ePub 版

supply lines. Therefore, when the Ameri- send troops to Korea, and it would take great
can troops started a counteroffensive on 25 efforts from Stalin to persuade the Chinese
January 1951, Peng Dehuai, the Chinese that it was in China's basic interest to prevent
commander, proposed a temporary retreat the war from reaching China's northeast
in a telegram to Mao on January 27. Mao, border. (See the article by Alexandre
however, overestimated China's strength. Mansourov in this issue of the Bulletin.)
In a telegram to Peng the next day, he Why does this discrepancy exist? What
ordered Peng to use a Chinese/North Ko- really happened between Beijing and Mos-
rean offensive to counter the American of- cow in October 1950?
fensive. He even argued that the Chinese To answer these questions (and many
troops possessed the capacity to advance to other similar questions) scholars need full
the 36th parallel.20 Mao's instructions con- access to Beijing's archives. “Selected
tributed to the military defeat of the Chinese works” are useful, but only in a highly lim-
troops on the Korean battlefield in spring ited sense. This is particularly true because
1951. This telegram is certainly important even in the age of "reform and opening to the
because it revealed Mao's strategic thinking outside world,” the writing of Party history
at a crucial point of the Korean War, and in China remains a business primarily de-
reflected the goals he hoped to achieve in signed to enhance the legitimacy of the Party's
Korea—driving the Americans out of the reign in China. This means that materials
Korean peninsula, thus promoting China's released through “selected works” are often
reputation and influence in East Asia while driven by intentions other than having the
at the same time enhancing the Chinese truth known, and, as a result, can be mislead-
revolution at home. However, this telegram ing.
also makes it clear that sometimes Mao's Therefore, while it is wrong for China
judgment of the situation could be very scholars to refuse to recognize the historical
poor. Although a few Chinese authors with value of materials contained in "selected
access to classified documents have cited works," it is dangerous and unwise for them
the telegram in its entirety, this important to rely completely or uncritically on "se-
telegram is excluded from Jianguo yilai lected work" sources. While using them,
Mao Zedong wengao and Mao Zedong junshi scholars must double check“selected works”
wenji.21 This, of course, is only one of materials against other sources, including
many, many such cases.

information obtained from interviews. In the
The end of the Cold War makes it long run, scholars must be given full and
possible for scholars to gain access to docu- equal access to Chinese archives to tell the
ments from the former Soviet Union. Many story of the Chinese Communist revolution
of the Russian documents that have recently and China's relationship with the outside
become available display discrepancies com- world.
pared to what has been revealed by Chinese
documents. In some cases these discrepan-

1. An earlier draft of this article was presented to an

international symposium on “Local Chinese Archives cies expose the limit to which truth is re

and the Historiography of Modern China" at the Univervealed in the documents published in "se- sity of Maryland, College Park, 5-7 October 1995. lected works” in China. Here is another 2. Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected

Documents of the CCP Central Committee, internal example. All the Chinese documents about

edition, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1983the Korean War published in the first vol

1987, 14 vols.; open edition, Beijing: CCP Central ume of Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao Academy Press, 1989-1993, 18 vols.). indicate that the Beijing leadership made 3. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's the decision to enter Korean War in early

Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Repub

lic of China, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical October 1950. In a telegram dated October

Documents, 1987-1994, 8 vols.). 2, Mao formally informed Stalin that the

4. For English translations of these previously released CCP leadership had made the decision to documents, see Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao send troops to Korea.22 However, Russian

7. Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of Mao
Zedong's Military Papers, Beijing: Military Science
Press, 1993, 6 vols.)
8. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic
Papers of Mao Zedong, Beijing: World Knowledge
Press, 1994).
9. Ibid., 322-333.
10. Mao Zedong wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's
Papers, Beijing: People's Press, 1993, 2 vols.).
11. Mao Zedong nianpu (A Chronicle of Mao Zedong,
Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents and
People's Press, 1993, 3 vols.).
12. Ibid., 3:499-500.
13. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic
Papers of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of
Historical Documents, 1990).
14. See ibid., 25-27.
15. Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai niandu, 1898-1949 (A
Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of
Historical Documents, 1989).
16. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng
Xiaoping, Beijing: People's Press, 1993, 3 vols).
17. Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military
Papers of Peng Dehuai, Beijing: The Central Press of
Historical Documents, 1989).
18. Chen Yun wenxuan (Selected Works of Chen Yun,
Beijing: People's Press, 1984, 2 vols.); Hu Qiaomu
wenji (A Collection of Hu Qiaomu's Works, Beijing:
People's Press, 1993-94, 3 vols.); Liu Shaoqi xuanji
(Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, Beijing: People's Press,
1982, 2 vols.); Nie Rongzhen junshi wenxuan (Selected
Military Papers of Nie Rongzhen, Beijing: People's
Liberation Army Press, 1992); Wang Jiaxiang xuanji
(Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang, Beijing: People's
Press, 1984); Zhang Wentian xuanji (A Collection of
Zhang Wentian, Beijing: People's Press, 1993-94, 3
vols); Zhu De xuanji (Selected Works of Zhu De,
Beijing: People's Press, 1984).
19. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7: 391-392.
20. For a more detailed description of the contents of
Mao's telegram, see Chen Jian, “China's Changing
Aims during the Korean War, 1950-1951,The Journal
of American-East Asian Relations 1:1 (Spring 1992),
21. My interviews with researchers at Beijing's Acad-
emy of Military Science, who were responsible for
editing Mao Zedong junshi wenji, in summer 1991
confirmed that this telegram would not be included
because of its “improper" content.
22. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 2 October 1950,
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1:549-552.

Chen Jian is associate professor of history at Southern
Illinois University (Carbondale) and is the author of
China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the
Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994).


The Bulletin regrets that, due to production errors, a number of errors were introduced into the footnoting of Mark Kramer's article in the Spring 1995 issue on "The “Lessons' of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations." A corrected version will appear in the next issue.

Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971 (New

York: Pantheon Books, 1974). documents on the Korean War (which Rus

5. For English translations of these documents, see sian President Yeltsin gave to South Korean Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese CommuPresident Kim Young-sam in June 1994) nist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: Docutell a different story. According to these

mentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publi

cations, 1995), Part II. documents, Mao Zedong informed Stalin

6. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Paon 3 October 1950 that China would not

pers of Mao Zedong, Beijing: Soldier's Press, 1981).


to pay.

THE SECOND HISTORICAL the compiling of a collection of archival cial archives, and those which “involve naARCHIVES OF CHINA:

documents, Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhishi tional interest,” scholars are free to utilize all A Treasure House for Republican ziliao huibian (A Compilation of Materials of SHAC's files. Procedures for foreign China Research

on Chinese Modern Political History). The scholars have also been dramatically simpli

project, launched in 1956 with a directive fied. However, due to the effects of ecoby Gao Hua

from the CCP Central Committee Political nomic reform, SHAC has also increased its translated by Scott Kennedy Research Office, consumed SHAC's entire fees for those scholars who have yet to use its

energies for three years. Only 100 sets of the services. SHAC is also planning to install an After arriving at Nanjing's 309 244 volume, 21 million character collection air-conditioned reading room as another serZhongshan East Road, passing the police were printed. They were then distributed to vice to foreigners, but, of course, you'll have stationed at their post and going through a central party and political organs as well as routine check-in, researchers face a classical some universities to be used as a research A Chinese-language reference book Chinese edifice—the famous Second His- reference. At present, this important collec- which is helpful to users of the Second torical Archives of China (SHAC).1 tion is the largest and richest set of materials Archives is Zhongguo dierlishi dang'anguan

Established in February 1951, SHAC concerning China's domestic situation dur- jianming zhinan (A Brief Guide to the Sechas one of the largest historical collections in ing the Republican era.

