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situation in Lebanon is more flexible as no treaty is involved there. It is said that one issued the invitation, and the other came, and [the noose] is hitched up. As far as Taiwan is concerned, this is an encased knot since a treaty was signed. There is no difference between the Democrats and Republicans in this case. Eisenhower agreed on the treaty and [Harry] Truman sent the Seventh Fleet there. Truman could come and go at will since there was no treaty during his time. Eisenhower signed the treaty. America is tied up [in Taiwan] because of the Guomindang's panic and request, and also because America was willing [to be tied up there].

Is it [America] tied up at Jinmen and Mazu? I think that it has also been tied up at Jinmen and Mazu. Why do I think so? Did not the Americans say that they had not made any decision yet, and that they would

Khrushchev's Nuclear Promise To Beijing During the 1958 Crisis

introduction by Vladislav M. Zubok

The history of the "second" Taiwan Straits crisis (August-October 1958) has gotten a second wind lately, due to the emergence of new Chinese evidence.1 While this research has greatly illuminated Chinese decision-making, scholars still have been unable to ascertain precisely what transpired between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships

after the outbreak of the crisis. The document printed below, a previously secret 27 September 1958 communication from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC CPC), an internally circulated version of which is now declassified and available to researchers at the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, adds one more piece of evidence to this puzzling story.

Two episodes relating to Soviet-Chinese interactions during the 1958 crisis have attracted particular attention: the secret visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Beijing and his talks with Chinese leaders on September 6-7; and the letter of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 warning that an attack on the People's Republic

make the decision in accordance with the situation after the Communists landed there? The problem lies in the 110,000 Guomindang troops, 95,000 men on Jinmen and 15,000 on Mazu. America has to pay attention to them as long as these two large garrisons are on the islands. This concerns the interest and feelings of their class. Why do the British and Americans treat the governments in some countries so nicely? They cannot fold their hands and see these governments collapse. Today the Americans and Jiang are having a joint military exercise under the command of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.] Beakley, commander of the Seventh Fleet. Also is there is [Roland] Smoot, 35 the person who ordered the firing, which made the [U.S.] State Department and Defense Department unhappy. He is there, together with Beakley, to take the command.

To make a long story short, you [Ameri

of China (PRC) would result in Soviet nuclear retaliation. Researchers have assumed for some time that Soviet leaders were unhappy with the new Sino-American confrontation and considered the Chinese brinkmanship as a dangerous development that interfered with Kremlin plans for "detente" with the West. In their memoirs, Khrushchev and, more recently, Gromyko both described how puzzled and alarmed they were by Mao's seemingly reckless attitude toward nuclear war as not only possible, but actually desirable for the communist camp.2 However, Khrushchev's September 7 public declaration to Eisenhower-stating that “An attack on the Chinese People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union"3. seems to contradict this general thesis.

The secret letter from the CC CPSU to the CC CPC printed below links the two puzzling events noted above, and helps point toward possible answers to the questions they raise. It attests to the fact that, in spite of the genuine tension between the two communist giants, the Khrushchev leadership at that time still was determined to stand with Beijing at a moment of crisis, and took additional steps to prove that it remained loyal to the spirit and letter of the SinoSoviet Treaty of February 1950.

The first article of that treaty, concluded at the end of Mao Zedong's summit meetings in Moscow with Stalin after the estab

cans] are noosed here. You may be able to get away if you take the initiative to leave slowly and quietly. Is there not a policy for getting away? In my view, you had a policy for getting away from Korea, and now a policy for getting away from Jinmen-Mazu is being shaped. As a matter of fact, those in your group really want to get away, and the public opinion also asks you to do so. To get away is to extricate yourself from the noose. How can this be done? That is, the 110,000 troops should leave. Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs. The dealing between us and you [the Americans] is an international issue. These are two different issues. Although you Americans have been associated with Jiang Jieshi, it is possible to dissolve this chemical combination. This is just like electrolytic aluminum or electrolytic copper, the combination will be dis

lishment of the PRC the previous fall, stated that, "in the event of one of the Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.”4 (The United States was not mentioned by name in the text, but the implication was clear enough.)

