« 上一頁繼續 »
YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and]LIU ber, I sent a letter to Mao Zedong, inquiring ous struggle and an imposing display of SHAOQI with me, which were reported at whether he could dispatch to Korea immedi- force not only would China fail to obtain all the time. In these conversations, it was ately at least five or six divisions under the these concessions but it would not be able to noted by them that the people and the PLA cover of which our Korean comrades could get back even Taiwan which at present the [People's Liberation Army) are ready to form reserve troops. Mao Zedong replied United States clings to as its springboard not help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of with a refusal, saying that he did not want to for Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek], who has the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese no chance to succeed, but for themselves or defeat the American troops, regarding them army was weak in technical terms, and that for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow. as weaker than the Japanese.
the war could cause great dissatisfaction Of course, I took into account also (the 2. The Chinese government undoubt- (nedovol’stvo] in China. I replied to him by possibility] that the USA, despite its edly could send to Korea not only five-six the following letter:
unreadiness for a big war, could still be battle ready divisions, but even more. It
drawn into a big war out of [considerations goes without saying that these Chinese troops “I considered it possible to turn to You of] prestige, which in turn, would drag China are in need of some technical equipping in with the question of five-six Chinese volun- into the war, and along with this draw into antitank weapons and to some extent in teer divisions because I was well aware of a the war the USSR, which is bound with artillery.
number of statements made by the leading China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should The reasons for the changes in the posi- Chinese comrades regarding their readiness we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, tion of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It to move several armies in support of the because together we will be stronger than the is possible to suppose that it has been influ- Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross USA and England, while the other European enced by the international situation, the wors- the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness capitalist states (with the exception of Gerening of the position in Korea, (and) the of the Chinese comrades to send troops to many which is unable to provide any assisintrigues of the Anglo-American bloc Korea by the fact that China was interested tance to the United States now) do not present through (Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] in preventing the danger of the transforma- serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward tion of Korea into a USA springboard or a then let it be waged now, and not in a few patience and abstention [from intervention] bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan years when Japanese militarism will be rein order to avoid catastrophe. against China.
stored as an ally of the USA and when the ROSHCHIN
While raising before You the question USA and Japan will have a ready-made
of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered bridgehead on the continent in a form of the No. 2270 3.10
5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.
considerations of an international character: pects of an international nature that I proDec[iphered by] Araushkin 12.50 3.10
1) the USA, as the Korean events ceeded from when I was requesting a mini[12.50 p.m. 3 October]
showed, is not ready at present for a big war mum of five-six divisions from You.” Typ[ed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10 Ik bol'shoi voine);
In response to this [letter), on October 7, [1.20 p.m. 3 October]
2) Japan, whose militaristic potential I received letter from Mao on 7 September Typ[ed in) 10 copies (copies no.] 9-10 -(to has not yet been restored, is not capable of [sic-October), in which he expresses solifile)
rendering military assistance to the Ameri- darity with the fundamental positions discans;
cussed in my letter and declares that he will (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, 3) the USA will be compelled to yield in dispatch to Korea nine, not six, divisions. listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn the Korean question to China behind which But she said) that he will send them not now, Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov.] stands its ally, the USSR, and will have to but after some time. He also requested that
agree to such terms of the settlement of the I receive his representatives and discuss
Korean question that would be favorable to some details of the mission with them. Of Document 13: Letter, Fyn Si [Stalin) to Korea and that would not give the enemies a course, I agreed to receive his representaKim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 8  Octo- possibility to transform Korea into their tives and to discuss with them a detailed plan ber 1950 springboard;
of military assistance to Korea. 4) for the same reasons, the USA will It is obvious from the above mentioned
not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to that You must stand firm and fight for every PYONGYANG, TO SHTYKOV
reject the idea of a separate peace with the tiny piece of your land, that you have to for KIM IL SUNG
Japanese reactionaries, as well as to aban- strengthen resistance to the American occudon their plans of revitalizing Japanese im- piers of Korea and prepare reserves, using
perialism and of converting Japan into their for this purpose the military cadres of the Comrade Kim Il Sung! springboard in the Far East.
Korean People's Army coming out from the In this regard, I proceeded from the encirclement. Also, this shows that You are
I My reply has been delayed because of assumption that China could not extract these absolutely right in your proposal that we my consultations with the Chinese com- concessions if it were to adopt a passive transfer all Korean comrades studying in the rades, which took several days. On 1 Octo- wait-and-see policy, and that without seri- USSR into the pilot training program.
