« 上一頁繼續 »
being held. As the leadership of the frater- tries. Under present conditions, when the sector)
Proletariat of all countries, unite! tiations showed that the Chinese side does socialist community, it is all the more impornot aim, in the near future in any case, to tant to meticulously observe the criteria elabo- COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET come to any agreements about the normal- rated at the meetings of the international UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE ization of relations between the USSR and departments of the CCs of the fraternal counthe PRC; that China knowingly proposes tries for approaching questions of bilateral
TOP SECRET unacceptable preconditions, and rejects the relations between socialist countries and the Soviet side'sconstructive proposals, directed PRC. These mandate that the rapproche- No. P217/57 at the elaboration of principles of relations ment between Beijing and the USA (as their between the two countries and the building actions in Indochina and Afghanistan attest)
To Comrades Brezhnev, of a political-juridical basis for them. is taking a more and more dangerous form
Kosygyn, Andropov, Gromyko, As far as the second round is con- and is directed against the interests of peace
Kirilenko, Suslov, Tikhonov, cerned, now it is generally difficult to say and the process of and the process of detente. Given the way the
Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, anything about it, insofar as the Chinese situation is progressing, keep in mind that the
Zamiatin, Smirtyukov. press announced that it would be "inappro- task of decisively repelling the strengthening
“ priate” to hold them at present. Recent attacks on the socialist community on the
Extract from protocol No. 217 of events attest to the escalation of Beijing's part of imperialism, reaction, and Chinese
the CC CPSU Politburo session hostility towards the Soviet Union. hegemonism, is all the more important.
of October 2, 1980 3. Taking into account the hostile char- 5. Note the necessity of a vigilant apacter of China's policy towards socialist proach to the activities of Beijing and its states and the strengthening of its aggres- representatives in socialist countries, its at- Re: Carrying out additional measures to siveness, note the necessity of a careful and tempts to penetrate various spheres of the counter American-Chinese military deliberate approach to the development of domestic life of these countries, to spread its cooperation economic ties and scientific-technical co- influence in various strata of the population, operation with the PRC, particularly in those particularly among young people, some of Approve the draft indicated for Soviet areas which would facilitate the growth of whom are a part of the technical, scientific, ambassadors and Soviet representatives its military-industrial potential. Beijing's and creative intelligentsia. It is important not (enclosed). efforts to exaggerate the brilliant perspec- to weaken control over their contacts with tives of trade and economic cooperation Chinese representatives, to monitor their vis
CC SECRETARY with some socialist countries don't have any its to various organizations, including govreal basis and are only a tactical means of ernment agencies, scientific-research and influencing these countries. Beijing now educational institutions, and also to limit the considers it advantageous to orient itself attendance by citizens in the post countries of
For point 57 prot. No. 217 towards the West, and not to the develop- events at Chinese embassies. ment of trade-economic ties with the coun- It would be inadvisable to consider the
Secret tries of the socialist community. The Chi- explanatory work on this question to be an nese side is prepared to give any promises, episodic campaign. It is necessary to con- FOR ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS however, as experience shows, among them duct it consistently, taking into account the AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES the heralded experience of relations with specifics of the post country, and, as much as Romania and Yugoslavia, China does not possible, involve a wide range of leading At the present time the partnership behave sufficient foreign currency and trade party and government cadres, as well as the tween American imperialism and Beijing's resources to fulfill these promises. In 1979, creative intelligentsia. As necessary, con- hegemonism, which is spreading to the milifor example, the planned trade balance with tribute any suitable proposals for effective tary sphere, is a new negative phenomenon the FSRY [Yugoslavia] was fulfilled only to opposition to Beijing's subversive activities in world politics and dangerous for all of one fourth. China not only is an undesirable and the neutralization of undesirable tenden- humanity. Counting on using “strong and partner, but also often uses trade-economic cies in the policies of specific socialist states. stable”China in its strategic interests, Washrelations as a means of pressure on socialist
ington is expanding the parameters for coopstates (SRV, MNR, Albania), which refuse
eration with Beijing in the military-technito undertake obligations for purely political
cal sphere. In particular, the USA adminismotives.