What emerged from the Gromyko-Chinese talks in early September 1958 and what appeared to have worried the Kremlin leadership was not that the Chinese might provoke a general war with the United States. Rather, as the text of the Soviet letter below implies, it was the general assumption of the Chinese Politburo that if the United States "should start a war against the People's Republic of China" and used tactical nuclear weapons against the PRC (in response to Chinese attacks against the offshore islands or Taiwan), the Soviet Union should remain passively on the sidelines, as a strategic reserve in case the Americans decided to broaden the war by using high-yield (e.g., thermonuclear) weapons. This interpretation of the Soviet commitments diverged significantly from Article I of the Treaty signed in Moscow eight years earlier.

In a forthcoming book, Constantine Pleshakov and I argue that many in the Soviet leadership were unhappy to see the

continued on page 226

solved when it is electrolyzed. Jiang Jieshi is [for us] a domestic issue, and you [Americans] are [for us] a diplomatic issue. [The two] cannot be mixed up.

America now attempts to dominate four out of the five continents, except for Australia. First of all, in North America, this is mainly America's own place, and its armed forces are there. The next is Central and South America where it intends to provide "protection," although it does not have garrisons there. Then, there are Europe, Africa, and Asia, to which [America] has given its main attention, and deployed its main force in Europe and Asia. I do not know how it [America] can fight a war with a few soldiers scattered everywhere. Thus, I believe that it focuses on occupying the intermediate zone. As far as the territories of our [socialist countries] are concerned, I believe that the Americans do not dare to come, unless the socialist camp encounters big trouble and they are convinced that the Soviet Union and China will totally collapse as soon as they come. Except for [the countries belonging to] our camp, America is seeking hegemony everywhere in the world, including Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and, also, Australia. Australia has linked itself with America through a military alliance and follows its orders. Is it better for America to try to control these places by utilizing the banner of "anti-communism" or by fighting a real war against communism? To fight [a real war] against communism means to dispatch its troops to fight us and fight the Soviet Union. I would say that the Americans are not so stupid. They only have a few soldiers to be transferred here and there. After the incident in Lebanon, American troops were transferred there from the Pacific. After they arrived in the Red Sea area, the situation changed unfavorably [in the Pacific], and they turned around quickly and landed at Malaya. They announced that [the troops] were taking a vacation there, and kept quiet for seventeen days. Later, after one of their reporters claimed that [America] was taking charge of the Indian Ocean, everyone in the India Ocean [area] expressed opposition. When we began our artillery bombardment, America came here since there were not enough [of its] troops here. It will probably better serve America's interests if it leaves such places like Taiwan in an earlier time. If it continues to stay, let it be noosed here.

This will not affect the overall situation, and we can continue the Great Leap Forward.

We should strive to produce eleven million tons of steel, doubling last year's output. Next year another twenty million tons, striving to reach thirty million tons. The year after next, another twenty million tons. Is it not fifty million tons by then? Three years of hard efforts, fifty million tons of steel. At that time, we will occupy third place in the world, next only to the Soviet Union and the United States. The [steel] output of the Soviet Union reached fifty million [tons] last year. In three years, they can make it sixty million [tons]. If we make hard efforts in the next three years, it is possible that [our steel output] may surpass fifty million tons. In another two years, by 1962, it is possible [for us to produce] eighty to a hundred million tons [of steel], approaching the level of the United States (because of the impact of economic recessions, America's [steel output] will probably only reach a hundred million tons at that time). [At the end of] the second five-year plan, we will approach or even surpass America. In another two years, in seven years, [we may] produce a hundred fifty million tons of steel, and surpass America to become the number one in the world. It is not good for us to name ourselves as the most superior in the world, but it is not bad to become the number one steel producer. [We should also] make hard efforts in the next three years to [increase] grain production. three years to [increase] grain production. The output of this year is between three hundred fifty to four hundred million tons. [The output] will double next year, reaching, probably, seven hundred fifty million tons. We should slow down a little bit the year after next, for we have to find outlets for [extra] grain. Food will be grain's main outlet; but we also need to find other outlets

in industry. For example, [using grain] to in industry. For example, [using grain] to produce ethyl alcohol, and, through ethyl alcohol, to produce rubber, artificial fiber, plastic, and other things.

