ePub 版

odic external reviews of CGP operations.


very unlikely that a reply will be sent even if As a basis for these evaluations, in May 1995

continued from
page 260

the letter is received), but I was able to obtain CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson produced

permission in Phnom Penh without great Jarvis and Peter Arfanis, who visited the a 209-page Implementation Plan outlining

difficulty. It may, however, take a few days. archives at the end of 1992 were “dismayed (The first time I applied on the Friday before the Program's strategy for achieving its ob

at what we saw.... Valuable records from jectives. The first external evaluation, held

a holiday week. Nevertheless, permission to in June 1995, termed the progress of CGP the French colonial days are on the floors

use the archives was received the Monday operations “excellent” (Time Magazine, 26 and shelves rotting away. About 50% of the

following the holidays.) records—and there are about 2000 linear June 1995).

The archives is open only about four or CGP also carries out an internal review metres of records all up—are either wrapped

five hours per day. Many documents remain process, staffed by distinguished experts in in brown paper or still in their original boxes.

wrapped in paper. The documents theminternational law and genocide investigaThe boxes have been constructed from acidic

selves are often in very fragile condition, pasteboard, starch-filled cloth, and protein and insects sometimes scurry out from among tion, such as Professor Cherif Bassiouni, former Chair of the United Nations Comadhesive which has promoted insect infiltra

the pages. There is no working electricity in mission of Experts for the inquiry on violation, mainly termites and beetle larvae. Other

the building, and plumbing is rudimentary. tions of international humanitarian law in records are sitting unwrapped gathering dust,

Miss Kim Ly, the archivist, is helpful, as are the Former Yugoslavia (predecessor to the mould and also being attacked by insects.”4

other members of the staff. Kim Ly underYugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal). The first

By the end of 1994, conditions were still

stands French and some English. round of internal evaluation of CGP operafar from good. During my two visits to the

In May 1994, there were few researcharchives that year, stacks of books, most tions began in June 1995. This evaluation

ers (often I was alone in the building), and has already produced numerous useful ideas beyond repair, still stood on the floor of the

the rainy season added to a sense of gloom for improving various aspects of our operalibrary's storage areas and in the archives.

and foreboding resulting from reports of tions, and yielded an overall positive apWrapped and unwrapped documents re

rebel Khmer Rouge gains in the countryside. praisal of CGP progress. According to one mained on dusty shelves in the archives, and

But by December the Khmer Rough threat evaluator, “Your thoughtful and methodical insect damage was evidenteverywhere. Nev

seemed to have receded. Now government ertheless, thanks to the dedication of some explanations for the preparation of such a

officials and private citizens did come by to Cambodians and some foreign (mainly Ausproject should serve as a model for the

consult the archive's records. School childocumentation and analysis of crimes against tralian) assistance, there have been improve

dren also visited. The library was heavily humanity in other countries.... The training ments, and the archives can in any event be

used, especially in December when there used. There are now typescript guides to program designed to support the project is

was a very well attended celebration of the some of the more important documentary library's seventieth anniversary. Perhaps outstanding."

collections, and proper archival storage Summary. In 1994 the prospect of a

this is a hopeful sign of Cambodia's returnboxes, a gift from Australia, are increasingly ing health. trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders seemed remote. Now, through the work of the Cam- being used.

The archives contain numerous, if eclecbodian Genocide Program, it has become a

1. Peter Arfanis and Helen Jarvis, “Archives in Cambotic, works including official journals, the strong probability. In 1994, the information

dia: Neglected Institutions,” Archives and Manuscripts United States Civil Code, Russian encycloresources and legal evidence necessary for a

[Australia) 21:2 (1993), 252-62.

