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ited insights of these experts by revealing the to dispense with all but the most modest, the complex relationship of past to presentdegree to which decisionmaking on critical commonsensical theory" and perhaps even of how the present may subtly influence the
“ issues has been closely held, the monopoly to enter the fray over what the evidence agenda for historical research and how hisof a handful of leaders. Moreover, the new actually means. The theoretically enthralled torical findings may illuminate current probhistory reveals that major decisions have may thereby rediscover in Chinese policy lems. often been tightly guarded, not something to some of the classic and “soft” issues of share with a foreigner-except where it suits international politics—the importance of Defining a Historical Agenda the purposes of the party center to make personality, the contingent nature of poliavailable partial and sometimes tendentious tics, the complexity of thought behind ac- CCP foreign policy is, as the above information.
tion, and the persistence and power of politi- discussion suggests, a field distinctly in flux. The shift toward a more historical ren- cal culture.
Specialists have put a good deal of time and dering of the CCP past should have a notable While this new CCP history should give energy into coping with the recent flood of impact on political science research. Those political scientists pause, they also have im- valuable documentary and other materials. of a more descriptive bent should welcome portant contributions to make to a more The flood may be cresting, and those who and benefit from the accumulation of fresh historically oriented field. Their concern have escaped drowning and reached the evidence that makes possible greater ana- with understanding the state and explaining safety of high ground are now in a position lytic rigor and sharper interpretive insight. its exercise of power has generated a reper- to reflect on their future tasks. The more theoretically inclined may be the toire of theories that may prove helpful to The most obvious is to link a better more threatened, but some will accommo- anyone trying to make sense of considerable documented version of CCP external reladate to the new data, using it as ballast that new data and still uncertain of the most tions chronologically and thematically to will keep them closer to the safety of the fruitful way to frame the issues. Moreover, Chinese foreign relations in general. Qing ground. Indeed, it is possible that taking a the political scientists' preoccupation with sources, printed and archival, have long been longer view and looking at the implications contemporary questions stands as a salutary available, and have been recently reinforced of better documented cases may induce them reminder to the more historically oriented of by the opening of collections located in the
CCP LEADERS' SELECTED WORKS
Consequently, the selection process often AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY
For the purpose of mobilizing the party's resulted in a substantive revision of the texts OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST rank and file as well as the masses, the CCP of historical documents. For example, it is REVOLUTION1
has long carried out a practice of compiling well known among China scholars that the
and publishing the works of Party leaders. texts of many pieces in Mao Zedong xuanji By Chen Jian
The most important example in this regard is were substantially altered from the original
the publication of the four-volume Mao versions. The study of 20th-century Chinese his- Zedong xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Yet scholars of the Chinese revolution, tory, especially the history of the Chinese Zedong) in the 1950s and 1960s. Alto- including historians, have widely used such Communist revolution, has experienced a gether, over 100,000,000 sets of xuanji had publications as Mao Zedong xuanji as their boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s been printed and sold by 1966-1967, making primary sources. Indeed, at a time that largely for two reasons. First, the introduc- them, together with the famous "little red Western scholars had to travel to Hong Kong, tion of the “reform and opening to the out- book" (Quotations of Chairman Mao), the Taipei, and Tokyo to collect materials on the side world” policy in the People's Republic “Red Bible" during the years of the “Great Chinese Communist revolution, how could of China in the late 1970s and early 1980s Proletarian Cultural Revolution." (As a by- they exclude Mao Zedong xuanji from their resulted in a more flexible political and product, Chairman Mao became the richest data base? The openly published selected academic environment, which enabled Chi- person in China from royalty income, al- works by CCP leaders, together with official nese scholars, historians in particular, to though, according to the memoirs of his CCP statements, contemporaneous newspaconduct their studies in more creative and nurses and bodyguards, he disliked money per and journal literature, and, in some cases, critical ways. Second, the release of many and was unwilling to touch it himself.) The Guomindang (Nationalist Party) and Westprevious unavailable documentary sources publication of works of the CCP leaders was ern intelligence reports, formed the docuabout the activities of the Chinese Commu- not designed to provide scholars with reli- mentary basis of Western studies on the nist Party (CCP) makes it possible for schol- able source materials to study the party's Chinese Communist revolution before the ars, both in China and in the West, to base past; rather, it was aimed to guide the revo- early 1980s. Sometimes China scholars had their studies on a more comprehensive docu- lutionary mass movement into the orbit set no choice but to rely on obviously flawed mentary foundation. This paper reviews the up by the party.