ond Historical Archives of China),(Archives China. The former tenant at the archive's Since 1979, SHAC has made public a Publishing House, 1987), a well-organized address was the “Committee for Compiling large number of documents one after an- introduction to each of the categories under GMT (Guomindang] Party Historical other and published three major archival which all of SHAC's documents are stored. Records.” After the People's Republic of document sets: Zhonghua minguoshi Also useful are Dangdai zhongguode China (PRC) was established in 1949, the dang'an ziliao huibian (A Compilation of dang'an shiye [China Today: Archival UnChinese Communist Party (CCP) took over Republican China History Archival dertakings] (Chinese Academy of Social management of the Committee as well as the Records), Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an

Records), Zhonghua minguoshi dang'an Sciences Publishing House, 1988); and archives from the original “National History ziliao conkan (A Series of Republican China Minguoshi yu minguo dang'an lunwenji House." Soon after, large quantities of docu- History Archives), and Zhonghua minguoshi [Republican History and Collected Essays

, ments concerning the GMT regime housed dang'an ziliao congshu (A Collection of on Republican Archives] (Archives Pubin Guangzhou (Canton), Chongqing (Chung- Republican China History Archives). Fi- lishing House, 1991). king), Chengdu, Kunming, Shanghai and nally, in 1985, SHAC launched the quarBeijing, as well as the archival records stored terly, Minguo dang'an (Republican Ar

1. Zhongguo dier lishi dang'anguan. in Beijing on the Northern Warlords Gov- chives). ernment, were all moved to Nanjing, and SHAC has been a resource on issues

Gao Hua, a specialist on Republican era together make up the foundation of SHAC's where historical questions influence current collection.

policy questions. Since 1986, Minguo history and modern intellectual history, At the heart of SHAC's collection are dang'an has published a large number of

teaches in the history department at Nanjing the original records of the central organs of documents concerning relations between

University and the Johns Hopkins Univerthe various regimes in existence during the Tibet and central government authorities.

sity-Nanjing University Center for AmeriRepublican era (1912-1949), namely: 1) the SHAC has also cooperated with Beijing's

can and Chinese Studies. He is currently a Nanjing Provisional Government (January- "China Tibetan Studies Research Center" to

visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and April 1912); 2) the Northern Warlords Gov- publish three volumes of historical materials

is working on a study of the origins of the ernment (April 1912 - June 1928); 3) the on Tibet. The journal has also published

Yanan Rectification Campaign and its influvarious GMT regimes, first centered in materials concerning China's claim to the

ence on the development of Maoism. Scott Guangzhou and Wuhan, and then as a na

Kennedy is a research assistant in the ForSpratly Islands in the South China Sea. tional government in Nanjing (1927-1949); SHAC provided the Ministry of Foreign eign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings and 4) the various puppet regimes of the Affairs with materials concerning China's

Institution and a doctoral candidate in the Japanese (e.g., Wang Jingwei's Nanjing re- Republican-era relationship with Estonia,

Republican-era relationship with Estonia, political science department of George gime). The archives provide a detailed ac- Lithuania and Latvia. They recently al

Washington University. count of policy and actual conditions—at lowed Taiwanese scholars to view docuthe central and local levels-on foreign ments concerning the 2-28 Incident (a mas


TO PUBLISH STUDY policy, military matters, commerce and fi- sacre of Taiwanese by the GMT on 28 Febnance, culture and education, and even so- ruary 1947). Finally, geologists and policy- Two Russian historians who have conducted cial customs. However, the materials of makers involved in the planning of the con

extensive research in Russian and U.S. sources greatest number and value collected at SHAC troversial proposed Three Gorges dam have

have completed a study of Soviet leaders and are those archives concerning the GMT rule relied on SHAC for materials on relevant

the early Cold War: Vladislav M. Zubok and

Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's in Nanjing from 1927-1949. Republican-era research.

