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letter provides the names of two Ameri- because of Mengistu's resistance, and Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen. can officials, alleged masterminds of the to the disappointment of the Soviets, the In his meeting with Honecker the folplot, with their ranks and positions at party didn't come into existence until lowing month, Castro provides a dethe U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. 1984. Two documents presented here tailed report about the attitudes of the If it is true, as Paul Henze asserts in this refer to Soviet anxiety about repeated two leaders, Mengistu and Barre, topublication, that even the names are fic- delays from the Ethiopian side in ac- ward the proposal. Mengistu is referred titious, it is odd that the Ethiopian au- cepting the arrival of “a specially se- to in glowing terms while Barre is dethorities convened a socialist ambassa- lected group of experienced CPSU scribed as a chauvinist whose principal dors' meeting in panic instead of easily comrades” to help in the party forma- idea is nationalism, not socialism. The verifying through elementary diplo- tion process. One of them notes that report vividly shows Castro trapped as matic inquiry and concluding that it had “Mengistu apparently has no concept of a victim of his own ideology. Having been a fabrication. The theory of a cha- the cooperation with the advisers (and erroneously assumed an absolute conrade -a make-believe drama enacted on that) it is necessary to convince him that nection between perceived global false information—will thus have to they could be a real help and relief.” trends-depicting socialism as the
— include the Ethiopians as well as So- Obviously, at this early stage in the world's dynamic force—and the local viet authorities as actors if it is to be revolution, the Soviets did not realize situation in the Horn, he had expected considered a plausible explanation. that Mengistu was intentionally pre- a successful outcome to his efforts. His
In addition, a few other documents venting Moscow's infiltration into his sharp disappointment in Barre's personprovide accounts of some early reser- power structure before completing a ality, on which the report dwells, should vations the Soviet Union and its allies prolonged process of weeding out po
have been subordinated to the more cruhad about Mengistu's handling of cer- tential contenders and adversaries. cial realization that national and ethnic tain issues. It should be noted that in
rivalries peculiar to the region had earlier Western writings, some of these
II. Ethio-Somali War
doomed the confederation from the outreservations were usually associated
set. Also in this document, the Cuban with a later period, after Gorbachev as- A substantial number of the docu- leader, perhaps for the first time, forcesumed power in Moscow in 1985. But ments presented here address the So- fully raised the impending dilemma facas early as December 1977, a conver- viet bloc's involvement in the conflict. ing the Soviet bloc in the Horn of Afsation between the East Germans and Indeed, for Moscow, Barre's aggression rica. He tells Honecker, “I see a great Ratanov points toward the need for against Ethiopia, which began in early danger ... if the socialist countries help Ethiopia to adopt a mixed economy 1977 under the guise of a Western So- Ethiopia, they will lose Siad Barre's along the lines of the Soviet NEP (New mali Liberation Movement and which friendship. If they don't, the Ethiopian Economic Program) of the 1920s. The escalated into full-scale intervention the revolution will founder.” Faced with leadership’s perception of the national following July, was both a welcome an either/or situation within six-eight bourgeoisie as an enemy of the revolu- event and a potentially dangerous de- months, Moscow bet on Ethiopia at the tion and the alienation and exclusion of velopment. On one hand, it provided risk of irretrievably losing Somalia. this group as well as of the liberal- the Soviets with the opportunity to rap- Another issue warranting mention minded functionaries of the state appa- idly penetrate Ethiopia, the prized state is a probable justification for the ratus from the economy and national life of the Horn, while, on the other hand, it Kremlin's massive air- and sealift of is criticized as a dangerous trend with entailed a potentially painful risk of los- military equipment (worth about one negative consequences. In another con- ing another state where Moscow had billion dollars), 12,000 Cuban combat versation the following February, a cen- already built a presence: Somalia. The troops, and about 1500 Soviet military tral player in the CPSU's Africa policy documents help in tracing Moscow's advisers to Ethiopia in November-Degroup, Boris Ponomarev, expressed his policy in the region which began in cember 1977. This measure immediconcern over extremes in the Ethiopian 1976 as a strategy of courting “Social- ately followed Somalia's unilateral abRevolution—the mass executions of ist Ethiopia” without disturbing its rogation of the 1974 Treaty of Friend
— prisoners and the government's Red longstanding friendship with Somalia. ship and Cooperation with the USSR. Terror-directing the transmittal of By 1978 it had gone through a complete Why was such an overwhelming show these concerns to Mengistu using vari- somersault with the Soviet ejection of force necessary? Moscow's apparous channels.