Let me talk a little bit more about the tense situation. You [Americans] cause the tense situation, and you think it advantageous to you, do you not? You may be wrong. The tense situation can mobilize the people in the world, making everyone blame you Americans. When a tense situation emerges in the Middle East, everyone blames the Americans. When tension comes to Taiwan everyone again blames the Americans. Only few people blame us. The

Americans blame us, Jiang Jieshi blames us, and Syngman Rhee blames us. Maybe there are some others [who blame us], but mainly these three. Britain is a vacillating element. While it will not be militarily involved, it is said that it has strong sympathy politically. This is because Britain faces problems in Jordan. How can it handle the situation in Jordan if the Americans withdraw from Lebanon because [the British] failed to show sympathy [to the Americans]? Nehru issued a statement, which basically echoed us, suggesting that Taiwan and other [offshore] islands should be returned to us, but hoping that a peaceful solution can be reached. The countries in the Middle East, especially Egypt and Iraq, warmly welcomed [our artillery bombardment] this time. They praise us every day, saying that we have done the right thing. This is because our [artillery bombardment] here has reduced the pressure the Americans put on them.

I think that we can tell the people of the world publicly that, in comparison, a tense situation is more disadvantageous to the western countries, as well as more disadvantageous to America [than to them]. Why is it advantageous to them [the people of the world]? Does the tense situation in the Middle East do any good for America? Does it do any good for Britain? Or is it more advantageous to the Arab countries and to the peace-loving people in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other continents. To which side is the tense situation in the TaiIwan [Straits] more advantageous? Let us take our country as an example. Our country is now experiencing a nationwide mobilization. If during the Middle East crisis about thirty to forty million people participated in the rallies and protest parades, this time [during the Taiwan crisis] we will probably mobilize 300 million people [to participate in rallies and parades], educating them and toughening them. This event will also benefit our unity with all democratic parties 36 in China because all the parties now share a common goal. As a result, those who in the past had knots in their hearts, who were unhappy, and who were criticized will now feel a little bit more comfortable. If we can continue to handle the situation in this way, doing it again and again, we will all belong to the working class one day. Therefore, in my view, the tense situation caused by the imperialists eventually becomes advantageous to hundreds of millions of Chinese

[merged small][ocr errors]

people who oppose imperialism, to peaceloving peoples all over the world, and to all social classes, all social ranks, and the governments [in various countries]. They now have to believe that America, always arrogant and aggressive, is no good after all. [The U.S. government] moved six of its thirteen aircraft carriers [to the Taiwan Straits]. Among these carriers, there are some big ones with the size reaching 65,000 tons. It is said that with 120 ships, it forms the strongest fleet in the world. It does not matter if you want to make it even stronger. It does not matter if you want to concentrate all of your four fleets here. I welcome you all. After all, what you have is useless here. Even though you move every ship you have here, you cannot land. Ships have to be in the water, and cannot come to the land. You can do nothing but make some threatening gesture here. The more you play, the more the people in the world will understand how unreasonable you are.

7. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh, 10 September 1958

Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:413

Comrade President:

Your letter of 8 September37 has been received. Thank you.

I believe that (1) the Americans are afraid of fighting a war. As far as the current situation is concerned, it is highly unlikely that a big war will break out; and (2) it seems to me that the business in your country should go on as usual.

8. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and Huang Kecheng, 13 September 195838 Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, 7:416-417

Part One

Premier Zhou and Comrade Huang Kecheng:

[I] have received [the documents] you sent to me, including two intelligence reports on Jinmen's situation and the order of our military.39 In addition to carrying out [the operations] in accordance with the lines set up by the order, it is also necessary to fire some scattered shells day and night around the clock, especially at night, shelling especially the area within the three-mile radius of Liaoluowan. The sporadic shelling (200 to 300 shells a day) will make the enemy

panic[ky] and restless day and night. It seems to me that [doing this] is a big, or at least moderate, advantage [to us]. What is your opinion about it? On the days of heavy shelling we will not fire scattered shells. On the days of light shelling we will use this method. For the sake of shelling Liaoluowan at night, [we] should accurately calibrate battery emplacements during daytime, which will make the shelling at night more accurate. Please seek opinions from [the people at] the front, to see if this method is workable or not.

As far as the Warsaw talks are concerned, in the next three to four days, or one week, [we] should not lay all of our cards on the table, but should test [the Americans]. It seems that it is unlikely for the other side to lay all of their cards out, and that they will also test us. What is your opinion, Zhou [Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], Zhang [Wentian],40 and Qiao [Guanhua]41?