Cold War: Soviet Leaders From Stalin to From 1951 to 1979, SHAC's doors re- SHAC has formally been open to schol

Khrushchev, is scheduled for publication by mained closed to the public. During those ars for the past 14 years. Apart from the

Harvard University Press in March 1996. years, the only significant work done was dossiers of various individuals, some judi



Translated and Annotated by
Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian

Translators 'Notes: In February 1950, conversation with the Soviet Ambassador as butchers and Hitler-style fascists, and we the People's Republic of China (PRC) and P.F. Yudin on 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong kept silent on the resolution (condemning the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friend related the joint Sino-Soviet flotilla issue to you), although we published articles to critiship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, a series of more general questions concern- cize you in 1948. In retrospect, we should both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the ing the overall relationship between the two not have done that; we should have disSino-Soviet alliance, made between two countries, revealing comprehensively (often cussed (this issue) with you: if some of your "brotherly" Communist countries, would in cynical tones) his understanding of the viewpoints were incorrect, we should have last forever. However, serious problems historical, philosophical, and political ori- let) you conduct self-criticism, and there soon emerged between the Chinese and gins of the problems existing between Beijing was no need to hurry (into the controversy] Soviet parties and governments. Starting in and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again as [we] did. The same thing is true to us: 1960, the two parties became engaged in an emphasized the issue of equality,empha- should you disagree with us, you should do increasingly heated polemical debate over sizing that Beijing could not accept Moscow's the same thing, that is, the adoption of a the nature of true communism and which treatment of the CCP as a junior partner. method of persuasion and consultation. party represented it. By the late 1960s, the The third group includes four Chinese docu- There have not been that many

successful relationship between the two countries had ments from Russian Foreign Ministry ar- cases in which one criticizes foreign parties deteriorated to such an extent that a major chives, which demonstrate the extent to which in newspapers. (Your] case offers a proborder war erupted between them in March China had been dependent upon the military found historical lesson for the international 1969. Why did China and the Soviet Union and other material support of the Soviet communist movement. Although you have change from allies to enemies? What prob- Union in the 1950s. These documents make suffered from it, the international commulems caused the decline and final collapse it possible to observe the Sino-Soviet rela- nist movement has learned a lesson from this of the Sino-Soviet alliance? In order to tions from another perspective.

mistake. [The international communist answer these questions, scholars need ac

movement) must fully understand [the sericess to contemporary documentary sources, Part I. Criticism of Stalin and the ousness of ] this mistake. and these translations of the newly avail- Emergence of Sino-Soviet Differences When you offered to recognize new able Chinese documents provide a basis for

China, we did not respond, nor did we debeginning to answer these questions. 1. Minutes, Mao's Conversation with a cline it. Undoubtedly, we should not have

The documents are divided into three Yugoslavian Communist Union Delega- rejected it, because there was no reason for groups. The first group includes two tion, Beijing, (undated) September 19561 us to do so. When Britain recognized us, we speeches by Mao Zedong and one report by Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Se- did not say no to it. How could we find any Zhou Enlai in 1956-1957. They reflect the lected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] excuse to reject the recognition of a socialist Chinese Communist view on such important (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical country? questions as Khrushchev's criticism of Documents, 1993), 251-262

There was, however, another factor Stalin, the general principles underlying

which prevented us from responding to you: the relations among brotherly parties and We welcome you to China. We are very the Soviet friends did not want us to form states," and their perception of the Soviet pleased at your visit. We have been sup- diplomatic relations with you. If so, was Union's attitude toward the Chinese revo- ported by you, as well as by other brotherly China an independent state? Of course, yes. lution. Particularly interesting is Mao (Communist) parties. We are invariably If an independent state, why, then, did we Zedong's repeated reference to the "un- supporting you as much as all the other follow their instructions? [My) comrades, equalrelationship between the Chinese brotherly parties. In today's world, the Marx- when the Soviet Union requested us to folCommunist Party (CCP) and the Soviet ist and Communist front remains united, low their suit at that time, it was difficult for Union during Stalin's era. Through these whether in places where success (of Com- us to oppose it. It was because at that time documents one is able to sense some of the munist revolution) is achieved or not yet some people claimed that there were two deep-rooted causes leading to the decline of achieved. However, there were times when Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the the Sino-Soviet alliance. The second group we were not so united; there were times when other in China, even if no one passed a includes three documents reflecting the CCP we let you down. We listened to the opinions resolution that Mao Zedong was Tito. I have leadership's response to the Soviet propos- of the Information Bureau2 in the past. Al- once pointed out to the Soviet comrades that als in 1958 to establish a long-wave radio though we did not take part in the Bureau's [they) suspected that I was a half-hearted