Document II. CPSU CC Politburo tration has affirmed its readiness to deliver 4. Pay attention to the importance of Directive to Soviet Ambassadors and modern American weapons and technology continuing a consistent and broad coordina- Representatives, 2 October 1980
to China, which could be widely used for tion of actions towards China and its at
military purposes. tempts to use a differentiated approach to Subject to return within 7 days to
As American-Chinese military coopundermine the cohesion of the socialist coun- the CC CPSU (General department, 1st eration develops further, destructive elements
will grow in international relations.
ing China into a military "superpower," and and USA have agreed to follow. In accordance with the instructions you the resolution of the most serious problems, As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, received previously and taking into account such as increasing the extremely low mate- it has every opportunity to defend its interthe specifics of your post country, continue rial and cultural level of the Chinese people, ests and repel the presumptions of other your work to reveal the dangerous character has been relegated to an indefinite future. In countries, including the PRC. The calculaof the developing rapprochement between China they don't hide the fact that “modern- tions of those who try to direct Americanaggressive circles in the West, above all the ization” is the best means of preparing for Chinese relations in such as way as to use USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling war. In practice, unrestrained militarization China as a means of pressure and as a miliattention to the following aspects.
accelerates economic collapse and increased tary counterweight to the Soviet Union are 1. In developing military cooperation instability in China. Thus, those countries short-sighted. Those who hope to redirect with China, the ruling circles in the USA who actively take part in the Chinese pro- Chinese expansion to the north risk major count on the possibility of influencing China gram of "modernization,” actually contrib
miscalculation. Encouraging the expansion to act in a "desirable" way, of channeling its ute to the growth of its military potential and of China's military potential increases the policies in an acceptable direction. Fre- render a disservice to the Chinese people. danger that certain countries would be inquently the foreign policy activity of the On the other hand, the policy of milita- veigled into Beijing's orbit, and in the longPRC is presented as a “stabilizing” factor in rizing the country will inevitably engender term, could lead to a situation in which these the international arena. The Chinese leaders unpredictable turns and zigzags and future very countries could become the victims of themselves are not adverse to playing up to evidence of foreign policy adventurism, lead- Chinese expansion. Therefore, thinking resuch a discussion and, to this end, without ing to the dangerous destabilization of the alistically, it would follow to recognize that withdrawing the thesis of the “inevitability international situation and the inflammation a "strong" China would chose a different of war," have begun to use a more flexible of international tension. Any injection of direction for its expansionist plans: in all terminology. However, with the help of a aid, particularly by the USA, either directly likelihood it would swallow up neighboring sham "peaceful nature,” invoked to add or indirectly contributing to China's milita- countries, grab hold of all the vitally imporgreater“respectability” to the PRC's foreign rization and to the development of the Chi- tant regions of the world, and would cerpolicy, Beijing is simply counting on gain- nese military potential, would enable China tainly not serve as an instrument in the hands ing time to accomplish the forced arming of to find the striking power necessary for the of the USA or any other country. the country. Actually, more and more, the realization of its hegemonic schemes. Un- 5. The development of military-politiChinese leadership is resorting to a policy of der conditions when Beijing not only op- cal cooperation between China and the USA, diktat and interference in the domestic af- poses all constructive proposals to strengthen which elicits concern among many states, fairs of other countries, and assumes on peace and detente, but also directly pro- has led already to a noticeable worsening of itself the improper functions of “teaching vokes international conflict, this said] would the international situation and complicated lessons” and “punishing” the unruly with mean an increased danger of war breaking the search for real paths to strengthening the force of arms.
out and the growth of threats to all humanity, peace and security in various regions of the 2. As before, the PRC government including the Chinese and American peoples. world. In an effort to create favorable condideclines to make any international legal com- The fact that what is proposed for deliv- tions for the realization of its hegemonic mitments to disarmament, tries to diminishery to China is “non-lethal" equipment and aims, the Beijing leadership counts on agthe importance of results achieved in this technology, “defensive,” and “dual-use,” gravating relations between countries, setarea, and refuses to take part in measures to etc., does not change the situation. The issue ting some states against others, and provoklimit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set is not that such distinctions are extremely ing military conflicts. Beijing does not hide about to manufacture and experiment with relative, but that cooperation with military
relative, but that cooperation with military the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear conintercontinental ballistic missiles, capable modernization will free up the forces within flict between the Soviet Union and the USA, of carrying nuclear warheads, and is work- China and the means necessary for building and, from its ashes, assume world dominaing on the creation of neutron weapons. All up its principal strike force - its nuclear tion. this drives the global arms race forward and capability.