Congratulations for the success from the very start.

9. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1958

Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 353

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

Your letter dated the night of the 18th has been received. It is indeed very good.42 [I am] very happy after reading it since [we] have gained the initiative. Please take due actions immediately. Please also pass your letter and my reply here at once to Comrades Wang Bingnan43 and Ye Fei. Make sure that they understand [the key to] our new policy and new tactics is holding the initiative, keeping the offensive, and remaining reasonable. We must conduct our diplomatic struggle from a far-sighted perspective so that it will develop without any difficulty.

Mao Zedong

4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei

10. Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Conversation with S.F. Antonov44 on the Taiwan Issue, 5 October 1958 (Excerpt)45 Source: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 262

267

The entire situation has already changed at this point. Dulles's press conference published on 30 September reveals some changes in America's position. Although

Dulles's talks with reporters do not clearly indicate [America's new position], he expressed ambiguously that if China commits to a cease-fire, America can persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw from the offshore islands [under his control]. Apparently America intends to carry out basically a policy to help Jiang slip away from Jinmen.

After Dulles made this suggestion, Jiang Jieshi became very upset. Jiang knew the content of Dulles's talks in advance. Thus, he gave a speech on 29 September, and another on 1 October, stating that the Americans had done a disservice to him. Two days later, when he talked to British reporters from The Times [of London], Jiang asked Britain to advise America not to be fooled [by the communists]. This is really funny.

Last night the Indian ambassador [to Beijing] hurriedly informed me of V. K. Krishna Menon's plan [at the United Nations].46 Menon believes that current changes in the situation have already become a tendency. Thus, he is planning to make a general speech at the UN meeting, including a suggestion that Jiang's troops withdraw from the offshore islands and a request to us to stop fighting against Jiang. Britain attempted to mediate this affair in the past, but we refused it. Dag Hammarskjold47 of the UN intended to talk to us through Norway, [but] we also turned it down. Even though America was not willing to invite India [to mediate] before, it had no choice but to invite Menon this time. Menon was unwilling to come himself, if America did not send an invitation to him, or if he was unsure about the situation. At the present, since Menon feels certain about the situation because America has asked for his help, he is planning to deliver this proposition. Our assumption is as follows: after Menon makes his proposition, it will be accepted by UN members, and then by most countries in the world. Through this approach, the UN can put pressure on Jiang Jieshi and meanwhile ask us to make compromises. Thereby, America can maneuver between Jiang and us to make a bargain.

We calculate that America has three cards to play:

First, to defend Jin[men]-Ma[zu]. America's proposition on 18 September requested our cease-fire on Jinmen, we rejected it immediately. We have been ever since condemning America's occupation of Taiwan. America now attempts to expand

its occupation to Jinmen-Mazu, we must oppose it firmly. America dares not engage in a war merely for the sake of Jinmen, because the American people and its allied countries oppose it. Moreover, if America wants a war for Jinmen, we are prepared to fight against it. In addition, the Soviet Union supports us. After our rejection, America took back its first card, that is, defending Jinmen and Mazu.

Its second card is about "two Chinas." America's proposition on 30 September had a central point of lining up China with the Soviet Union on the one side, and Jiang Jieshi with the United States on the other side. It puts forth a "two Chinas" scheme and pushes us to accept the status quo. We firmly oppose it now, and will continue to oppose it.

The third is to freeze the Taiwan Straits. America intends to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw from the offshore islands as an exchange to freeze the situation in the Taiwan Straits, requesting our renouncing the use of force on Taiwan, or our accepting America's occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and "two Chinas" as "an existing fact." America may not play its third card at once. As soon as Dulles's meeting with press caused Jiang Jieshi's big complaints, Dulles wrote to Jiang for explanation and comfort. At the same time, Eisenhower informed the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that America could not yield to force. He, however, also said that if Communist China ceased fire, [America] could reconsider [the situation there]. It shows that America is still wavering, though it wants to get away from JinmenMazu.

According to the above calculations, I told the Indian ambassador yesterday that we did not want Menon to deliver his proposition to the UN. We cannot trade a settlement of Jinmen-Mazu for a recognition of America's occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and acceptance of the existence of socalled "two Chinas."