from Mogadishu and its entrenchment ent objective in this spectacular move Finally in this section, the issue of in Addis Ababa after a massive supply
was to guarantee the swift and decisive Moscow's relentless prodding of of arms which decided the outcome of end of the Ethio-Somali war with a Mengistu to set up a Marxist-Leninist the conflict in favor of Ethiopia. My quick and unconditional withdrawal of vanguard party to institutionalize the
comments, however, will only briefly Somali forces from Ethiopian territory. revolution as well as to transform the focus on three particular issues. Two documents, the joint memorandum country into a reliable Soviet ally is a One is on the 16 March 1977 Cu- of the CPSU Third Africa Department subject addressed by many authors and ban-Yemen effort at creating a Marx- and the Political Department of the the focus of my own study.5 Primarily ist-Leninist confederation consisting of GDR Embassy in Moscow, and the So
viet Foreign Ministry/CPSU CC Inter- understanding of the Soviet dilemma: have any relations with the USSR, but national Department report on the So- rendering military assistance to Ethio- it went on record as advocating Albamali-Ethiopian conflict, shed light on a pia at the risk of losing its opportunity nian-style socialism, thus relations with probable motive: “to avoid a situation in Somalia. He also articulates Albania or China are not altogether inanalogous to the one in the Middle Ethiopia's revolutionary indebtedness conceivable. The few documents preEast”—where Sadat was taking his own and obligation to take Moscow's inter- sented here shed some light on Soviet spectacular initiative in making an un- est in the region into account. The docu- and East German links with the EPLF precedented visit to Jerusalem-from ment doesn't make clear whether he and its much smaller rival organization arising in the Horn.
was responding to a Soviet request; but, in Eritrea—the Eritrean Liberation According to the documents, the particularly if he raised the issue on his Front (ELF)—in the context of the two Soviet Union wanted to avert at all costs own initiative, the fact he makes such socialist countries' efforts at facilitatthe internationalization of the conflict an indirect commitment appears to have ing mediation with the Mengistu reand the possible involvement of the UN been subtle and timely maneuver to at- gime. In particular, in 1978 the East Security Council which it believed tract Moscow toward Ethiopia.
Germans had arranged two direct highwould be in the interest of Western pow
level talks between Mengistu's repreers. Such an outcome, Moscow argued, III. The Eritrean Secessionists sentative, Berhanu Bayeh, and EPLF would be possible if an armistice were
leader Issaias Afeworki, the results of reached without the withdrawal of So- An interesting paradox in the which were promptly communicated by mali troops from occupied Ethiopian Ethiopian revolution can be noted. With Honecker to Brezhnev. territory while Western powers simul- the exception of the Ethiopian Demo- What is clear from these docutaneously pushed for Security Council cratic Union (EDU) (an entity associ- ments is the fact that the EPLF had apinvolvement. A takeover by the Secu- ated with the remnants of the Selassie parently maintained well-established rity Council, moreover, would delay a era), the other four major organizations contacts with the SED and Issaias talked resolution of the conflict in a similar which struggled to topple Mengistu's directly with Honecker as a leader of a fashion as in the Middle East, possibly regime all ironically professed alle- revolutionary party. This level of conincreasing the danger for superpower giance to Marxism-Leninism, just like tact may well not have been to confrontation as the West and other un- their principal adversary. While two of Mengistu's liking. On the other hand, friendly states demanded Soviet exit them, the Ethiopian People's Revolu- Moscow apparently exhibited sensitivfrom the region as a precondition and tionary Party (EPRP) and the All Ethio- ity to the views in Addis Ababa in that blame it for causing the conflict. The pian Workers' Movement (MEISON), the ELF and its leader Ahmed significance of this logic is better ap- all but perished during the violent con- Mohammed Nasser were less closely preciated when recalling Sadat's dra- frontations of the late 1970s, the other linked with Moscow through the matic announcement in early Novem- two, the Eritrean People's Liberation USSR's Solidarity Committee. Moreber that he would visit Israel. It was a Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean People's over, in one of the documents, move that crushed plans for multilat- Liberation Front (TPLF) ultimately suc- Ulianovskii rejects an East German proeral talks on the Middle East at Geneva ceeded in coordinating their efforts to posal that Issaias meet with him in and suddenly removed the Soviets from renounce Marxism after the late 1980s, Moscow so that the CPSU could exert a direct role in the Arab-Israeli peace dislodge Mengistu from power in 1991, pressure on the EPLF to compromise talks. In the face of such setback, and establish two independent states- with Mengistu. Nevertheless, it is clear Moscow apparently showed its deter- Eritrea and the Federal Democratic that both Berlin and Moscow had apmination to anchor just at the other end Republic of Ethiopia—by 1993-1994. parently coordinated a concerted effort