2. Ibid., 255. George Smith, a librarian employed by the judicial accounting of the genocide had yet pedias, and works from the French period.

state of Alaska, made the same point in a paper delivto be identified or assembled, and the reMore significant are the collections of pub

ered at the "Seminar on the Khmer Culture's Revival,” quired legal skills did not yet exist. These lished and unpublished documents that have

Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 21 December 1994. survived. The bulk of the collection consists prerequisites are now well on the way to

3. Helen Jarvis, “The National Library of Cambodia: of those colonial records which the French Suriving Seventy Years of Drastic Socio-Economic ward fulfillment. By the end of 1996, when did not take with them when they left, par

Impact,” Paper delivered at CONSAL9, the Ninth Conthe CGP's mandate will expire, an interna

gress of Southeast Asian Librarians, Bangkok, Thaitional Cambodian genocide tribunal may ticularly records of the Résidence Supérieure

land, 2-6 May 1993. have already commenced functioning. By

du Cambodge. Some of the manuscripts 4. Arfanis and Jarvis, "Archives in Cambodia," 256-57.

date to the late nineteenth century and con- 5. For a more complete description of the archive's then, the CGP will certainly have provided

holdings, see Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambothe scholarly and legal resources for Cambocern a wide range of mostly domestic mat

dia.” dians to pursue their own justice for the

ters. These, along with some printed Forvictims of the Khmer Rouge regime. In

eign Affairs records from the 1950s and short, the Cambodian Genocide Program 1960s, were the documents most useful to

Kenton J. Clymer, professor of history and me. However, other records concern the has taken major steps to fulfill its own three

department chair at the University of Texas Buddhist Institute, Norodom Sihanouk, and part mandate: to expose and document the

at El Paso, is researching a history of U.S.the Khmer Rouge period.5 crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and to hold the

Cambodian relations. His most recent book

Permission is required to use the arperpetrators accountable.

is Quest for Freedom: The United States and chives, and prospective researchers need to

India's Independence (New York: Columapply at the Council of Ministers. There is

bia University Press, 1995). no fee. Writing ahead might be useful (it is

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ing World War II. When the GKO was for Internal Affairs (NKVD) since 1941, DOCUMENTING THE EARLY disbanded on 4 September 1945, the Special serving with the rank of general. SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS Committee was recast as a “Special Commit- Fourth, Vannikov was appointed chairPROGRAM

tee of the USSR Council of People's Com- man of the Technical Council, and Alikhanov

missars.” (The Council of People's Com- was appointed the scientific secretary of the by Mark Kramer

missars was itself renamed the USSR Coun- Council. The text of Stalin's edict does not

cil of Ministers in March 1946.) Shortly after bear out David Holloway's assertion (in Two recent developments pertaining to Beria's arrest on 26 June 1953, the Special Stalin and the Bomb, p. 135) that Pervukhin, the early Soviet nuclear weapons program- Committee of the USSR Council of Minis- Zavenyagin, and Kurchatov were appointed the declassification of an edict promulgated ters (as it was then known) was dissolved, deputies to Vannikov on the Council. In by Josif Stalin in August 1945, and the and the staff and organizations under its fact, Pervukhin, as noted above, was not on issuance of a directive by the Russian gov- control were transferred to the newly formed the Technical Council at all. Zavenyagin ernment in mid-1995—are worth noting. Ministry of Medium Machine-Building. and Kurchatov were members of the CounEach development is covered here briefly, Second, the edict provided for the cre- cil, but were not listed as deputy chairmen. and the relevant documentation is provided ation of a Technical Council, which was to Fifth, the other new subordinate organ at the end.

report directly to the GKO’s Special Com- created by Stalin's edict-a First Main Di

mittee. Until now, Western experts such as rectorate of the Council of People's ComThe Establishment of Beria's David Holloway had thought that the Tech- missars—also was placed under Vannikov’s Special Committee

nical Council was set up as an integral part of supervision, and Zavenyagin was appointed