Meanwhile, some Asian and African countries are suggesting that the Eight-nation Committee48 can draft a statement about the Taiwan situation. I also told the Indian ambassador yesterday that we believed that the Asian and African countries could hardly issue such a joint statement since there existed two different positions among themselves. I said to him it was better not to have

this kind of joint statement. If the statement mentioned a cease-fire, it would benefit America; we had to oppose it. If the statement criticized both America and China, it would be unable to tell right from wrong, we had to disagree as well. A just statement should include the following major points: to recognize firmly that Taiwan is China's territory, and that no foreign countries are allowed to intervene; America should withdraw from the Taiwan Straits; no creation of "two Chinas"; China and America should continue their talks. Obviously, some countries that follow America will not agree to these points. Thus, if the Asian and African countries cannot issue a just statement, it is better for them not to issue any joint statement.

Moreover, this morning Comrade Chen Yi49 met diplomatic envoys from eight concerned Asian and African countries that have diplomatic relations with China. Regarding these countries' discussion about issuing a joint statement, he clarified the above position of the Chinese government and made further explanations.

I talked to you on 30 September [about our policy toward Taiwan]. Originally, our plan had two steps: the first was to recover the offshore islands; the second to liberate Taiwan. Later, after we began shelling Jinmen, our bombardment played a role to mobilize the people of the world, especially the Chinese people. Thereafter, many countries launched and joined a new anti-American movement on a much larger scale than that after the Lebanon event. The situation already becomes clear. America knows that we do not want to fight a war against it. When it escorted Jiang Jieshi's ships, we did not fire [on them]. We have no intention to liberate Taiwan immediately. We know that America does not want to fight a war against us over Jinmen either. It strictly restrained its air and naval forces from entering our territorial waters between three and twelve miles from our coast. Currently America works on how to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu to prevent its forces from being pinned down in this region.

As I said to you on 30 September, we realized that it was better to keep Jiang Jieshi on Jinmen-Mazu. After the Central Committee's discussions, we still believe that it is the best to keep Jiang Jieshi on Jinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands. It Jinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands. It is extremely beneficial [to us] that Jiang

stays at Jinmen and Mazu, and America continues to intervene. It will educate the people of the world, especially the Chinese people. We will not let America go, when it wants to get away from Jinmen and Mazu. We demand that America withdraw its armed forces form Taiwan. Under this circumstance, if we need tension, we can shell Jinmen and Mazu; if we want relaxation, we can stop shelling. As Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi said to you, [we can] have small-, or medium-, or large-scale shelling of Jinmen. We can have shelling while negotiating, and we can stop shelling anytime we like. This is advantageous for us. So we are not going to recover these offshore islands in the near future. We will take back them together with the Penghus and Taiwan later.

Thus, we decided to issue a "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" in the name of our defense minister. [It indicates that] we will suspend our shelling for seven days from 1:00 p.m. on 6 October so as to allow Jiang's troops to transport their logistic supplies easily. Our suspension of bombardment, however, has a precondition that no American ships provide escort. Moreover, [it] suggests a direct negotiation with Jiang. Jieshi searching for peaceful solutions to the conflicts between both sides. Since our shelling is actually a punitive operation against Jiang's troops, we can slow it down as long as Jiang is willing to cooperate [with us]. If he is not, we will continue to punish him. Therefore, we will always be in a positive position.

Our purpose in publishing this "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan" is to deepen the conflicts between America and Jiang. Jiang's current garrison on Jinmen, about 80,000 men under the command of Chen Cheng, 50 is the main strength of Jiang's forces. Jiang Jieshi wants to defend Jinmen to the last and drag America down to the water. Chen Cheng, however, wants to save these troops. If we bottle up the troops on Jinmen, it is easier for America to encourage Chen to persuade Jiang to withdraw his troops from the offshore islands. If we let these troops stay on Jinmen, Jiang and Chen can use them to drive a hard bargain with America. In our message to the compatriots [in Taiwan], we warn them that America will abandon them sooner or later. There is no need to fight for America's interests between the two Chinese sides. Although we can possibly fight for thirty more years,

it is better [for both sides] to talk for solutions.

