatic reports from member-states, UN field offices, and member-states who are interested in the dispute. The information is processed through the many offices throughout the Secretariat that have a role in analysis and early warning. Subsequently, a decision is made to investigate the reports (by the Security Council, General Assembly, or the Secretary-General), and a fact-finding mission is deployed. The previously mentioned fact-finding mission to the Republic of Georgia in 1993 and to Burundi in 1994 had the following mission statements:

(Republic of Georgia)

Investigate reports of human rights violations and ethnic cleansing. Make recommendations for the viability of future UN involvement to restore civil peace and security (UNSC S/26795: 2).

(Burundi)

Investigate the coup d'etat and the massacres of October 1993. ■Consider, in concert with the Burundi Government, what activities future missions or an expanded United Nations political presence could undertake in order to encourage a return to civil peace (UNSC S/1995/157: 4).

In both cases, the information requirements are oriented toward the verifying incidents for the purpose of making decisions about possible UN action.

Assessment and Survey Teams

The Interagency Assessment Teams, Initial Survey Teams, and Technical Survey Teams are centered around collecting information for the purpose of planning UN field operations. Examining the mission requirements and composition of these teams is difficult because the documentation

surrounding their mission preparation and findings is considered confidential in nature and classified UN Restricted. The survey teams, like the factfinding teams, consist of both policy analysts and planning personnel. For example, a team might consist of a member of DPKO's mission planning service to gather information about airstrip conditions, a member of DPA's Policy Analysis Unit for the purpose of constructing profiles of key political figures, and a member of DHA's Rapid Response Team to conduct an assessment of food and supplies needed for life-sustaining relief. Again, like the fact-finding teams, there is no standard structure or information requirements. The mission and composition of the teams are tailored to the specific situation and the resources available to the UN.

Summary

Regardless of who initiates the fact-finding process or whether it is conducted by a special representative or a composite team, one of its primary purposes is to collect information. The Secretary-General, normally through DPA, controls the mission and the information it produces. The information collected is normally classified UN Restricted, but it is incorporated into the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. The fact-finding missions, in conjunction with special representatives, give the Secretary-General a comprehensive information collection capability. They are truly the eyes and ears of the Secretary-General and contribute greatly to the Secretary-General's overall efforts to conduct early warning.

EARLY WARNING

Former director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Robert Gates stated that the U.S. Intelligence Community's most important role is to provide "warning." He defined warning as "a process of communicating judgments about threats to U.S. Security or policy interests to decisionmakers." He elaborated by stating: "[the warning] must be received and understood in order for leaders to take action that can deter, defuse, or address the threat, and minimize the damage to U.S. interests" (McCarthy: 5). Comparing this description of "warning" with the following statement by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali highlights the importance of understanding the UN's concept of early warning.

[T]he United Nations system has been developing a valuable network of Early Warning Systems concerning environmental threats,

the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movement of populations, the threat of famine, and the spread of disease. There is a need, however, to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyze what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it (UNGA A/47/277: 8).

Clearly there are common themes present in the two descriptions. Both underscore that the collection and analysis of information must be coordinated with (or synthesized into) a decisionmaking process in order to be effective. Both are oriented toward strategic-level decisions and actions— one concerning threats to U.S. interests, and the other threats to international peace (which can be considered a UN interest). The primary difference between the descriptions is that one addresses the intelligence community of a sovereign state and the other, the UN, repudiates the concept of intelligence collection.

THE EARLY WARNING CELL

The UN's concept of early warning, and its link to successful preventive diplomacy, has a long historical development. SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjold promoted the concept in the early 1950s; Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar continued its advancement and, in 1987, created ORCI to conduct early warning. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali champions the cause by reforming the Secretariat in accordance with An Agenda for Peace.