documentary sources. As a result, in those works of CCP leaders that have been com- Thus, the criteria for selecting the works years, the ability to make good "educated piled and published (both internally and of Party leaders followed the Party's needs. guesses” was a necessary quality for every openly) since the early 1980s, examining Indeed, only those documents which served
Western scholar writing about China. their influence on the historical writing of to promote the Party's current policy, or to
II the Chinese Communist revolution.
enhance the Party's and its leaders’ image of In a brief sketch, it is hard to describe being "eternally correct," were made public.
continued on page 144
PRC. Materials from the Republican era get they often resolve by impaling themselves such terms as “national interest," "strategic steadily better as fresh publications appear on one or the other of its horns.
interests,” "geostrategic imperatives," and and archives open on Taiwan and within the Of all the dualisms, none is more perva- “geopolitical realities.” Thus we get acPRC. The new CCP material helps round sive and troubling than the idea of the "inter- counts that confidently proclaim China's out an already rich documentary base and national system" and its conceptual twin, foreign relations is "propelled by national
“ makes all the more urgent an integrated "domestic determinants.” A moment of criti- interests" (not its evil twin, “ideology'). treatment of China's external relations. cal reflection reminds us that the make-up of Other accounts seek to differentiate “pragDrawing on this range of sources, historians the international system is not self-evident, matic” policies (usually linked with Zhou can begin to offer in-depth treatment of all and those who champion its power to shape Enlai's or Deng Xiaoping's name) from the kinds of topics associated with a well national policy differ widely on what the "radical" or "provocative" policies (here developed foreign-relations literature- system is and how it works. Claims for the Mao or the “Gang of Four" is likely to from important personalities to the relation primacy of domestic determinants” suffer appear), and hold up as an ideal a "balance
“ of policy to the "public.” It should also from an equally serious problem: "domes- of-power” approach that secures “strategic
“ convey a more complex sense of policy with tic” is understood so narrowly and determi- interests,” “national security,” and “foreignfeatures-economic opportunism, political nants" is taken so literally that the phrase is policy interests” in a changing “internaflexibility, cultural ambivalence, strategic almost drained of its significance.
tional system." opportunism, and policy confusion-long The impulse to distinguish domestic and While this language most commonly associated with the better studied policies of international influences may not be particu- appears in American writing on contempoother countries. To bring these themes into larly useful in understanding the foreign
larly useful in understanding the foreign rary China, Chinese scholars writing about better focus specialists will want to place policy of any country, and in the case of their country's foreign policy have been the CCP's historical experience in a com- China draws a distinction that party leaders showing signs of appropriating this vocabuparative framework and look for insight on from Chen Duxiu to Deng Xiaoping would lary. Influenced by American international the CCP that might emerge from juxtaposi- have found baffling, even wrong-headed. relations literature as well by their own search tion with other foreign-relations histories. The growing availability of documentation for a usable foreign-policy past, they have
This broad agenda, good as far as it makes it possible to argue what common emphasized the neatly formulated and goes, neglects a fundamental and necessar- sense already suggests—that discussions of smoothly executed nature of Chinese policy ily unsettling interpretive collision about to Chinese policy need to transcend this and the and held up Zhou Enlai as a model of “realplay out within the CCP foreign-relations other stark categories that narrow and im- ism" and "expertise," while wrestling over field. Its resolution bears directly on the poverish our discourse.
whether to make Mao's contributions to kind of agenda the field will follow. As Some scholars (including political sci- foreign-policy-realistic" or “ideological.”:25 historians turn to CCP foreign relations, entists) have already begun to escape these Behind this vocabulary lurks a strongly they will bring with them an anthropologi- stark alternatives.