To be sure, [on the one hand,] Jiang Jieshi will likely hold a press conference [as soon as we publish our message], accusing us of attempting to cast a bone between him and America, saying that he will never sit down with the Chinese Communists for negotiations, and so forth. In his mind, however, Jiang can figure out himself that there is a lot behind this, and that he can make a further bargain with America. This is his old trick. On the other hand, Americans will also criticize the Chinese Communist attempt to drive a wedge between them and Jiang. But, meanwhile, they will suspect in their minds that we suddenly let up pressure on Jinmen, almost blockaded to the death, because there might be a tacit agreement between us and Jiang. The louder Jiang yells, the more suspicious the Americans. will become.

Therefore, we cause a new dilemma for America, and it does not know how to cope with it. America is facing a very difficult situation right now. It originally planned to persuade Jiang's troops to withdraw [from Jinmen]. If it again suggests withdrawal, Jiang Jieshi will say that America abandons him. If America stops persuading Jiang to withdraw, we will achieve our goal.

11. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai, 5 October 1958 Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:437

Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] Kecheng:

Our batteries should not fire a single shell on 6 and 7 October, even if there are American airplanes and ships escorts. If the enemy bombs us, our forces should still not return fire. [We should] cease our activities, lie low, and wait and see for two days. Then, we will know what to do. Although the air force must carry on our defense, the airplanes should not fly off the coast. One more thing: do not issue any public statement during these two days because we need to wait and see clearly how the situation will develop. Please carry out the above order immediately. Or [you can] pass this letter [as an order] to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu,51

Mao Zedong

8:00 A.M., 5 October

P.S.: After you have handled this letter, please convey it to the Premier.52

12. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai, 6 October 1958 Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:437

Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Kecheng]: Please pass on to Han [Xianchu] and Ye [Fei]:

Yesterday I said not to issue any public statement, and to wait and see for two days. Later [I] thought about this again, and considered it more appropriate to issue a statement first. This is the reason for [me to write] the "Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan."53 This statement is about to be issued, please instruct the Fujian Front radio station to broadcast it repeatedly.

Mao Zedong

2:00 A.M., 6 October

14. Notation, Mao Zedong on Zhou Enlai's Report, "On the Shelling of Jinmen," 20 October 195857

Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:466

Part I

The report is approved.

Part II

It is more appropriate to start shelling one hour after, or half hour after, the reading [of the order] is finished.58

15. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 31 October 1958

Source: Mao Zedong Wengao, 7:479

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and [Huang] Kecheng:

[We] should extend the areas where no shelling is allowed on even-numbered days.

Send this to [Huang] Kecheng for handling That means shelling will be prohibited on immediately.54

13. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 11 October 1958

Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:449-450

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

No hurry to reply to the letters from the Soviets.55 Need to discuss them first.

Cao Juren56 has arrived. Ignore him for a few days, do not talk to him too soon. [I] will think about whether I need to meet him or not.

Tell [Huang] Kecheng to double-check accurate numbers of how many enemy airplanes we shot down, and how many of our planes were shot down in more than fifty days of air engagements since the Shantou air battle on 19 August. Prepare the statistics for the Soviets' information. They believed the enemy's false information and do not know the true story. [The Soviets] should sell ground-to-air missiles to us, and let us control the employment of them. The Soviets may send a few people to teach us how to use them. I intend to adopt this policy. [We can] discuss and decide whether it is appropriate tonight or tomorrow night.

Mao Zedong

10:00 A.M., 11 October

even days on all fronts. Allow Jiang's troops to come outdoors and get some sunshine so that they can continue to stay there. Only fire a few shells on odd days. Instruct the Fujian [front] by internal channels to carry it out. Do not issue public statement at this point. If there is a need later, [we] will consider making an announcement then. Please discuss and decide on this matter.

I am leaving for a southern trip this afternoon.

Mao Zedong

2:00 A.M., 31 October

16. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 2 November 1958

Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:490

Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and [Huang] Kecheng:

Suggest having a heavy all day shelling tomorrow (the 3rd, an odd day). Fire at least 10,000 shells and bomb all the military targets [on Jinmen] in order to affect America's election, promoting the Democrats' victory and the Republicans' defeat. Meanwhile, give Jiang's troops an excuse for refusing to withdraw [from Jinmen]. Please consider and decide if this is proper.

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