the newly-created First Main Directorate of a first deputy. Vannikov and Zavenyagin Exploration of the basic processes in- the Council of People's Commissars (an thus enjoyed the distinction of serving on all volved in nuclear fission began in the Soviet entity that is discussed below).1 A close look three of the main bodies created by Stalin's Union well before World War II, and seri- at Stalin's edict shows that on this pointedict. Four officials who were not on either ous work aimed at building nuclear weap- Holloway was incorrect. The Technical the GKO’s Special Committee or the Techons was initiated at a top-secret research Council was established as a separate body nical Council were appointed deputy heads facility in Moscow, known simply as Labo- under the Special Committee, not under the of the First Main Directorate: Nikolai ratory No. 2, in early 1943. Over the next First Main Directorate (which itself was sub- Borisov, the deputy chairman of Gosplan; two years the Soviet nuclear bomb program ordinated to the Special Committee). Pyotr Meshik, the head of the NKVD's ecowas spurred on by intelligence disclosures Third, of the nine members of the GKO’s nomic directorate and deputy head of the about the Manhattan Project in the United Special Committee, five were also members “Smersh” Main Counterintelligence DirecStates, but it was not until after the fighting of the 11-man Technical Council. The ex- torate; Andrei Kasatkin, the First Deputy ended—and the technical feasibility of ceptions were Beria, Georgii Malenkov, People's Commissar for the Chemical Innuclear weaponry had been vividly demon- Nikolai Voznesenskii, and Mikhail dustry (which Pervukhin headed); and Pyotr strated by the bombs dropped on Hiroshima Pervukhin. (N.B.: Nikolai Voznesenskii, Antropov, a geologist and deputy member and Nagasaki—that an all-out program was the director of the State Planning Commit- of the GKO. Antropov was placed in charge launched in the USSR. On 20 August 1945, tee—known as Gosplan for short—should of a commission responsible for the explorathe supreme leader of the Soviet Union and

not be confused with the distinguished physi- tion and mining of uranium. chairman of the wartime State Defense Com- cist Ivan Voznesenskii, who was a member Sixth, the document was forthright about mittee (GKO), Josif Stalin, formed a nine- of the Technical Council.) It stands to reason the need for the Soviet Union to ensure member “Special Committee” under the that the three senior political officials on the access to foreign sources of uranium, inGKO’s auspices to oversee the whole So- Special Committee—Beria, Malenkov, and cluding deposits “in Bulgaria, Czechoslovaviet bomb effort. The Special Committee Nikolai Voznesenskii—would not have been kia, and other countries.” Although it did was placed under the direction of Stalin's included on the Technical Council, but not specifically mention eastern Germany as top aide, Lavrentii Beria, the notorious se- Pervukhin's absence is somewhat more puz- a source of uranium, the Soviet zone in cret police chief. The edict that Stalin issued zling, since he was in charge of the USSR's

zling, since he was in charge of the USSR's Germany (which was transformed into the (No. GKO-9887ss/op) to establish the Spe- chemical industry at the time. The Technical German Democratic Republic in 1949) becial Committee and its two main subordi- Council consisted predominantly of re- came the largest supplier by far for the nate organizations was declassified and pub- nowned physicists: Igor Kurchatov, Pyotr Soviet bomb program. The importance of lished in the July-August 1995 issue of Kapitsa, Abram Ioffe, Abram Alikhanov, uranium in Soviet policy toward Germany in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (“Military- Yulii Khariton, Isaak Kikoin, and Ivan the late 1940s should not be underestimated, Historical Journal”), pp. 65-67. The full Voznesenskii. The other four members in- as Norman Naimark points out in his recent text is provided below in translation. cluded a radiochemist, Vitalii Khlopin, and book, The Russians in Germany: A History

Several points about the document are three highly capable industrial managers and of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945worth noting:

engineers: Boris Vannikov, Avraamii 1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University First, Stalin's edict placed the Special Zavenyagin, and Vasilii Makhnev.

Zavenyagin, and Vasilii Makhnev. Press, 1995), pp. 235-250.2 Committee under the control of the GKO, Zavenyagin, among other things, had been a Seventh, the GKO's Special Committee the supreme organ in the Soviet Union dur- deputy to Beria at the People's Commissariat was given almost unlimited discretion over




its own funding and operations, a sign of the cables recently declassified by the U.S. Na- gazeta on 7 June 1995 (p. 5), listed 20 overriding priority that Stalin attached to the tional Security Agency, see below).4