stark alternatives.24 They have shown not judgmental impulse antipathetic to less unical concern with culture and a post-modern just that Mao and his colleagues operated versal, more culture-specific insights. Unsensitivity to language, both currently strong within an international arena of Cold War derstanding policy, whatever its complexipreoccupations within their discipline. rivalry and in a China of revolutionary aspi- ties, takes a back seat to handing down a Those interpretive proclivities are distinctly rations and conflict but also that those worlds clear-cut verdict based on what a “rational” at odds with at least three fundamental fea- overlapped and interacted. Conclusions or “realistic” actor would have done in a tures of the established literature and dis- drawn from the behavior of the American particular set of circumstances. course defined by political science. Finding imperialists, upheavals observed in Eastern The Korean War literature starkly illusways to make fresh, thoughtful use of the Europe, and Nikita Khrushchev's theses on trates this point about the powerful impulse new historical evidence is here as perhaps in peaceful coexistence played off against in- to evaluate the rationality or realism of policy. general inextricably tied to a critical exami- ternal discussions and debates about the best Chinese scholars have joined Americans in nation of older, well worn, and often narrow road for China's socialist development, treat- reporting approvingly on Beijing's reassurchannels of interpretation.
ment of peasants and intellectuals, the nature ingly clear, unitary, and above all carefully One point of conflict arises from the of party leadership, and China's appropriate calculated response to U.S. intervention on long-established tendency to cast policy in place in a world revolutionary movement. the peninsula. In the American literature on terms of antinomies that in effect impose an Together the foreign and the domestic strands deterrence China's handling of the Korean interpretive strait-jacket. The literature is were interwoven into a single web, and nei- War has even been enshrined as a positive peppered with reference to policies that are ther strand can be removed without doing model in striking contrast to the bumblings supposed to fit in one of several either/or fundamental harm to our understanding of of U.S. policymakers at the time. 26 Subcategories. Policies were either idealistic" the whole.
jected now to a closer look thanks to the new or "realistic.” They were either “ideologi- A second point of likely conflict is an evidence, this positive characterization seems cally driven" or responsive to “situational interpretive vocabulary whose unexamined wide of the mark. Mao and his associates, it factors.” They were shaped either by the assumptions exercise a quiet but nonetheless now turns out, were themselves engulfed in “international system" or by “domestic de- dangerous linguistic tyranny. Any reader of the kind of messy and confused terminants.” These alternatives confront international relations would recognize the decisionmaking that also afflicted Amerischolars with an interpretive dilemma that widely used lexicon, including prominently can leaders. Viewed in this new light,
Beijing's reaction to the Korean crisis be- mentally culture-bound or at least that em- tioned by personal background, beliefs, and comes interesting not so much for the evalu- ploy a definition of culture so narrow as to surroundings. ative question of who did the better job but close off potentially interesting lines of in- Analysts using imposed, culture-bound rather for the interpretive question of how do vestigation. Historians more interested in categories find themselves in much the same we understand the limits of cultural under- understanding the past than judging it will impossible situation an outsider would face standing and human control in a story strongly find limited appeal in hauling CCP leaders in trying to understand the Australian abmarked by chaos and contingency. These into court and formulating a verdict on the origines who spoke Dyirbal. To ignore their observations are not meant to deny rational- basis of their realism.
language is to close the door to understandity on the part of Chinese policymakers or The third interpretive impulse likely to ing their world with its unfamiliar classificafor that matter on the part of Americans but create conflict is a notion of ideology that is tion: bayi (human males, animals); balan to highlight the difficulty of evaluating policy ahistorical and anemic. This unfortunate (human females, water, fire, fighting); balam rationality, especially with the help of simple, approach to the role of ideas in policymaking (nonflesh food); and bala (a residual catdichotomous notions of policy as either real- is in part a reflection of the rigid dualisms egory).32 This breakdown may not make istic or idealistic, driven by either careful and fixation with rationality discussed above. much sense to an outsider, but if getting into calculations of national interest or by ungov- It is also a reflection of a broader tendency the head of the “other” is important, then ernable ideological impulses.27
during the Cold War to denigrate ideology uncovering the particular categories used to Though the critique of the rational actor as a peculiar deformation of the socialist constitute their world is essential. By conmodel is widely made and apparently widely bloc, a tendency that carried over into the trast, the conceptual baggage the observer accepted, 28 much of the CCP literature still China field as international relations spe- brings from home must be counted a serious seems unusually preoccupied with distin- cialists, schooled in comparative commu- impediment. Employing outside frames of guishing sound from misguided policy. This nism, applied a Soviet model to Chinese reference may obscure more China-centered siren call to make judgments about interna- politics. In their accounts a pervasive, pow- and China-sensitive perspectives and thereby tional behavior finds a response in all of us, erful Marxist-Leninist ideology came to of- divert us from our ultimate destination—the but answering the call carries dangers. The fer an important key to understanding Chi- understanding of China's beliefs and behavmost apparent is the tendency for simple nese policy.