station in China and a joint Sino-Soviet [business), we found it difficult not to sup- Tito, but they refuse to recognize it. When submarine flotilla in 1958. In his long port it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you did they remove the tag of half-hearted Tito

from my head? The tag was removed after tion. (Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us people who had suspected whether China's [China] decided to resist America [in Korea) correct this mistake: while Wang Ming was a real revolution. and came to (North) Korea's aid and when “decked himself out and fawned on (Jiang]," You might wonder why (we) still pay a (we) dealt the US imperialists a blow. Jiang Jieshi “slapped his face and kicked tribute to Stalin in China by hanging his The Wang Ming line3 was in fact Stalin's him out.” Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China's portrait on the wall. Comrades from Mos

” line. It ended up destroying ninety percent best instructor: he had educated the people cow have informed us that they no longer of our strength in our bases, and one hundred of the whole nation as well as all of our Party hang Stalin's portraits and only display percent of our strength) in the white areas. 4 members. Jiang lectured with his machine Lenin's and current leaders' portraits in pubComrade [Liu] Shaoqis pointed this out in guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with lic parade. They, however, did not ask us to his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress. 6 his own words.

follow their suit. We find it very difficult to Why, then, did he not openly attribute (the The third time was after Japan's surren- cope. The four mistakes committed by Stalin losses) to the simpact of Stalin's line? There der and the end of the Second World War. are yet to be made known to the Chinese is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and people as well as to our whole party. Our could criticize Stalin; but it would be inap- [Franklin D.) Roosevelt and decided to give situation is quite different from yours: your propriate for us to criticize him. We should the whole of China to America and Jiang (suffering inflicted by Stalin) is known to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Jieshi. In terms of material and moral sup- the people and to the whole world. Within Union. Maybe (we) could make our criti- port, especially moral support, Stalin hardly our party, the mistakes of the two Wang cism public sometime in the future. It has to gave any to us, the Communist Party, but Ming lines are well known; but our people be that way in today's world, because facts supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was do not know that these mistakes originated are facts. The Comintern made numerous made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later in Stalin. Only our Central Committee was mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages told Tito (this decision) who mentioned his aware that Stalin blocked our revolution and were not so bad, but its middle stage was not conversation (with Stalin on this decision] in regarded me as a half-hearted Tito. so good: it was all right when Lenin was his autobiography.

We had no objection that the Soviet alive and when (Georgii] Dimitrov was in Only after the dissolution of the Union functions as a center (of the world charge. The first Wang Ming line domi- Comintern did we start to enjoy more free- revolution] because it benefits the socialist nated (our party) for four years, and the dom. We had already begun to criticize movement. You may disagree (with us on Chinese revolution suffered the biggest opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and this point. You wholeheartedly support losses.8 Wang Ming is now in Moscow tak- unfolded the rectification movement. The Khrushchev's campaign to criticize Stalin, ing a sick leave, but still we are going to elect rectification, in fact, was aimed at denounc- but we cannot do the same because our him to be a member of the party's Central ing the mistakes that Stalin and the Comintern people would dislike it. In the previous

a Committee. He indeed is an instructor for had committed in directing the Chinese revo- parades (in China), we held up portraits of our party; he is a professor, an invaluable lution; however, we did not openly mention Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as one who could not be purchased by money. a word about Stalin and the Comintern. those of a few Chinese [leaders)—Mao, Liu He has taught the whole party, so that it Sometime in the near future, (we] may openly [Shaoqi), Zhou (Enlai), and Zhu (De] – would not follow his line.

do so. There are two explanations of why we and other brotherly parties' leaders. Now That was the first time when we got the did not openly criticize (Stalin and the we adopt a measure of "overthrowing all": worst of Stalin.