Agency, see below).4 individuals who were given responsibility development of nuclear weapons. An entire Merkulov had been giving periodic reports for “studying archival documents and develdirectorate was set up within Gosplan to to Beria before August 1945 about the tech- oping proposals concerning their ensure that all necessary resources were nical progress of the Manhattan Project and declassification” for an official anthology. available. Despite the ravages of the war and about the prospects of locating adequate the full text of that directive, including the the need for mass reconstruction, no ex- stores of fissionable material. In mid-Octo- 20 members of the Working Group, is feapense was spared in the drive to build a ber 1945, shortly after the GKO’s Special tured below. nuclear bomb. Although the extravagance Committee was formed, Merkulov sent a The combination of Yeltsin's decree of Beria's efforts proved troubling to some follow-up report to Beria, which drew on and Chernomyrdin's directive provides some of the participants, their objections were on elaborate information supplied by the spy cause for concern. The announcement of practical, not moral, grounds. Pyotr Kapitsa Klaus Fuchs in June and September. The plans for an official anthology is a welcome cited this matter (as well as his sharp per- report provided a detailed technical over- step, but unless it is followed by a more sonal differences with Beria) when he wrote view of the design, dimensions, and compo- systematic declassification of archival maa letter to Stalin in November 1945 asking to nents of a plutonium bomb (the type of bomb terials, the proposed anthology will give be removed from the program. Kapitsa dropped on Nagasaki).

dropped on Nagasaki). In subsequent only a very limited—and perhaps misleadargued that the path chosen by Beria was months, Merkulov and Kuznetsov contin- ing—depiction of the early Soviet nuclear “beyond our means and will take a long ued to furnish invaluable data about bomb weapons program. Unfortunately, judging time,” and he insisted that a “methodical and technology and uranium supplies. The in- from the instructions approved by Yeltsin well-planned” program would enable the clusion of Point 13 in Stalin's edict is one and Chernomyrdin, it appears that, at least Soviet Union to build nuclear weapons

further indication of the crucial role of intel- for now, no broader release of documents is “quickly and cheaply."

ligence in the Soviet nuclear bomb program. under consideration. Eighth, Stalin's edict specified the need

The composition of the Working Group for increased espionage vis-a-vis the U.S. The Russian Government's

also does not bode well. The affiliations and nuclear program. Until this time, responsi

May 1995 Directive

backgrounds of most of the 20 members bility for Soviet foreign intelligence had

imply that archival openness will not be been spread among several agencies (and On 17 February 1995 Russian President their paramount concern: the NKVD's role in the process was very Boris Yeltsin issued a decree “On the Prepa

The panel is chaired by Lev limited), but the edict gave Beria direct con- ration and Publication of an Official Compi- Dmitrievich Ryabev, a first deputy Minister trol over all nuclear espionage carried out by lation of Archival Documents Pertaining to of Atomic Energy. Ryabev has decades of Soviet intelligence organs, including the the History of the Development of Nuclear experience in the Soviet/Russian nuclear People's Commissariat on State Security Weapons in the USSR.”5 This decree (No. weapons program, including several years (NKGB, later renamed the Committee on 180) was published in the 1 March 1995 (beginning in 1986) when he served as head State Security, or KGB), the Intelligence issue of Rossiiskaya gazeta, and an English of the Ministry of Medium Machine-BuildDirectorate of the Red Army (RUKA, later translation was provided in the Spring 1995 ing, the body now known as the Ministry of renamed the Main Intelligence Directorate, issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (p. 57). The Atomic Energy. (Although Ryabev curor GRU, of the Soviet General Staff), and decree stipulated that certain archival mate- rently is only a first deputy minister rather other unspecified intelligence bodies. Cop- rials were to be released for an official com- than a minister, his retention of a senior post ies of this part of the edict (Point 13) were pilation (sbornik) of documents (presum- in the former Soviet nuclear weapons comdistributed to Vsevolod Merkulov, the ably a single volume) on the Soviet Union's

ably a single volume) on the Soviet Union's plex is a sign of his trustworthiness and People's Commissar for State Security, and pursuit of nuclear weapons between 1945