ior in international affairs. 33 judgments and a polemical style to appeal The resulting notions of CCP ideology One promising way to get beyond simple most strongly when limited evidence af- are, it would now appear, ahistorical. The and mutually exclusive notions of CCP idefords the weakest supporting grounds for use of the Soviet Union as a starting point for ology-for example, either making it “Marxthem. For example, it was easy to offer up an understanding Chinese thinking may be un- ism-Leninism”or“nationalism"-is to think idealized Mao when his own party decided wise and is certainly premature because the of it as a fabric that we can better understand what we should know, and it was natural to Soviet model is itself drawn in narrow politi- by following the strand of keywords. A move toward a negative appraisal when new cal terms and lacks firm historical ground- close look at those keywords and the relarevelations thrust at us serious, previously ing.29 Moreover, the Chinese party, which tionship among them might prove helpful in unsuspected personal flaws. As the evi- itselfonly recently began to come into sharper defining policy discourse over time and undence becomes fuller and more reliable for historical focus, is unlikely to offer an easy locking contending visions of China's place Mao as for the CCP in general, older judg- fit with any Soviet template.30 Indeed, we ments must confront previously unimagined may look back on this Sino-Soviet ideologi- "Patriotism" (aiguo zhuvi) is one of moral and political dimensions, and what cal model and realize that the conclusions those neglected keywords examined earlier previously seemed self-evident evaluations drawn from one set of highly circumstantial in these pages. Another is “small and weak dissolve into complexity.
studies became the foundation for another nationalities” (ruoxiao minzu). It too would But beyond the simple problem of judg- set of equally circumstantial studies. repay close examination, revealing comments handed down on scant or skewed The prevalent thin, abstract conception plexities not easily spotted in a straightforevidence there is a broader and more com- of ideology should not divert our attention ward reading of formal party statements. plex problem. The claim to understand and from more subtle and perhaps powerful in- Like patriotism, this term had its roots in the judge “national interest,” “national secu- formal ideologies that may be of consider- late Qing, and persisted in CCP discourse rity," and so forth rests on a fundamentally ably greater analytic value.31 Examining from the party founding through the Maoist metaphysical faith that value preferences the intellectual predispositions and funda- era and even beyond, injecting into it tenserve to settle otherwise eminently debat- mental assumptions that constitute informal sions as well as unintended ironies, China at able issues. That claim becomes often un- ideology may render us more sensitive to the times offered flamboyant rhetorical support thinkingly universalistic when scholars dis- cultural and social influences over policy. for its revolutionary neighbors, but it has cover in countries and cultures other than Such an approach may thus help us better also collided with India and Vietnam, both their own roughly comparable notions of
understand how calculations of "interest" important members of that community to national interest and national security-at are rooted in social structure and filtered which China claimed to belong. How has least among policymakers deemed suffi- through a screen of culturally conditioned the concept of “small and weak nationaliciently skilled in the realist calculus of power. assumptions and how individual responses ties" evolved, and what has China's regional The inadvertent results of this rational actor to “objective” circumstances in the interna- ambitions and limited resources done to framework are judgments that are funda- tional environment are profoundly condi- reconstitute the meaning of that term?