Comintern): first, as we followed their in- no one's portrait is handed out. For this The second time was during the anti- structions, we have to take some responsi- year's “First of May” celebration, AmbassaJapanese war. Speaking Russian and good bility ourselves. Nobody compelled us to dor Bobkoveshi10 already saw in Beijing at flattering Stalin, Wang Ming could di- follow their instructions! Nobody forced us that no one's portrait was held in parade. rectly communicate with Stalin. Sent back to be wrongfully deviated to right and left However, the portraits of five dead perto China by Stalin, he tried to set (us) toward directions! There are two kinds of Chinese: sons—Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin and right deviation this time, instead of follow- one kind is a dogmatist who completely Sun (Yat-sen]—and a not yet dead personing the leftist line he had previously advo- accepts Stalin's line; the other opposes dog- Mao Zedong-are still hanging (on the wall). cated. Advocating (CCP) collaboration with matism, thus refusing to obey (Stalin's) in- Let them hang on the wall! You Yugoslavithe Guomindang [the Nationalist Party or structions. Second, we do not want to dis- ans may comment that the Soviet Union no GMD), he can be described as “decking please (the Soviets], to disrupt our relations longer hangs Stalin's portrait, but the Chihimself out and self-inviting (to the GMD);" with the Soviet Union. The Comintern has nese still do. he wanted [us] to obey the GMD whole- never made self-criticism on these mistakes; As of this date some people remain heartedly. The Six-Principle Program he nor has the Soviet Union ever mentioned suspicious of whether our socialism can be put forward was to overturn our Party's Ten- these mistakes. We would have fallen out successfully constructed and stick to the Principle Policy. [His program] opposed with them had we raised our criticism. assertion that our Communist Party is a establishing anti-Japanese bases, advocated The fourth time was when (Moscow] phony one. What can we do? These people giving up our Party's own armed force, and regarded me as a half-hearted Tito or semi- eat and sleep every day and then propagate preached that as long as Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Titoist. Not only in the Soviet Union but that the Chinese Communist Party is not Kai-shek] was in power, there would be also in other socialist countries and some really a communist party, and that China's peace (in China). We redressed this devia- non-socialist countries were there some socialist construction is bound to fail. To

take a

them, it would be a bewildering thing if remains the most fearsome (for the imperial

remains the most fearsome [for the imperial- ten to twenty years and even more dangerous socialism could be built in China! Look out, ists] whereas China is merely the second. in forty to fifty years. (they warn). China might become an impe- What they are afraid of is our politics and that My comrades, let me advise you that rialist country—to follow America, Britain, we may have an enormous impact in Asia. you should also watch out for this potential. and France to become the fourth imperialist That is why they keep spreading the words Your industry is much modernized and has country! At present China has little indus- that China will be out of control and will experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin try, thus is in no position [to be an imperial- invade others, so on and so forth.

made you suffer and hence, justice is on your ist country); but (China) will become formi- We have been very cautious and mod- side. All of this, though, may become your dable in one hundred years! Chinggis Khan11 est, trying to overcome arrogance but adher- (mental] burden. might be brought to life; consequently Eu- ing to the “Five Principles."14 We know we The above-mentioned four mistakes rope would suffer again, and Yugoslavia have been bullied in the past; we understand Stalin committed (concerning China] may might be conquered! The “Yellow Peril” how it feels to be bullied. You would have also become our burden. When China bemust be prevented!

had the same feeling, wouldn't you? comes industrialized in later years, it will be There is absolutely no ground for this to China's future hinges upon socialism. It more likely that we get cocky. Upon your happen! The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist will take fifty or even one hundred years to return to your country, please tell your youngParty. The Chinese people are peace-loving turn China into a wealthy and powerful coun- sters that, should China stick her tail up in people. We believe that aggression is a try. Now no [formidable] blocking force the future, even if the tail becomes ten thoucrime, therefore, we will never seize an inch stands in China's way. China is a huge sand meters high, still they must criticize of territory or a piece of grass from others. country with a population of one fourth of China. [You must keep an eye on China, We love peace and we are Marxists. that of the world. Nevertheless, her contribu- and the entire world must keep an eye on

