網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

tive for the return of any such specialists comes from the government of the DPRK. You should not display any initiative of your own in raising the issue of the evacuation of Soviet specialist before the Koreans do.

The return of the personnel of the Soviet organizations working in the DPRK to the Soviet Union should be done in the previously-established order, that is, via the MFA of the USSR upon consultations with appropriate ministries and organizations of the USSR.

You should inform the MFA of the USSR about each case of pending return of the Soviet specialists from Korea well in advance.

Army Groups' Commands failed to imple-
ment Kim Il Sung's order for the withdrawal
of troops northward, which allowed the U.S.
troops to cut them off and surround them.
Our Korean friends have no troops capable
of resistance in the vicinity of Seoul. Hence,
one needs to consider the way toward the
38th parallel wide open.

I think that if in the current situation you
consider it possible to send troops to assist
the Koreans, then you should move at least
five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at
once so as to give our Korean comrades an
opportunity to organize combat reserves
north of the 38th parallel under the cover of
your troops. The Chinese divisions could be
considered as volunteers, with Chinese in

A. Gromyko command at the head, of course.

[Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 123, 125]

Document 10: Ciphered Telegram,
Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and
Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950

Transmitted to Bulganin

On 1.X.50 [1 October 1950] at 3:00 a.m.

Ciphered Telegram

To BEIJING, SOVIET AMBASSADOR

(For immediate transmission to MAO ZEDONG and ZHOU ENLAI.)

I am far away from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from events in Korea. However, judging by the information that I have received from Moscow today, I see that the situation of our Korean friends is getting desperate.

It was on 16 September already that Moscow warned our Korean friends that the landing of the U.S. troops at Chemulp'o [Inchon] had great significance and was aimed at cutting off the First and Second Army Groups of the North Koreans from their rear in the North. Moscow admonished them to withdraw at least four divisions from the South immediately, to set up a frontline to the north and east of Seoul, and later to gradually pull out most of the troops fighting in the South northward, thereby providing for the defense of the 38th parallel. However, the 1 [First] and 2 [Second]

[blocks in formation]

We constantly point out to You the exceptional importance of the withdrawal of troops out of the encirclement. In this matter, the crucial point is to bring the manpower and commanding officers back to the north.

In the current situation, without delay you must give instructions to the soldiers and officers who are still fighting in the south to retreat by any means, in groups or person by person, to the north. There is no continuous frontline. These troops are fighting on their own territory, so the population feels compassion toward them and will help

[blocks in formation]

Document 12: Ciphered telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin], 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao to Stalin

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION
OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
SOVIET SOVIET ARMY

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov,
Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

From BEIJING Received 12:15
3.10.1950

TOP PRIORITY T

TO FILIPPOV [STALIN]

I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG to your [telegram] No. 4581:

"I received your telegram of 1.10.50 [1 October 1950]. We originally planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to re

treat.

In the second place, it is most likely that

[ocr errors][merged small]

this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large [kraine bol'shim].

Many comrades in the CC CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send out troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for

peaceful construction will be completely ru-
ined, and many people in the country will be
dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the
people by the war have not yet healed, we
need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience
now, refrain from advancing troops, [and]
actively prepare our forces, which will be
more advantageous at the time of war with
the enemy.

Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war.

We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is

[blocks in formation]

MAO TO STALIN, 2 OCTOBER 1950: THE RUSSIAN VERSION

[graphic]
[graphic]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

ДОНАДЫВАЮ Ответ НЛО ЦЗВ-ДУБА В Вал 4561

"Вана телеграмма от 1.10.50 г. получена, их пер воначально планировали двинуть несколько доброволь ческих дивизий в Северную Корею для оказания походк корейским товаришам, когда прогизних выступит совер– нее 38 параххехх.

Однако, тательно продумав считаем теперь, такого рода действия могут вызвать крайне серьёз последствка.

- Во-первых, несколькими динканями очень трудно разрепить корейский вопрос (оспаление наших в

ма слабое, нет уверенности з успехе военной

с американскими войсками); гротивних монет знаки
нас отступить.

Во-вторых, наиболее вероятно, что это вы
крытое столкновение США и Китая, вследствие чего
ветский Сока также может бы25 втянут в войну 1-1
ким образом вопрос стал бы крайне большим. -

Многие товариги В ДК КИ ОЧИТЕит, что здесь пе
обходимо проявить осторожность.

Конечно, не послать наши войска для оказания
моки — очень шохо для корейских товарищей;.
какая в настоящее время в телом затруднитель
жения, к мы сами весьма это переживаем
выдвинем несколько диакам

отступить у к тому же это вызове

YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU SHAOQI with me, which were reported at the time. In these conversations, it was noted by them that the people and the PLA [People's Liberation Army] are ready to help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to defeat the American troops, regarding them as weaker than the Japanese.

2. The Chinese government undoubtedly could send to Korea not only five-six battle ready divisions, but even more. It goes without saying that these Chinese troops are in need of some technical equipping in antitank weapons and to some extent in artillery.

The reasons for the changes in the position of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It is possible to suppose that it has been influenced by the international situation, the worsening of the position in Korea, [and] the intrigues of the Anglo-American bloc through [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward patience and abstention [from intervention] in order to avoid catastrophe.

No. 2270 3.10

ROSHCHIN

Dec[iphered by] Araushkin 12.50 3.10 [12.50 p.m. 3 October]

Typ[ed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10 [1.20 p.m. 3 October]

Typ[ed in] 10 copies [copies no.] 9-10 -(to file)

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov.]

Document 13: Letter, Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 8 [7] October 1950

PYONGYANG, To SHTYKOV for KIM IL SUNG

Comrade Kim Il Sung!