pursuit of nuclear weapons between 1945 political acumen.) As an institution, the Fyodor Fedotovich Kuznetsov, the chief of and 1954. It did not, however, provide for Ministry of Atomic Energy has been exthe RUKA. (Incidentally, the mention of any broader declassification of materials tremely wary of releasing documents that Kuznetsov's surname on the distribution list related to the early Soviet nuclear program. would shed any light on Soviet nuclear weapconfirms, for the first time, that he was head The February 1995 decree indicated ons developments. Ryabev has been among of Soviet military intelligence in the 1940s. that a Working Group was to be established those who have expressed the need for “great Kuznetsov is described in Soviet military within one month (i.e., by mid-March 1995) caution.” reference works as having been the deputy to begin considering which documents might *** One of the two deputy chairmen of chief of the General Staff from 1943 to 1949, be released for an official compilation. This the Working Group, G. A. Tsyrkov, is also a but he was never explicitly identified as head Working Group, formed under the auspices senior official in the Ministry of Atomic of the RUKA.)

of the Russian government's Commission Energy. Like Ryabev, Tsyrkov has been Both Merkulov and Kuznetsov had been for the Comprehensive Solution of the Prob- leery of divulging any information about overseeing a massive operation to gain intel- lem of Nuclear Weapons, was not actually Soviet nuclear technology and design pracligence about nuclear weapons technology, set up until 24 May 1995, some two months tices. as the newly released “Venona" documents behind schedule. Directive No. 728-R, *** Of the other 18 members of the amply show (for more about these docu- signed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Working Group, five are senior officials ments, partially decrypted Soviet intelligence Chernomyrdin and published in Rossiiskaya from the Atomic Energy Ministry and five are high-ranking military officers from the July 1995, contained numerous documents programs, and he provided useful informaMinistry of Defense, including the General that shed light on the activities of Soviet tion to David Holloway for the book Stalin Staff. The Defense Ministry, like the Atomic spies in the Manhattan Project. The disclo- and the Bomb. No doubt, Khariton is more Energy Ministry, has been highly skeptical sure of these materials may erode the tradi- inclined than the other panel members to as an institution about the merits of releas- tional secrecy about such matters in Mos- urge the release of extensive documentation, ing documents for scholarly purposes. Rus- cow. Second, some officials in the Russian especially materials that would shed light on sian military archivists have been especially security and intelligence organs may want to the role of espionage versus indigenous scidisinclined to release items pertaining to release sensitive documents to spotlight the entific achievements. But because he is in nuclear weapons, ostensibly because of con- role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear and his early 90s, it is unlikely that he will be able cerns about nuclear proliferation. (This thermonuclear bomb projects. A fierce de- to play a central role on the Working Group. policy can be taken to ludicrous extremes. bate emerged in Russia in the early 1990s Quite apart from obstacles posed by the When I worked in the Russian General Staff about the relative importance of espionage composition of the Working Group, it is archive in the summer of 1994, I was told versus indigenous scientific achievements in possible that the Russian government's dithat all documents pertaining to nuclear

the Soviet nuclear/thermonuclear programs. rective (and Yeltsin's decree) will go largely operations—just operations, not technol- Most observers in both Russia and the West

Most observers in both Russia and the West unimplemented. Several impressive-lookogy—would be sealed off until the year now agree that information provided by So- ing decrees and directives about the 2046. I asked why that particular year was viet spies was vital in accelerating the con- declassification of archival materials have chosen, but no one seemed to know.) struction of the first Soviet fission bomb, but been issued by Yeltsin and the Russian gov