in the world 34
This discussion of keywords suggests that we need a more subtle and expansive 1. The observations that follow draw in part on Jin notion of ideology-one that includes more Liangyong, “Jianguo yilai jindai Zhongwai guanxishi than the formal ideology that the party uti
yanjiu shuping” (A review of post-1949 research on the
history of modern Sino-foreign relations), Jindaishi lized as an organizational glue and mobili
yanjiu, 3(1985), 193-214;Wang Xi and Wang Bangxian, zation guide—if we are to move toward a “Woguo sanshiwu nianlai de ZhongMei guanxishi richer understanding of CCP external rela- yanjiu" (Research on the history of Sino-American tions. The network of ideas that make up an
relations in our country over the last thirty-five years),
Fudan xuebao 5 (1984), 73-76; Tao Wenzhao, informal ideology is a complex, unstable
“ZhongMei guanxishi yanjiu shinian huigu” (Looking amalgam drawn from a wide variety of back on a decade of research on the history of Sinosources and varying significantly from indi- American relations ), in Xin de shiye: ZhongMei guanxishi vidual to individual. Some party leaders
lunwenji (New fields of vision: a collection of articles on
the history of Sino-American relations] (Nanjing: had experienced formative brushes with an
Nanjing daxue, 1991), 282-307; a fairly extensive readarchism. Others had reacted strongly against ing in party history periodicals; and conversations with disturbing urban conditions that made capi- Chinese colleagues working on the CCP's foreign relatalism the main foe. Yet others constructed
2. Yao Xu, “KangMei yuanChao de yingming juece" from their rural roots a populist outlook.
[The brilliant decision to resist America and aid Korea), Each borrowed from a rich, complex intel- Danghshi yanjiu 5 (1980), 5-14. A new generation of lectual tradition, drew from distinct regional scholarship heralded by Yao's work did greatly improve roots, and learned from diverse political
on earlier thin and domestically oriented accounts such
as Hu Zhongchi, KangMei yuanChao yundong shihua experience as youths. A more penetrating (An informal history of the resist-America aid-Korea grasp of Chinese policy depends ultimately campaign) (Beijing: Zhonghua qingnian, 1956), which on exploring the enormous diversity of think- had its own, even more pronounced patriotic premises. ing that shaped its course.
3. These tendencies are evident in Ding Shouhe and Yin The negotiation of these and other points chuanbo (From May Fourth enlightenment to the propa
Shuyi, Cong wusi qimeng yundong dao makesi zhuyi de of difference between historians and politi- gation of Marxism) (rev. ed.; Beijing: Sanlian, 1979), cal scientists will redefine the agenda for esp. 88-108; Lu Mingzhuo, “Li Dazhao zai wusi yundong CCP foreign-policy studies and in the pro
shiqi de fandi sixiang” (Li Dazhao's anti-imperialist
thought during the period of the May Fourth movecess help recast a field already in the midst
ment), in Jinian wusi yundong liushi zhounian xueshu of important change as a result of the revival
taolunhui lunwenxuan (A selection of articles from a of CCP studies in China. Historians taking scholarly conference in commemoration of the sixtieth a more prominent place in the field will be anniversary of the May Fourth movement], ed. Zhongguo
shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo (Beijing: advancing a new constellation of questions Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1980), 2: 151-63; and Zhu and methods. The response by political Jianhua and He Rongdi, “Shilun Li Dazhao de fandi scientists will doubtless vary with those of a sixiang” (An exploration of Li Dazhao's anti-imperialdescriptive bent finding it easy, while those
ist thought), in Li Dazhao yanjiu lunwenji (A collection
of research papers on Li Dazhao), ed. Han Yide and devoted to theory may well find the transi
Wang Shudi (2 vols.; Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin, tion awkward. How much this interaction 1984), 2: 515-29. across disciplinary lines will lead to a new 4. Pei-yi Wu, The Confucian's Progress: Autobiographimix of concerns and approaches and how
cal Writings in Traditional China (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), offers a suggestive introducmuch historians and political scientists will
tion to this genre. turn their back on each other, effectively 5. The earliest Chinese version appears to be Waiguo creating a schism in the field, remains to be jizhe xibei yinxiangji (A foreign reporter's impressions seen. Whatever the outcome outside of
of the northwest](Shanghai: Dingchou bianyishe, 1937).