I will keep you informed about further talks with the Chinese comrades. 8 October 1950.
FYN SI (STALIN]
Comrade Shtykov, I ask You to read this letter to Kim Il Sung. He may copy it by hand in your presence, but You may not hand over this letter to Kim Il Sung because of its extreme confidentiality.
some Soviet specialists upon consultations nizations and their families, follow the inwith the Korean government, as well as of structions laid out in our telegram # 18909. the personnel of Soviet organizations in Second. You must decide the question Korea.
of the evacuation of families of Soviet citi
zens of Korean nationality from the territory GROMY KO of Korea on the spot, bearing in mind changes
in the situation on the ground. 5-nb
Third. All the Soviet personnel of the
air commandants' offices and families of (APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy Soviet military advisers must be evacuated 121-122)
from the territory of Korea.
Fourth. We agree with your proposal
that, in case of emergency, all the Soviet Document 15: Gromyko and
citizens, including Soviet citizens of Korean Vasilevsky to Stalin, 6 October 1950, nationality, be evacuated to the territory of attaching draft cable to Shtykov
the USSR and China.
(Handwritten: This letter was delivered to
Document 14: Telegram from
Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC
Decision dated October 5, 1950
168. The Question of Shtykov.
Ministry of Defense of the USSR
(A. Gromyko) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
(Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827,
Kim Il Sung to Stalin (via Shtykov), 9
Ciphered Telegram # 600382/sh
To Comrade STALIN I.V. he pressed the question of the evacuation FROM: PYONGYANG from Korea of Soviet specialists working in Korea, personnel of Soviet organizations in Sent by wire on 10/09/50 at 7:05 a.m. Korea, families of Soviet citizens of Korean Received in Moscow on 10/09/50 at 9:38 nationality, staff of the Soviet air comman- a.m. dants' offices, and, in case of emergency, all Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/09/50 at 9:45 Soviet citizens, we consider it necessary to a.m. reply in accordance with the attached draft. Deciphered by Morozov on 10/09/50 at
10:45 a.m. We request your consideration thereof.
Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2,
Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1,
I herewith transmit a letter of the fol
lowing content addressed to Your name from [Attachment]
comrade KIM IL SUNG: PRIORITY CABLE
"Comrade STALIN Iosif To PYONGYANG
ask You, dear Iosif RE: 1405/sh
Vissarionovich, for assistance and advice.
Now it is evident to everybody that First. Regarding the question of the having made significant achievements in evacuation of Soviet specialists and their recent military operations, the American families, as well as personnel of Soviet orga- aggressor will not stop at anything short of
The attached draft of a telegram addressed to the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Com. Shtykov, regarding the question of the evacuation of Soviet specialists and personnel of Soviet organizations from Korea to the USSR, has been approved.
SECRETARY OF THE CC
(Attachment to the Decision of the
Politburo #78 regarding #168]
1304/sh. We agree with your proposals concerning the temporary evacuation of
the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its squadron of mine-sweepers, the first and the p.m. conversion into its military-strategic spring- third assault landing groups. board for further aggression in the Far East. Ch’óngjin was heavily bombarded from (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, In my opinion, the struggle of our people the air and the sea.
list 3] for its independence, freedom and state sovereignty will be protracted and very hard.
(signature] GOLOVKO For a successful struggle against a strong
[signature) FOKIN Document 19: Ciphered Telegram, enemy armed with the latest achievements No. 244cc
Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin), 14 of military science and technology we will 13 October 1950
October 1950, re Meeting with Mao have to train pilots, tankists, radio operators,
Zedong and engineering officers urgently.
(Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, It is very difficult to train them inside list 139]
Ciphered Telegram # 25629 our country. Therefore, we turn to You, comrade STALIN, with the following re
FROM: BEIJING quest:
Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 01:38 1. To permit the training of 200-300 Document 18: Ciphered Telegram, a.m. pilots from among Korean students studying Shtykov to Fyn Si (Stalin), 14 October Deciphered by Yelezov on 10/14/50 at in the Soviet Union. 1950
02:00 a.m. 2. To permit the training of 1,000
Typed by Rubleva on 10/14/50 at 03:20 tankists, 2,000 pilots, 500 radio operators, Ciphered Telegram # 600428/sh
a.m. and 500 engineering officers from among FROM: PYONGYANG
Cabled by VTCH to the South for Stalin Soviet Koreans residing in the Soviet Union.