*** Other members of the Working that espionage was of much less importance ernment over the past two years, but very Group include senior officials from the For- for the Soviet thermonuclear program. If the little has come of them. Now that the politieign Intelligence Service, the Federal Secu- release of documents could show that the cal outlook in Russia is so uncertain, there is rity Service, the Department for the Defense extent of Soviet nuclear spying was even little chance that the archival situation will Industry, and the State Technical Commis- greater than previously thought, the Russian improve anytime soon. If anything, the sion. (The first two bodies are the main Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal increased strength of Communist delegates successors to the Soviet KGB, and the last Security Service might be somewhat less in the Russian parliament could lead to furtwo bodies are under the jurisdiction of the averse to the prospects of declassification. ther restrictions on access to major repositoRussian President's apparatus. The State *** Two heads of research institutes ries. Technical Commission is housed in the same specializing in the history of science and If an official anthology of documents building as the General Staff of the Russian technology–V. V. Alekseev and V. M. about the early Soviet nuclear weapons proArmed Forces.) These four agencies have Orel—are included on the Working Group, gram is eventually published, it undoubthardly been noted as champions of archival but even if they are inclined to press for edly will contain many interesting and valuopenness. Documents held by the Foreign greater openness (which is by no means able materials. Even the release of indiIntelligence Service and Federal Security certain), they will be far outweighed by offi- vidual documents can add a good deal to the Service, in particular, have been kept tightly cials from the nuclear weapons complex and historical record (see above). But in the sealed away. The role of these two agencies military establishment.

absence of a wider declassification of relis bound to be critical in the release of *** Rudolf Pikhoya, the director of the evant items, the one-time compilation of an documentation, whether for an official an- Russian State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), official anthology will not reveal as much thology or for other purposes. The Foreign is the only panel member from Rosarkhiv. about early Soviet nuclear developments as Intelligence Service archive houses the most Even if Pikhoya seeks the release of as many one might hope. sensitive documents on the role of espio documents as possible—and it is far from nage in the Soviet nuclear weapons pro- clear that he will—his influence on the Work

1. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet gram, and the Federal Security Service ing Group is inherently limited, despite his Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1994), 135. Holloway's book is archive contains documents generated by position as a deputy chairman. The most

by far the best source available on the early Soviet the Special Committee headed by Lavrentii valuable documents on the early Soviet

nuclear program. Beria from August 1945 until his arrest in nuclear weapons program are stored in ar- 2. See also Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 174-180. late June 1953 (see above). So far, there is chives outside Rosarkhiv's jurisdiction. 3.P.L. Kapitsa, Pis'ma o nauke (Moscow: Moskovskii little indication that access to either agency's *** The presence of Yulii Khariton on

rabochii, 1989), 237-247. On Kapitsa's withdrawal

from the program, see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, document holdings will be expanded. the Working Group is encouraging, but it

138-144. However, two factors may induce the may be largely symbolic. Khariton, who was 4. Some new details about spies in the Manhattan Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal born in 1904, was one of the key physicists in Project are also available from Harvey Klehr, John Earl Security Service to be more willing to re- the early Soviet nuclear program, and is the

Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, eds., The Secret

World of American Communism (New Haven: Yale lease documents about nuclear espionage: only living member of the Technical Council

University Press, 1995), esp. 216-226. In addition, see First, the U.S. National Security Agency that was established in August 1945 to advise Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 82-88, 90-95, 102-108, has begun declassifying some of its huge Beria's Special Committee (see above).

129, and 137-138. collection of "Venona” transcripts of inter- Khariton has given lengthy written and oral

5. In Russian: “O podgotovke i izdanii ofitsial'nogo

sbornika arkhivnykh dokumentov po istorii sozdanii cepted Soviet communications from 1939 testimony over the past few years about the

yadernogo oruzhiya v SSSR.” through 1945. The initial batch, released in early Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb 6. The directive was published under the rubric“Sbornik the construction of atomic energy

arkhivnykh dokumentov" (A Compilation of Archival
7. For one such decree, approved in September 1994,
see "Yeltsin's Directive on Declassification," which I
translated and introduced in CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall
1994), 89, 100. For a more recent, though similar,
directive adopted by the Russian government, see “Ob
ustanovleniya poryadka rassekrechivaniya i prodleniya
srokov zasekrechivaniya arkhivnykh dokumentov
Pravitel’stva SSSR,” Sobranie zakonodatel’stva
Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow) 9 (27 February 1995),






EDICT No. GKO-9887ss/op

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20 August 1945 Moscow, the Kremlin.