A partial copy is in the Wang Fu Shih collection, China, party historians within China are for
University Archives, University of Missouri, Kansas their part likely to maintain a largely au
City. Hu Yuzhi translated one of the early versions, tonomous community interacting selectively perhaps this one. Snow's account was also published with foreigner counterparts. Thus this trend
under the title Xixing manji (Notes on a journey to the
west) and Mao Zedong zizhuan (Mao Zedong's autobitoward a more historical picture of CCP
ography]). For details on the production of the autobiogexternal relations, at work in both the United
raphy, see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi States and China, is not likely to lead to a and Xinhua tongxunshe, comps., Mao Zedong xinwen new monolithic field. And perhaps this
gongzuo wenxuan (A selection of Mao Zedong works on
journalism) (Beijing: Xinhua, 1983), 37-38; Wu Liping, outcome, marked by national and disciplin
comp., Mao Zedong yijiusanliunian tong Sinuo de tanhua ary diversity, is to be welcomed if it proves (Mao Zedong's 1936 talk with Snow](Beijing: Renmin, conducive to the wide-ranging inquiry and 1979), 1, 6-9; and Qiu Ke'an, Sinuo zai Zhongguo lively discussions associated with a field in
(Snow in China] (Beijing: Sanlian, 1982).
Appearing in 1937 along with the Snow account renaissance.
was the first, perhaps rudimentary collection of Mao's
Postwar American Historiography of China,” positions 1 (Fall 1993), 486-525. For a helpful evaluation of the literature on imperialism accompanied by suggestions on fruitful modes of inquiry, see Jürgen Osterhammel, “Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in TwentiethCentury China: Towards a Framework of Analysis," in Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Osterhammel (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 290-314. 12. See e.g., Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), which begins by stressing the importance of relating the actions of the state to the lives of even ordinary citizens” (xi). 13. Bin Yu, “The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospect,” World Politics 46 (January 1994), 235-61, offers a detailed, critical appraisal of this large body of writing. See also Friedrich W. Wu, “Explanatory Approaches to Chinese Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Western Literature,” Studies in Comparative Communism 13 (Spring 1980), 41-62; and Samuel S. Kim, “China and the World in Theory and Practice,” in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Kim (3rd rev. ed.; Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), 3-41. Both Kim, China and the World; and Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 1994), offer a sampling of the kinds of work now being done by political scientists. Harry Harding, “The Evolution of American Scholarship on Contemporary China," in American Studies of Contemporary China, ed. David Shambaugh (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 14-40, helps put this particular body of political science work in the broader context of the general social science literature on China. 14. Wu's 1980 survey, “Explanatory Approaches,” tied progress in the field to better theory and methodology, as did Michael Ng-Quinn's "The Analytical Study of Chinese Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 27 (June 1983), 203-24. More recently James N. Rosenau, “China in a Bifurcated World: Competing Theoretical Perspectives," in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 524-51, has offered a somewhat defensive presentation along the same lines. Bin Yu, “The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy,” 25659, is considerably more reserved about the prospects for the theoretical enterprise. 15. For an early, vigorous argument for putting Mao at the center of the policy process, see Michel Oksenberg, “Policy Making under Mao, 1948-68: An Overview," in China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, ed. John M. H. Lindbeck (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), 79-115. Frederick C. Teiwes, “Mao and His Lieutenants,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 19-20 (January-July 1988), 1-80, and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), with their stress on personality and sensitivity to sources, are good examples of the application of this approach. Both are concerned mainly with domestic politics, but their findings have considerable import for foreign policy. 16. One distinguished China-watcher has proposed careful examination of past forecasting as a way of highlighting possible future interpretive problems as well as identifying past successes. Allen S. Whiting, **Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie,” in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 506-23. This proposal tellingly omits historical reconstruction of the very events analysts were trying to read. Without a fresh,