Those who insist on the necessity of directly contradicts the interests of detente. 4. The plans Beijing has been develop- “strengthening” China base their calculaThis policy of Beijing's seriously threatens ing for a long time to change the global tions on the assumption that Beijing would everyone, even the USA and Japan, and not correlation of forces and the entire structure coordinate in a confrontation with the USSR just the Soviet Union and other socialist of contemporary international relations elicit and in its conflicts in Asia, and therefore states.
serious alarm. The transfer to China of any would not be dangerous for the West. But 3. There is absolutely no basis for technology or equipment whatsoever—this taking into account the continuing domestic concluding, as some do, that Beijing's al- would be a step in the direction of the erosion political struggle in China, no one can guarleged adoption of a “modernization pro- of the established military-balance in the antee that in 5-10 years China would not gram" represents a new political course to world and of a new cycle in the arms race. bring into play an anti-American card or overcome China's economic backwardness. The destruction of the balance of military anti-Japanese card and use its ICBM force In fact this course was taken above all to forces would erode the basis for the arms against those countries which irresponsibly contribute to the realization of pre-existing limitation negotiations insofar as equal se- connived and assisted with the PRC's replans to speed up the process of transform- curity is the main principle which the USSR armament.
The experience of history attests to the Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present
COLD WAR IN ASIA fact that the extent of China's expansion a direct threat to other regions.
continued from page 191 will be proportional to the military might of Under these conditions, the Soviet Union the Chinese army. Even today China's
RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC: can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not
PAST AND PRESENT neighbors, above all the countries of South- only do we carefully monitor the direction of east Asia which the Chinese leaders con- American-Chinese cooperation in the mili
(Khabarovsk, 26-29 August 1995) sider to be their traditional sphere of influ- tary sphere, but also we must take the neces
26 August 1995: Multiethnic Demographics ence, experience an immediate threat. It sary steps to strengthen the security of our would be easy to imagine how China will borders. We cannot tolerate change in the behave in relation to its neighbors once the military-strategic balance in favor of forces
Morning: Russians Abroad in the Far East USA and its neighbors assist China to ac- hostile to the cause of peace. quire more modern weapons. Above all, (Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw,
Maria Krotova (Herzen Institute, PetersChina is trying to institute its control over Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, burg): “Russo-Chinese Daily Relations in pre
1917 Harbin" Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul. Malacca and the straits of Singapore.
The post countries should inform MID
Lena Aurilena (Institute of History, Under these conditions, attempts to ig- Ministry of Foreign Affairs) that Soviet
Vladivostok): “Youth Politics in Russian Emigre nore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese ambassadors were sent instructions about Organizations in Manchukuo, 1930s-40s”
Nadezhda Solov'eva (Khabarovsk Provinpolicy and to remain neutral will only en- carrying out work to counter the negative courage Beijing to undertake new adven
cial Archive): “Khabarovsk's Archival Holdings counsequences for the causes of socialism,
on Russo-Chinese Relations" tures and to extend its expansion. Collec- peace, and detente, of the establishment of an tive efforts by Asian states could, on the American-Chinese military alliance. Famil
David Wolff (Princeton U.): “Interlocking contrary, impede China's path to increased iarize the recipient with the content of the
Diasporas: The Jews of Harbin, 1903-1914” aforementioned instructions. military might, which is directed above all
Shuxiao LI (Heilongjiang Trade Corporaagainst countries of this region.
Carry out your work in coordination
tion): “The Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin's (For New Delhi only. The connivance
Rise as an Economic Center” with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the and outright support of the USA for military Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the
Alexander Toropov (Central Archive of the
Far East, Vladivostok): “Russia's Far Eastern preparations in China can only contradict People's Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the India's interests. Although the Chinese Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), the Ger
Neighbors" leadership is holding talks about normaliz- man Democratic Republic (GDR), the Lao
Iurii Tsipkin (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): ing relations with India, there is an entire tian People's Democratic Republic (LPDR),
“The Social Composition of the Harbin Emigra
tion, 1920s-30s" array of means of pressure against it in the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), China's arsenal of strategies. In American- the Polish People's Republic (PPR), and the Chinese plans, the role which is allotted to Czechoslovak People's Republic (CPR).)
Afternoon : “Foreigners” in the Russian Far East Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India It is necessary to attentively follow all (RFE): Settlement and Resettlement and as a base of support for the aggressive foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans actions of the USA and China in Southeast
Tatiana Ikonnikova (Ped. Institute, for the expansion of American-Chinese miliAsia is expanding more and more. In coop- tary cooperation, to regularly and effectively Khabarovsk): “German Intelligence in the RFE eration with the USA, Beijing is flooding inform the Center about them, and to take the
during WWI: Suspicions and Realities"
Vladimir Mukhachev (Institute of History, India's neighbors with arms and, by creat- measures required to neutralize the tendening an atmosphere of war psychosis, is at- cies that are undesirable for our interests.