Distribution list - 9 copies: Stalin - 2, I ask You, comrade STALIN, to render Sent by wire on 10/14/50 at 03:15 a.m. Molotov -1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, us assistance in this regard.
Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 6:36 Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin a.m.
1, 8MDGS - 1. Respectfully, KIM IL SUNG”
Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/14/50 at 7:10 PRIORITY T
a.m. I support KIM IL SUNG'S request. Deciphered by Morozov on 10/14/50 at
To FILIPPOV (STALIN] 7:45 a.m. SHTYKOV Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2,
In addition to my No. 2406 (incoming Molotov-1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1,
No. 25612), Mao Zedong went on to say: No. 1447/sh
Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - Our leading comrades believe that if the 1.
U.S. troops advance up to the border of 9 October 1950
China, then Korea will become a dark spot FYN SI (STALIN)
for us (the Chinese - AM) and the Northeast Typed by Kravchuk on 10/09/50 at 11:20
will be faced with constant menace. a.m.
In accordance with your directive dated Past hesitations by our comrades oc
13.10.50 I had a meeting with KIM IL SUNG. curred because questions about the interna(Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, PAK HÓN-YONG was present at the tional situation, questions about the Soviet listy 72-73]
meeting. I read the text of your telegram to assistance to us, and questions about air
them. The content of the telegram caught cover were not clear to them. At present, all Document 17: Memorandum, Golovko KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YONG by these questions have been clarified. and Fokin to Stalin, 13 October 1950 surprise.
Mao Zedong pointed out that now it is KIM IL SUNG stated that it was very advantageous for them to dispatch the ChiComrade STALIN
hard for them (to accept Stalin's recommen- nese troops into Korea. The Chinese have
dation - AM], but since there is such advice the absolute obligation to send troops to According to electronic intelligence data they will fulfill it.
Korea. gathered by the Seventh Fleet, as of 8:00 KIM IL SUNG asked me to read prac
At this point, they are sending the first a.m., 13 October, the following U.S. battle- tical recommendations and ordered PAK
echelon composed of nine divisions. Alships were noticed in the vicinity of HÓN-YONG to write them down. He also though it is poorly armed, it will be able to Ch'óngjin: USS “Missouri,” three heavy asked us to help him develop a plan for fight against the troops of Syngman Rhee. In aircraft carriers (“Valley Forge," "Leyte,” measures related to this question.
the meantime, the Chinese comrades will “The Philippine Sea"), two escort aircraft
have to prepare the second echelon. carriers ("Sicily," "Beduin Strait"), three
SHTY KOV The main thing that we need,
Mao heavy cruisers (“Rochester,” “Toledo,” “Hel- No. 1476/sh
Zedong, is air power which shall provide us ena"), three cruisers (“Wooster," "Juno," 14 October 1950
with air cover. We hope to see its arrival as "Ceylon"), twelve destroyers, the third Typed by Bantsekina on 10/14/50 at 13:30
soon as possible, but not later than in two
CWIHP ACTIVITIES AT V WORLD CONGRESS
OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, POLAND, AUGUST 1995
13 Oct 1950 Furthermore, Comrade Mao Zedong [typed:] Sent on 13.X.50 noted that at present the government of the People's Republic of China cannot pay in (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, cash for the armaments delivered. They listy 74-75) hope to receive arms on credit.
Thus, the 1951 budget will not be affected, and it will be easier for them to Document 21: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn explain it to the democrats.
Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 14 October In conclusion, Mao Zedong stated that 1950 the leading comrades in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party be- CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 4829 lieve that the Chinese must come to the assistance of the Korean comrades in their To PYONGYANG-SOVIET AMBASdifficult struggle. To discuss this matter, SADOR Zhou Enlai will have to meet comrade Filippov again.
Transmit to KIM IL SUNG the followZhou Enlai is being sent new instruc- ing message: tions.
"After vacillations [kolebaniy) and a ROSHCHIN series of temporary (provisional] decisions No. 2408
the Chinese comrades at last made a final 13.10 [13 October
decision to render assistance to Korea with
able decision for Korea has been made at
In this connection, you should consider
You were told of earlier, annulled. You will
have to resolve concrete questions regarding Ciphered Telegram # 75525/4/6759 the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with (incoming #3735/shs)
the Chinese comrades. (Stalin's hand-written note)
The armaments required for the Chi
nese troops will be delivered from the USSR. PYONGYANG
I wish You success."