well-documented picture of those events it is hard to imagine measuring with any confidence the accuracy of contemporary readings. 17. This point is developed in chapters 5 and 6 of Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. 18. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), 25-27; comments by Chai Chengwenon Pu Shouchang's role as Zhou's translator on this occasion, in Renwu 5 (1992), 18. (Ed. note: For an English translation, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: University Press, 1993), 276-278.) For the understandably perplexed reaction of China-watchers, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 7 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 906, 912-13. 19. The oft-cited authority is Andrew Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly 53 (January March 1973), 34-66. 20. A glance at the literature on the CCP will reveal numerous instances of works stressing factional struggle on the basis of highly circumstantial evidence. Derek J. Waller, The Kiangsi Soviet: Mao and the National Congresses of 1931 and 1934 (Berkeley: University of California Center for Chinese Studies, 1973), sees a clear split between Maoists and Russian Returned Students in the early 1930s, with the latter increasingly dominant over the former in the factional struggles. Richard C. Thornton, The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928-1931 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), interprets the Li Lisan period in strong factional terms with leaders of each faction driven by a quest for personal power. James ReardonAnderson, Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), and Steven I. Levine, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), see factions defining the policy alternatives for the CCP in 1945-1946. Reardon-Anderson argues for a Mao-Zhou bloc favoring negotiations with the Nationalists, while the ultimately victorious military leaders wanted a resort to force. For his part, Levine sees differences in strategy in the northeast base area in factional terms. Donald S. Zagoria, “Choices in the Postwar World (2): Containment and China," in Caging the Bear: Containment and the Cold War, ed. Charles Gati (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), 10927, puts Mao and Zhou at the head of a nationalist group, while Liu emerges as the leader of the internationalists. The tendency to find factions persists in the studies of the post-1949 period. See for example Uri Ra'anan's and Donald Zagoria's treatments of Beijing's response to the Vietnam War in 1965-1966 in China in Crisis, vol. 2, ed. Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 23-71 and 237-68, as well as Michael Yahuda's response, “Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-66,” China Quarterly 149 (January-March 1972), especially 74-75. Yahuda rejects easy factional explanations, while stressing the interaction between “foreign and domestic politics." 21. For a thoughtful critique of this approach, now much in vogue, see Bin Yu, “The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," 244-56. Warren I. Cohen, “Conversations with Chinese Friends: Zhou Enlai's Associates Reflect on Chinese-American Relations in the 1940s and the Korean War," Diplomatic History 11 (Summer 1987), 283-89, suggests that historians are not immune
to the lure of the experts with “inside" information. 22. These points are treated more fully by Jürgen Osterhammel, “CCP Foreign Policy as International History: Mapping the Field,” and by Odd Arne Westad, “The Foreign Policies of Revolutionary Parties: The CCP in Comparative Perspective,” both in Toward a History of the Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches, ed. Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun (Washington: Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, n.d.). 23. See on some of the recent trends, Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); John E. Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and Irreducibility of Experience,” American Historical Review 92 (October 1987), 879-907; and Bryan D. Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). 24. Levine, Anvil of Victory; John W. Garver's Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 25. For good examples of this notable interpretive proclivity among Chinese scholars, see Hao Yufan and Guocang Huan, eds., The Chinese View of the World (New York: Pantheon, 1989); Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” China Quarterly 121 (March 1990), 94-115; He Di, “The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy toward the Offshore Islands," in The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 222-45; and Chen Xiaolu's, “China's Policy Toward the United States, 1949-1955,” Jia Qingguo, “Searching for Peaceful Coexistence and Territorial Integrity,” and Wang Jisi, “An Appraisal of U.S. Policy toward China, 1945-1955, and Its Aftermath," all in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 184-97, 267-86, 289-310. For a discussion of the impact of U.S. international-relations approaches on Chinese scholars, marked by this single, signal success, see Wang Jisi, “International Relations Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chinese Perspective," in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 481-505. 26. For perhaps the best known example, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), chap. 7. 27. I have developed this point in more detail in “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," Political Science Quarterly 107 (Fall 1992), 475-78. 28. For a helpful discussion of the rationality model,” see Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 11-14. 29. W. R. Connor, “Why Were We Surprised?" American Scholar 60 (Spring 1991), 175-84. Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (rev. ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Lewin, "Russia/USSR in Historical Motion: An Essay in Interpretation,” Russian Review 50 (July 1991), 249-66; and Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917 (New