Boutros-Ghali has recently improved early warning. In 1992, he designated DHA as the focal point of the collection, analysis, and dissemination of early warning information. Specifically, he assigned the DHA's New York office to closely monitor crisis developments and “act on early warning information" (UNGA A/47/594: 18). In 1994 Boutros-Ghali, in Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations, declared the existence of the Early Warning Cell in DHA (UNGA A/49/177: 6). The Early Warning Cell's mission is to manage the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) and to integrate it into an overall UN Early Warning System. The intended role and functions of the Early Warning Cell are nearly indistinguishable from those of some U.S. intelligence organizations. HEWS is a system that involves

collecting information, managing that information in a database, analyzing information (trend evaluation), and creating products for planning and decisionmaking.

SUMMARY

Within the United Nations Secretariat there is a quasi-intelligence architecture supporting the UN Secretary-General's role as a strategic decisionmaker. The intelligence architecture supports the decisionmaking cycle of the Secretary-General, who subsequently influences UN policy and the decisions made in the Security Council. The conceptual foundation of the intelligence architecture dates back to the origin of the UN Charter and has evolved continuously over the past 50 years. The primary factors influencing this development fall into four categories: the UN's organizational requirement for grand strategy; the failure of the Military Staff Committee to provide strategic direction to the Security Council; the expansion of the Secretary-General's implied executive authority under Article 99 of the UN Charter; and the concept of (and emphasis placed on) preventive diplomacy.

The drafters of the UN Charter created the Military Staff Committee to provide strategic direction to the Security Council. However, the MSC failed to produce strategy because it could not overcome the inhibiting effects of the Cold War on its collective decisionmaking methodology. The lack of a dedicated strategic decisionmaking body enabled the SecretaryGeneral to use his authority to create ad hoc organizations to influence the creation of UN policies and strategic decisions.

Cold War gridlock in the Security Council and the lack of strategic direction from the Military Staff Committee compelled the Secretary-General to seek to enhance powers implied in Article 99 of the UN Charter, in order to fill the strategic void. Article 99 simply allows the Secretary-General to personally inform the Security Council that there is a threat to the peace. However, by historical precedent, the Secretary-General's authority to address the Security Council has evolved into an implied power to monitor the international community, seek out the indications of potential crisis, and alert the Security Council that UN intervention is warranted. This implied power is closely linked to the Secretary-General's role of creating UN strategy and the concept of preventive diplomacy.

Preventive diplomacy has recently received renewed emphasis by the UN and many of its member-states (including the U.S.). However, it is not a new concept and has long been considered the ideal and most costeffective method of addressing international crises. Preventive diplomacy is dependent on forward-looking strategy, early warning of crisis, and rapid UN pre-crisis intervention. These elements directly involve the expanded role of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General has used his implied power under Article 99 of the Charter and his authority to reform the Secretariat to create an intelligence architecture to support strategic decisionmaking, early warning, and operational planning.

The intelligence architecture is intertwined in the bureaucracy of the UN Secretariat and consists of an analytical component and a collection component. The analytical component is located in the primary departments of the Secretariat structure. The Department for Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs all contain elements whose sole mission is analyzing information and producing assessments. The assessments are normally classified UN Restricted and are not disseminated for public use. The assessments are used for internal decisionmaking, and for operational and contingency planning.

The collection component of the intelligence architecture is housed in the concept of fact finding and early warning. The SecretaryGeneral's Special Representatives and ad hoc fact-finding teams are assigned the mission of collecting information for the SecretaryGeneral. The reports generated by these missions are initially classified UN Restricted and are used for internal coordination and decisionmaking. Eventually they are summarized and presented to the Security Council as official UN documents.

The intelligence architecture of the UN has developed over a long period and is not a formal organizational body. It is an ad hoc structure that is evolving in conjunction with the political climate of the international community, the personality of the Secretary-General, and the impact of the organizational inertia of the Secretariat. Further research is required to fully understand the structure of the intelligence architecture and its relationship to the decisionmaking cycle of the Secretary-General and the Security Council.