The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) organized several activities in connection with the V World Congress of Central and East European Studies, held at Warsaw University on 6-11 August 1995.
CWIHP, in cooperation with the National Security Archive (a non-governmental repository for declassified documents and research institute located at George Washington University), co-organized three panels at the Warsaw meeting. Two were chaired by CWIHP Director Jim Hershberg: “New Evidence on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981,” with presentations by Mark Kramer (Russian Research Center, Harvard University), Michael Kubina (Free University, Berlin), and Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive); and “Cold War Flashpoints," with Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive), Johanna Granville (Carnegie-Mellon University), Byrne, and Kramer. Malcolm Byrne chaired a session on “New Opportunities for Research and the Issue of Openness in Cold War Studies,” with presentations by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College), Sven Holtsmark (Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies), Hershberg, and Zubok.
During the conference, CWIHP, the National Security Archive, and the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, conducted a day-long workshop on current scholarship and research on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis. CWIHP presented a collection of newlyreleased Soviet documents on the crisis, included Politburo minutes, selected, translated, annotated, and introduced by Mark Kramer, while the Archive assembled declassified U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Plans were discussed to hold an oral history conference on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis, gathering key Polish, Russian, and Americans involved in the events, in the spring of 1997 in Poland. Meetings were also held with German and Hungarian colleagues regarding, respectively, meetings for scholars to present new East-bloc evidence on the 1953 East German uprising and the 1956 Hungarian crisis which are planned in connection with the National Security Archive's "Cold War Flashpoints" project and will be co-sponsored by CWIHP.
In conjunction with the Warsaw gathering, Hershberg and Byrne gave presentations regarding CWIHP's and the Archive's activities at the International Librarians' Conference on Libraries in Europe's Post-Communist Countries, held near Krakow, Poland, at Jagellonian University's Polonia Institute (Przegorzaly) on 3-5 August 1995.
I have just received a telegram from 14.10.50 Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CC Typed by Doronchenkova #8865 CPC (Central Committee of the Communist Made 2 copies: Stalin - 1, 8MDGS - 1. Party of China) discussed the situation [in Korea - AM) again and decided after all to (Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, render military assistance to the Korean com- list 77] rades, regardless of the insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed reports about this matter from Mao 1. Although on the front page of the telegram it says that Zedong. In connection with this new deci- it was sent from Pyongyang at 8:10 a.m. on September sion of the Chinese comrades, I ask You to
26, I believe that the date was indicated incorrectly
because of a typo. It should be dated as of September 27 postpone temporarily the implementation of
because at the end of the telegram it says that it was the telegram sent to You yesterday about the dispatched from Pyongyang at 12:35 p.m. on 27 Sepevacuation of North Korea and the retreat of tember 1950 (local time) which is 6:35 a.m. of the same the Korean troops to the north.
date Moscow time.
the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
11 July 1995
trary, charged Kim two percent-about what mander of the Korean Military Advisory mortgages cost in the U.S. then.)
Group (KMAG) “to recover high ground in To the Editor:
Document #7, Stalin's telegram to Rus- North Korea occupied by [the] South Ko
sian ambassador to P'yongyang Shtykov on rean Army.” Before dawn it launched strong Since Kathryn Weathersby chose once 30 January 1950, does not say what artillery barrages and then at 5:30 a.m., 4000 again to stigmatize my work (as “revision- Weathersby says it does, namely, it does not to 6000 North Korean border guards atist") in the spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP “reveal so bluntly” Stalin's strategic think- tacked the salient. They routed the South Bulletin, perhaps I might be permitted a ing or his “perfect mafioso style.” Instead it
Korean defenders, destroying two compacomment. The documents that she repro- shows Stalin appearing to be more interested nies of ROK soldiers and leaving hundreds duced, selectively culled from a vastly larger than at any previous point in Kim Il Sung's dead. archive and handcarried to Seoul by a Boris plans for South Korea, without a hint of what Virtual panic ensued at high levels of Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the Stalin's own strategic thinking might be. Dr. the South Korean government, leading faltering Russian economy, are quite inter- Weathersby thinks the timing of this change Syngman Rhee and his favored high officers esting but in ways that she does not seem to is to be explained by Dean Acheson's famed in the army to argue that the only way to understand.