We oppose great power politics in in- tion to the world is yet to be compatible with China. At that time, I definitely will not be ternational relations. Although our industry her population size, and this situation will here: I will already be attending a conference is small, all things considered, we can be have to change, although my generation and together with Marx. regarded as a big power. Hence some people even my son's generation may not see the We are sorry that we hurt you before, [in China) begin to be cocky. We then warn change taking place. How it will change in thus owing you a good deal. Killing must be them: “Lower your heads and act with your the future depends on how (China) develops. compensated by life and debts must be paid tails tucked between your legs." When I China may make mistakes or become cor- in cash. We have criticized you before, but was little, my mother often taught me to rupt; the current good situation may

why do we still keep quiet? Before behave “with tails tucked between legs.” bad turn and, then, the bad situation may take [Khrushchev's] criticism of Stalin, we were This is a correct teaching and now I often a good turn. There can be little doubt, though, not in a position to be as explicit about some mention it to my comrades.

that even if (China's] situation takes a bad issues as we are now. In my previous conDomestically, we oppose Pan- turn, it may not become as decadent a society versations with (Ambassador) Bobkoveshi, Hanism, 12 because this tendency is harmful as that of Jiang Jieshi's. This anticipation is I could only say that as long as the Soviet to the unity of all ethnic groups. based on dialectics. Affirmation, negation, Union did not criticize Stalin, we would be Hegemonism and Pan-Hanism both are sec- and, then, negation of negation. The path in in no position to do so; as long as the Soviet tarianism. Those who have hegemonious the future is bound to be tortuous.

Union did not restore (diplomatic] relations tendencies only care about their own inter- Corruption, bureaucracy, hegemonism, with Yugoslavia, we could not establish ests but ignore others', whereas those Pan- and arrogance all may take effect in China. relations with you.15 Now these issues can Hanists only care about the Han people and However, the Chinese people are inclined to be openly discussed. I have already talked to regard the Han people as superior to others, be modest and willing to learn from others. the Soviet comrades about the four mistakes thus damaging [the interests of] all the mi- One explanation is that we have little “capi- that Stalin had committed (to China); I talked norities. tal” at our disposal: first, we did not invent to [Soviet Ambassador Pavel] Yudin16 about

] Some people have asserted in the past Marxism which we learned from others; sec- it, and I shall talk to Khrushchev about it that China has no intention to be friends ond, we did not experience the October Revo- next time when we meet. I talk to you about with other countries, but wants to split with lution and our revolution did not achieve it because you are our comrades. However, the Soviet Union, thus becoming a trouble- victory until 1949, some thirty-two years we still cannot publish this in the newspamaker. Now, however, this kind of people after the October Revolution; third, we were pers, because the imperialists should not be shrinks to only a handful in the socialist only a branch army, not a main force, during allowed to know about it. We may openly countries; their number has been reduced the Second World War; fourth, with little talk about one or two mistakes of Stalin's in since the War to Resist America and Assist modern industry, we merely have agriculture the future. Our situation is quite different Korea.13 It is, however, a totally different and some shabby, tattered handicrafts. Al- from yours: Tito's autobiography mentions thing for the imperialists: the stronger China though there are some people among us who Stalin because you have already broken up becomes, the more scared they will be appear to be cocky, they are in no position to .

with the Soviet Union. They also understand that China is not that be cocky; at most, [they can merely show] Stalin advocated dialectical materialterrifying as long as China has no advanced their tails one or two meters high. But we ism, but sometimes he lacked materialism industry, and as long as China continues to must prevent this from happening in the and, instead, practiced metaphysics; he wrote rely on human power. The Soviet Union future: it may become dangerous (for us) in about historical materialism, but very often

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