Vladivostok): “Intervention and Civil War: New
Documents and Approaches” tempting to maintain in power unpopular regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. (Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 34, Dok. 10;
Teruyuki HARA (Slavic Research Center, Beijing is speeding up its military prepara- translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.)
Sapporo, Japan): “The Japanese in Vladivostok,
1906-1922" tions along the Chinese-Indian border, con
Elena Chernolutskaia (Institute of History, structing missile bases and strategic roads in Tibet, and activating its support for separat- Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the
Vladivostok): “Forced Migrations in the Far East
from the 1920s till mid-1950s" ist movements in northeast India, where it is Institute of Modern History, Academica
Natsuko OKA (Institute of Developing practically waging an “undeclared war"
Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on against this country.)
Economies): “Koreans in the Russian Far East: a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with There is no doubt that as China strength- China: The Evolution of Moscow's China
Collectivization and Deportation" ens its military-industrial potential, it will Policy, 1969-95.
Viktoriia Romanova (Ped. Institute, advance further along the path to the real
Khabarovsk): “The Jewish Diaspora in the makization of Chinese leadership's openly de
ing of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast" clared territorial pretensions against neigh
Chizuko TAKAO (Waseda U., Tokyo, Jaboring countries in Southeast, South, and
pan): “Reevaluating the 'Birobidzhan Project': West Asia. This will not only lead to a
The Regional Context" serious destabilization of the situation in
27 August 1995: Civilian and Military in the Borderland: Options and Tensions
Morning: Regional Political-Economy
Pavel Minakir and Nadezhda Mikheeva (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “The Economy of the Russian Far East : Between Centralization and Regionalization”
Vladimir Syrkin (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Economic Regionalism: Conditions, Factors and Tendencies”
Katherine Burns (Massachusetts Inst. of Technology): “The Russian Far Eastern Initiative: Autonomous Decision-Making and Cooperation in Northeast Asia.”
Cristina Sarykova (Univ. of Calif. at San Diego): “Politics and the Reform of the Primorsk Fuel and Energy Complex"
Vladivostok): “Foreign Investment in the Rus-
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL
Igor Sanachev (Far Eastern State U.): “For- CWIHP Working Papers are available free upon eign Capital in the Far East in the 1920s” request. Requests can be sent to Jim Hershberg, Takeshi HAMASHITA (Tokyo U.): “Japa
Director, CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center, nese Currency and Banking in Northeast Asia"
Smithsonian Castle, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW,
4439; or e-mailed to firstname.lastname@example.org
China's Entry into the Korean War”
Morning: International Economic Considerations
#2. P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw"
#3. James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Toward Germany during the Beria Interregnum"
Afternoon: The RFE as “Outpost"
#4. Vladislav M. Zubok, "Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Information, 1952-52"
Elizabeth Wishnick (Independent Scholar):
Weixian MA (Institute of E. Europe and
Natal’ia Bezliudnaia (Far Eastern State U.):
Jingxue XU (Institute of Siberia, Harbin):
Andrei Admidin and E. Devaeva (Institute
Douglas Barry (U. of Alaska - Anchorage):
#5. Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961"
Oleg Sergeev (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "The Cossack Revival in the Far East: From Borderguards to Émigrés to Interest Group"
Vladimir Sokolov (Primor'e Provincial Museum): "Russian Nationalism and the Cossacks of the Far East"
Jun NIU (Institute of American Studies, CASS): “Soviet Policy towards Northeast China, 1945-49"
Ping BU (Institute of Modern History, Heilongjiang Province Academy of Social Sciences): “Sino-Soviet Disposal of Japanese Chemical Weapons after 1945”
Evgenija Gudkova (Institute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Military Conversion in the Russian Far East"
James Hershberg (Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center, Washington, DC): “Northeast Asia and the Cold War"
Tamara Troyakova (Institute of History, Vladivostok): "The Maritime Province on the Road to Openness: Khrushchev in Vladivostok”
#6. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)”.