My reply has been delayed because of my consultations with the Chinese comrades, which took several days. On 1 Octo

ber, I sent a letter to Mao Zedong, inquiring whether he could dispatch to Korea immediately at least five or six divisions under the cover of which our Korean comrades could form reserve troops. Mao Zedong replied with a refusal, saying that he did not want to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese army was weak in technical terms, and that the war could cause great dissatisfaction [nedovol'stvo] in China. I replied to him by the following letter:

"I considered it possible to turn to You with the question of five-six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard or a bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan against China.

While raising before You the question of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered 5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, and I was proceeding from the following considerations of an international character:

1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war [k bol'shoi voine];

2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable of rendering military assistance to the Americans;

3) the USA will be compelled to yield in the Korean question to China behind which stands its ally, the USSR, and will have to agree to such terms of the settlement of the Korean question that would be favorable to Korea and that would not give the enemies a possibility to transform Korea into their springboard;

4) for the same reasons, the USA will not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to reject the idea of a separate peace with the Japanese reactionaries, as well as to abandon their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their springboard in the Far East.

In this regard, I proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if it were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy, and that without seri

ous struggle and an imposing display of force not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan which at present the United States clings to as its springboard not for Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], who has no chance to succeed, but for themselves or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

Of course, I took into account also [the possibility] that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of [considerations of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.

Such were the considerations and prospects of an international nature that I proceeded from when I was requesting a minimum of five-six divisions from You."

In response to this [letter], on October 7, I received letter from Mao on 7 September [sic-October], in which he expresses solidarity with the fundamental positions discussed in my letter and declares that he will dispatch to Korea nine, not six, divisions. But [he said] that he will send them not now, but after some time. He also requested that I receive his representatives and discuss some details of the mission with them. Of course, I agreed to receive his representatives and to discuss with them a detailed plan of military assistance to Korea.

It is obvious from the above mentioned that you must stand firm and fight for every tiny piece of your land, that You have to strengthen resistance to the American occupiers of Korea and prepare reserves, using for this purpose the military cadres of the Korean People's Army coming out from the encirclement. Also, this shows that You are absolutely right in your proposal that we transfer all Korean comrades studying in the USSR into the pilot training program.

[blocks in formation]

the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its conversion into its military-strategic springboard for further aggression in the Far East. In my opinion, the struggle of our people for its independence, freedom and state sovereignty will be protracted and very hard.

For a successful struggle against a strong enemy armed with the latest achievements of military science and technology we will have to train pilots, tankists, radio operators, and engineering officers urgently.

It is very difficult to train them inside our country. Therefore, we turn to You, comrade STALIN, with the following request:

1. To permit the training of 200-300 pilots from among Korean students studying in the Soviet Union.

2. To permit the training of 1,000 tankists, 2,000 pilots, 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering officers from among Soviet Koreans residing in the Soviet Union.

I ask You, comrade STALIN, to render us assistance in this regard.

[blocks in formation]

According to electronic intelligence data gathered by the Seventh Fleet, as of 8:00 a.m., 13 October, the following U.S. battleships were noticed in the vicinity of Ch'óngjin: USS "Missouri," three heavy aircraft carriers ("Valley Forge," "Leyte," "The Philippine Sea"), two escort aircraft carriers ("Sicily," "Beduin Strait"), three heavy cruisers ("Rochester," "Toledo," "Helena"), three cruisers ("Wooster," "Juno," "Ceylon"), twelve destroyers, the third

[blocks in formation]

In accordance with your directive dated 13.10.50I had a meeting with KIM IL SUNG.

PAK HÓN-YONG was present at the meeting. I read the text of your telegram to them. The content of the telegram caught KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YÓNG by surprise.

KIM IL SUNG stated that it was very hard for them [to accept Stalin's recommendation - AM], but since there is such advice they will fulfill it.

KIM IL SUNG asked me to read practical recommendations and ordered PAK HÓN-YÓNG to write them down. He also HÓN-YÓNG to write them down. He also asked us to help him develop a plan for measures related to this question.

No. 1476/sh

SHTYKOV

14 October 1950 Typed by Bantsekina on 10/14/50 at 13:30

p.m.

[Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, list 3]

Document 19: Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin), 14 October 1950, re Meeting with Mao Zedong

Ciphered Telegram # 25629

FROM: BEIJING

Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 01:38

a.m.

Deciphered by Yelezov on 10/14/50 at 02:00 a.m.

Typed by Rubleva on 10/14/50 at 03:20

a.m.

Cabled by VTCH to the South for Stalin
Distribution list - 9 copies: Stalin - 2,
Molotov -1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1,
Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin -
1, 8MDGS-1.
PRIORITY T

To FILIPPOV [STALIN]

In addition to my No. 2406 (incoming No. 25612), Mao Zedong went on to say:

Our leading comrades believe that if the U.S. troops advance up to the border of China, then Korea will become a dark spot for us [the Chinese - AM] and the Northeast will be faced with constant menace.

Past hesitations by our comrades occurred because questions about the international situation, questions about the Soviet assistance to us, and questions about air cover were not clear to them. At present, all these questions have been clarified.

Mao Zedong pointed out that now it is advantageous for them to dispatch the Chinese troops into Korea. The Chinese have the absolute obligation to send troops to Korea.

At this point, they are sending the first echelon composed of nine divisions. Although it is poorly armed, it will be able to fight against the troops of Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chinese comrades will have to prepare the second echelon.

The main thing that we need, says Mao Zedong, is air power which shall provide us with air cover. We hope to see its arrival as soon as possible, but not later than in two

« 上一頁繼續 »