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On a Special Committee Under the GKO's


The State Defense Committee orders:

facilities, and the development and produc- torate of the USSR CPC the level of funding, tion of an atomic bomb.

the size of the workforce, and the volume of 3. That a Technical Council be created material-technical resources that it requires, under the GKO’s Special Committee to con- so that USSR Gosplan can include these duct a preliminary examination of scientific resources in the spending category listed as and technical matters submitted for review “Special Exenditures of the GKO.” by the Special Committee, as well as an 8. That the chairman of USSR Gosplan, examination of plans for scientific research Cde. N. A. Voznesenskii, organize within and accounts for it, plus technical designs of Gosplan a directorate to help carry out the installations, structures, and facilities for the assignments of the GKO's Special Commituse of atomic energy of uranium. The Council will consist of the following:

That the dep. chairman of USSR 1. Vannikov, B. L. (chairman)

Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Borisov, be placed in 2. Alikhanov, A. I. — academician (sci- charge of the aforementioned directorate, entific secretary)

and that he be relieved of other work for 3. Voznesenskii, I. N. — corresponding Gosplan and the GKO. member, USSR Academy of Sciences

9. That the financial expenditures and 4. Zavenyagin, A. P.

upkeep of the GKO’s Special Committee, of 5. Ioffe, A. F. academician

the First Main Directorate of the USSR 6. Kapitsa, P. L. academician

CPC, of the First Main Directorate's scien7. Kikoin, I. K. — corresponding mem- tific research, design, and engineering orgaber, USSR Academy of Sciences

nizations and industrial enterprises, as well 8. Kurchatov, I. V. — academician as the work carried out by other agencies and 9. Makhnev, V. A.

departments at the behest of the Directorate, 10. Khariton, Yu. B.— professor are to be included in the union budget through 11. Khlopin V. G. academician the category “Special Expenditures of the

4. That a special directorate be orga- GKO.” nized under the USSR Council of People's That financing of capital construction Commissars—the First Main Directorate of for the First Main Directorate be carried out the USSR CPC, subordinated to the GKO’s through the State Bank. Special Committee—to exercise direct su- That the First Main Directorate and the pervision over scientific research, develop- institutes and enterprises under its auspices ment, and design organizations and indus- be freed from the registration of staffs in trial enterprises for the use of atomic energy


organs. of uranium and the production of atomic 10. That Cde. B. L. Vannikov be conbombs.

firmed as the deputy chairman of the GKO's 5. That the GKO’s Special Committee Special Committee and director of the First be obligated to devise a work plan for the Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, and that Committee and the First Main Directorate of he be discharged from his duties as People's the USSR CPC and measures to carry out Commissar of Munitions. this plan, and to present it to the Chairman of That the following be approved as the GKO for approval.

deputy directors of the Main Directorate: 6. That the GKO’s Special Committee – A. P. Zavenyagin first deputy take operative measures to ensure the fulfill- - N. A. Borisov — deputy ment of tasks assigned to it under the present

- P. Ya. Meshik — deputy edict; that it promulgate directives requiring - P. Ya. Antropov — deputy fulfillment by agencies and departments;

A. G. Kasatkin deputy. and that when a government decision is 11. That the First Main Directorate of needed, the GKO's Special Committee the USSR CPC and its enterprises and instishould presents its recommendations directly tutes, as well as work carried out by other for the approval of the Chairman of the agencies and departments for it, are to be GKO.

controlled by the GKO's Special CommitThe GKO’s Special Committee will tee. have its own staff and funding estimates and Without special permission from the an expense account at the USSR State Bank.

GKO, no organizations, institutes, or indi7. That the GKO’s Special Committee viduals have any right whatsoever to interdefine and approve for the First Main Direc- fere in the administrative or operational ac

1. That a Special Committee be formed under the GKO’s auspices consisting of C[omra]des..

1. Beria, L. P. (chairman)
2. Malenkov, G. M.
3. Voznesenskii, N. A.
4. Vannikov, B. L.
5. Zavenyagin, A. P.
6. Kurchatov, I. V.
7. Kapitsa, P. L.
8. Makhnev, V. A.
9. Pervukhin, M. G.

2. That the GKO’s Special Committee be empowered to supervise all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium:

the development of scientific research in this sphere;

the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium, as well as the exploitation of uranium deposits outside the USSR (in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries);

the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and

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