#7. Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, “Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two Reports"
Afternoon: Perceptions, Images & Area-Studies
#8. Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives"
#9. Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports”
#10. Norman M. Naimark, "To Know Everything and To Report Everything Worth Knowing’: Building the East German Police State, 1945-1949"
Late Afternoon: International Economic Considerations (1)
Viktor Larin (Institute of History,
Zhengyun NAN (Beijing Normal U.): “The
Stephen Kotkin (Princeton U.): “Frank
Evgenii Plaksen (Institute of History,
Thomas Lahusen (Duke University) :
Tatsuo NAKAMI (Tokyo Foreign Languages U.), “Japanese Conceptions of Northeast Asia in the 20th century”
#11. Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback”
#12. Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, and the Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery"
Natal'ia Troitskaia (Far Eastern State U.): “The Effect of Changing Border Regimes on Large-scale Trade between late-Imperial Russia and China"
Mikhail Koval'chuk (Institute of Transport, Khabarovsk): “Foreign Trade and Transport in the Russian Far East, 1860-1930s”
Anatolii Mandrik (Institute of History,
#13. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three
MAO ZEDONG'S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958:
CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS
Translated and Annotated
Translators 'Note: On 23 August 1958, as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic CulChinese Communist forces in the Fujian scholars have been forced to resort to "edu- ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, area along the People's Republic of China's cated guesses" to answer these questions. 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery
The materials in the following pages, Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled translated from Chinese, provide new in- Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: ChineseJinmen Island. In the following two months, sights for understanding Beijing's handling
sights for understanding Beijing's handling British-American Relations, 1949-1958 several hundred thousand artillery shells of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by it. At one point, a Chinese Communist Lengxi, then the director of the New China Thomas Christensen to be published by invasion of the Nationalist-controlled off- News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin Princeton University Press.] shore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) ribao (People's Daily). Wu was personally Rendering Chinese- or English-lanand Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In involved in the decision-making process in guage materials into the other language is response to the rapidly escalating Commu- Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and difficult because the two languages have no nist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the attended several Politburo Standing Com- common linguistic roots. Thus, the materiEisenhower Administration, in accordance mittee meetings discussing the events. His als provided below are sometimes free rather with its obligations under the 1954 Ameri- memoir provides both a chronology and an than literal translations from Chinese to can-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. insider's narrative of how Beijing's leaders, English. Great care has been taken to avoid naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. Mao Zedong in particular, handled the cri- altering the substantive meaning intended naval vessels to help the Nationalists pro- sis. The second part comprises 18 docu- by the author of the documents. Material tect Jinmen's supply lines. Even the leaders ments, including two internal speeches de- appearing in the text in brackets has been of the Soviet Union, then Beijing's close livered by Mao explaining the Party's exter- supplied to clarify meaning or to provide ally, feared the possible consequences of nal policies in general and its Taiwan policy missing words or information not in the Beijing's actions, and sent Foreign Minis- in particular. The two parts together provide
in particular. The two parts togetherprovide original text. Additional problems with inter Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to in- a foundation to build a scholarly under- dividual documents are discussed in the quire about China's reasons for shelling standing of some of the key calculations notes. The notes also include explanatory Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the underlying the Beijing leadership's man- information to place key individual and Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed agement of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly
agement of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly events in context or to provide further inforon October 6, when Beijing issued a “Mes- interesting is the revelation that Mao de- mation on the material being discussed. sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan" in the cided to shell Jinmen to distract American name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it attention from, and counter American moves Part I. Memoir, "Inside Story of the was speculated by many at that time, and in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his
, in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his Decision Making during the Shelling of later confirmed, that this message was extensive explanation of how China should Jinmen" drafted by Mao Zedong). The message use a "noose strategy" to fight the "U.S. By Wu Lengxi! called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan imperialists." Equally important is his em- (Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Litproblem, arguing that all Chinese should phasis on the connection between the tense erature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]] unite to confront the "American plot” to situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass divide China permanently. From this day mobilization in China leading to the Great In August 1958, the members of the on, the Communist forces dramatically re- Leap Forward. It should also be noted that Standing Committee of the Chinese Comlaxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the despite the aggressive appearance of munist Party (CCP) Central Committee PoTaiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war Beijing's Taiwan policy, Mao paid special litburo met at Beidaihe2 for a regular top between China and the United States. attention to avoiding a direct military con- leaders' working conference. The meeting
In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of frontation with American forces present in originally planned to focus on the nation's the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. industrial problems, and later the issue of the Cold War history, it is particularly impor- Although these materials are not directly people's commune was added to the discustant to understand Beijing 's motives. Why from Chinese archives, they create a new sion. did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the basis for scholars to deepen their under- The Politburo convened its summit shelling relate to China's overall domestic standing of the 1958 events. (Ed. note: For meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in and international policies? Why did the recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis newly available Chinese sources, see Shu the meeting several days later. On the 20th,