press club speech on January 12, which is to relieve pressure on Ongjin was to drive north Document #1, a standard transcript of assume a Stalin so inexperienced as to take to Ch'orwon—which happened to be about Kim Il Sung's meeting with Stalin on 5 Acheson's public statement of a private policy 20 miles into North Korean territory. Rhee, March 1949 widely circulated for use inside at face value (and even the public statement who was meeting with Chiang Kai-shek the Soviet government, is impressive pri- is always misread by scholars). Finally, (Jiang Jieshi] in a southern Korean port, marily for how bland it is, adding very little Stalin's request that Kim send 25,000 tons of returned to Seoul and dressed down his to the existing record. If anything it illus- lead (whether gratis or for a price is not defense minister for not having "attacked trates how distant Stalin was from the Ko- mentioned) is no more “mafioso” than the the North” after the Ongjin debacle. The rean situation, probing Kim on what kind of U.S. more or less telling South Korea that it American ambassador and the KMAG coman army he had, what kind South Korea had, would require Korea's entire annual output mander both intervened, since an attack on and whether he had utilized the “national of tungsten in the early 1950s, to make up for Ch'orwon would, in the words of the latter,
, bourgeoisie" to organize trade (which Kim the lost tungsten supplies of southern China. “cause heavy civil war and might spread. ” indeed had done). This transcript adds vir- Documents number two through six are The South did not move against Ch'orwon, tually nothing to what has been known of considerably more interesting, but remain but attacks from both sides across the paralthis meeting, a relatively full record of which inexplicable unless placed against the back- lelon the Ongjin peninsula continued through can be found in an archive of captured North and-forth logic of the developing civil con- the end of 1949, Korean materials in Washington. But it flict on the peninsula, with full knowledge of All this is based on unimpeachable does appear to show that no secret military what the South and the U.S. were doing. The American archival documentation, some of alliance or agreement issued forth from this critical issue in these documents is not a which was reproduced in the 1949 Korea meeting, as the South long claimed.
wholesale invasion of the South, but a mili- papers of the Foreign Relations of the U.S. This document certainly does not pro- tary operation to seize the Ongjin Peninsula, and which I treated at length in my 1990 vide evidence for Dr. Weathersby's asser- which juts southward from the 38th parallel book. When we now look at both sides of the tion that the meeting was "revealing in a on Korea's west coast, reachable from the parallel with the help of Soviet materials, we most intimate way [of] the nature of the South only by sea or by an overland route see how similar the Russians were in seeking relationship” between the USSR and the through North Korean territory. This is where to restrain hotheaded Korean leaders, inDPRK or that North Korea was “utterly the Korean War conventionally dated from cluding the two chiefs of state. Indeed, two dependent” on the USSR. The captured 25 June 1950 began, and where fighting key Russian Embassy officials seeking to archive has large numbers of documents on between the South and North began on 4 restrain Kim used language almost identical Korean-Soviet trade, negotiations over vari- May 1949—in a battle probably started by to that which John Foster Dulles used with ous exchanges, and proof that some pre- the South, according to the most reliable Rhee in his June 1950 discussions in Seoul cious Korean minerals, like gold and mona- accounts.
(both, upon hearing Kim or Rhee declaim zite (when refined, useful for a thorium According to these Soviet documents, their desire to attack the other side, “tried to atomic bomb) were indeed transferred in Kim Il Sung first broached the idea of an switch the discussion to a general theme," to large quantities to Russia. (I covered this operation against Ongjin to Shtykov on 12 quote from document #6). We see that Kim briefly in my Origins of the Korean War, August 1949. This came on the heels of the Il Sung, like southern leaders, wanted to bite volume 2 [Princeton University Press, 1990), biggest Ongjin battle of 1949, initiated on off a chunk of exposed territory or grab a pp. 151-2, 340-45.) These voluminous ma- August 4 by the North to dislodge South small city—all of Kaesong for example, terials still do not prove North Korea's utter Korean army units holding Unp'a Mountain, which is bisected by the 38th parallel, or dependency on the USSR, especially when a salient above the 38th parallel which the Haeju city just above the parallel on Ongjin, contrasted to South Korea, which had half South had aggressed against in a previous
which southern commanders wanted to ocits annual budget and five-sixths of its im- battle and the summit of which commanded
cupy in 1949-50. ports in the 1950s provided virtually gratis much of the terrain to the north. The North The Soviet documents also demonstrate by the United States. (Stalin, to the con- sought, in the words of the American com- the hardwon, learned logic of this civil war