were the same, and on the other hand, before treating with Bazaine, a Bazaine, a "manifestation was demanded from him and his army in favour of the Empress-Regent; that is to say, they imposed civil war along with a shameful peace. A restoration attempted under such conditions would have been sheer madness.

The Empress and M. Rouher, who was her adviser, thought, however, that they ought to make a last effort. On October 20th (?), a private friend of M. Rouher's, a former sub-prefect under the Empire, M. Théophile Gautier, the younger, left London with instructions to see Prince Bismarck and to treat with him, in the name of the Regent, as to the conditions of peace. M. Th. Gautier, furnished with a letter for King William from the Empress, was received by Prince Bismarck, on October 24th. There were two interviews. The conversation opened by an examination of the eventual part to be played by the army of Bazaine in the conclusion of peace and restoration of the Empire. Prince Bismarck once again drew attention to the fact, that Germany had not received and could not receive any guarantee for the fidelity with which Bazaine and his army would hold to their engagements: there was therefore nothing to be done. Nevertheless, M. Rouher's envoy proposed, according to his instructions, certain conditions of peace; he spoke of the neutralisation of Alsace, an indemnity of two milliards, and the cession of Cochin China. Prince Bismarck protested :-" If the King and I were to return to Berlin without bringing back Alsace, we should be received with a shower of stones." He alluded in the same terms to a cession of part of Lorraine. It was now October 26th.

On October 27th the news of the capitulation of the army of Metz was received at Versailles in the course of the night. The envoy sent by the Empress and M. Rouher, ends his story with this sad reminiscence, and adds:-"Nothing was left for me but to withdraw." 1

The army of Bazaine, not having "made the manifestation,"-these are Prince Bismarck's own words, had not been able to conclude a peace; and had no issue but capitulation."

On a review of this evidence, the concentration of facts is so exact that it leaves little room for doubt henceforth."

Bazaine did subordinate military considerations to political considerations, the offence with which he was reproached in the indictment of General Pourcet. Brought up in Algerian offices, having spent several years of his youth in Spain, and played a considerable political part in Mexico, he had adopted a habit of conducting combats and negotiations simultaneously.

A man of no vulgar, but complex, mind, self

1 Th. Gautier fils, Une visite au comte de Bismarck en Octobre 1870.-Revue de Paris, August 15, 1903.

* See the letters of the Emperor William and Prince Bismarck read by Me Lachaud, Compte rendu, p. 616.

* Do we not find something like a confession in the very vague explanation given by Marshal Bazaine to the municipal council of Metz when he imparted to them the necessity under which he was placed of capitulating? "General Coffinières has been invited to give the municipal council the necessary explanations, so that the town may be in possession of the negotiations, whose aim has always been to improve the serious condition in which the country is placed, an aim which, unfortunately, we have not been able to attain."-Publication du Conseil Municipal, p. 213.

centred and cautious, fatalist and obscure, without frankness, and without personal authority, he had faith neither in his army, nor in his own military proficiency, nor in victory. He had recourse to procedures in which he believed himself to be a past master. His calculations came into collision with shrewder and deeper designs.

His mistake sacrificed the finest army of France, decided the fate of a province and the destiny of the country. He would have been wiser, more skilful, more honourable, if he had confined himself strictly to his duty as a soldier.

CHAPTER VIII

ARMED PEACE AND THE INTERNATIONAL KULTURKAMPF.

I.-Europe and the new German Empire-Prince Bismarck and French domestic politics-The "armed peace system-The " Kulturkampf" and German unity-Germany and the "white policy."

II.-Emperor William at St. Petersburg-The Czar at ViennaVictor-Emmanuel at Vienna and Berlin-Germany and the monarchical campaign-William I at Vienna.

III.--The Duc Decazes, Minister of Foreign Affairs-Rome and the International Kulturkampf-Incident of the Episcopal mandates-A war feared-German military septennate— Reichstag elections in Alsace-Lorraine--Protest against annexation.

IV.-New apprehensions caused by German armaments-Spanish affairs-The Emperor of Austria at St. Petersburg -Europe and the "armed peace" system.

V. Accession of the Disraeli Cabinet-A change in British policy-The Czar's travels in Europe-Germany and the Eastern question-Prince Hohenlohe an ambassador in Paris-The European situation in May 1874.

VI.-Inauguration of a "world policy "-Russia in Central Asia-Annam and Tonkin incidents-Chinese affairs-The Ashantee war-Great Britain and the Suez Canal-Great international works.

I

HE years 1873, 1874, and 1875 were a time of

Europe became transformed; at home, the masses superseded the classes; abroad, area superseded nationalities. Great empires, only recently con

stituted, added up their forces and armed themselves for a powerful defensive and distant adventures. European peace, caparisoned with iron, prepared for the conquest of the world. Such a peace is heavy and onerous, slow to establish and violent at its very birth. The anxious period when it was founded was the time when France was labouring to produce its constitutional organisation. Universal attention was rivetted to the dramatic destiny of this country, in full travail, when it might have been supposed to be slumbering.

In Paris, a few statesmen, antagonistic successors though representatives of the past, last and still great descendants of great aristocrats, worked at transformations and liquidations with supple and dainty hands. Their transitory and transactional policy timidly sought to accommodate their ideas, principles, and prejudices, to new requirements; thus, in spite of themselves, they opened the road for the future. They were unpopular, both on account of their resistance and of their initiative. A sacrificed generation, doomed beforehand to contradictory insults; useful, useful, nevertheless, in its ephemeral anxiety and indecision.

Abroad, France, defeated, rent and weakened, had preserved its renown, if not its place among nations. Neither peoples nor governments had forgotten the services rendered or lost sight of those to come. Situated, as France is, at one end of Europe, such a counterweight could only be ignored if the whole extremity of the continent were to disappear. Besides, it is not in her nature to be forgotten; only barely recovered from her swoon, she was already watchful.

Things did not take place as in 1815; the victors