a of the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia in a To what extent these various (pre- at finding a political solution to the desperate attempt to balance, in some viously?) revolutionary organizations Eritrean problem by pressuring both the degree, the loss of influence in Egypt had forged parallel relations with Mos- government of Mengistu as well as the by consolidating a strong presence in cow and other socialist countries re- rebel movements toward constructive the greater Middle East conflict zone. mains an interesting question to explore. dialogue. The results, however, had not
The final issue of interest in this The EPRP claims to have established been encouraging. section addresses one of Mengistu's contacts with the CPSU as early as In conclusion, the documents prefirst reactions about the possible Soviet 1972.6 MEISON had purportedly de- sented here are indeed important conuse of Ethiopian port facilities in the veloped links through associations with tributions to the study of the politics of likely event of the Somalia's denying European Communist parties in the the Horn during 1977-1978 in the conMoscow access to the port of Berbera. 1970s.7 Until the Ethiopian revolution, text of the Cold War. Their value is not He addresses this issue with Ratanov the EPLF had been openly assisted by so much in the amount of “new” inforin a conversation dated 29 July 1977. countries like Cuba, possibly offering mation they present, although there is He, interestingly, doesn't provide a clear indirect ties to Moscow. The TPLF, as some. Rather, they are priceless in procut commitment to provide the USSR an organization founded after Ethiopia viding unique first-hand insight into the access to its ports. Instead he states an joined the Soviet orbit, probably didn't perceptions and attitudes of the major actors involved in the decisions that MOSCOW, MENGISTU, AND plicit references to this action in these shaped political outcomes.
THE HORN: DIFFICULT documents, Soviet Ambassador Interestingly, the documents from CHOICES FOR THE KREMLIN Anatolii P. Ratanov was reliably rethe Russian archives appear to have
ported at the time to have been the first been carefully selected to elide signifi
by Paul B. Henze
to congratulate Mengistu after the speccant “blank spots” even on the issues
tacular bloodbath in the Derg when sevand period covered. By contrast, the The Russian and East German eral challengers of Mengistu, most noformer East German materials, though documents reproduced here constitute tably Head of State Teferi Bante, were limited in number, seem more insight- a useful contribution to the history of shot. As a result, Mengistu emerged ful in the concentrated details they pro- the Horn of Africa during the critical into the open as the dominant figure as vide on one issue in particular: the events of 1977-78. They provide in- Chairman of the Provisional Military Ethio-Eritrean high-level mediation. sights into the Soviet relationship with Administrative Council (PMAC), i.e. Nevertheless, within the two-year the authoritarian leaders of Ethiopia and
the Derg. period covered in these do ents there Somalia at that time, Chairman The documents provide useful inare significant issues that find scant Mengistu Haile Mariam and President formation on the activities of Cuba as coverage. From the Soviet side these Mohammed Siad Barre, as well as into junior partner to the Soviets in Ethioinclude materials pertaining to the motivations of these men and some pia during this period. A long near-verMoscow's intelligence assessment and of their associates.
batim report from the archives of the possible involvement during the Ethio- Both Mengistu and Siad Barre former German Democratic Republic of pian power struggle; relations with or- were stubborn and ambitious leaders a meeting between Fidel Castro and ganizations other than the PMAC; mili- who confronted the Kremlin with diffi- Erich Honecker on Castro's return from tary reports from General Petrov and cult choices, which it tried to avoid for Africa in early April 1977 gives us vivid others in the Ogaden; and early mili- as long as possible. Siad comes across detail that confirms what has long been tary planning involvement in Eritrea. as a more blatant liar than Mengistu, generally known of Castro's unsuccessFrom the East German side, materials who
to have been more genu- ful effort to mediate the developing related to its assistance in restructuring inely devoted to “socialism.” While Horn crisis in mid-March 1977. A subthe Ethiopian security services would Siad seems totally mendacious and de- sequent briefing by Soviet Ambassador be of high interest. Beyond 1978, So- vious in his manipulation of the Sovi- Ratanov of Cuban Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa viet and other socialist countries' in- ets, Mengistu is shown with his back to provides a remarkably frank, and not volvement in the Ethiopian vanguard the wall. He was determined to win entirely positive, appraisal of Ethiopia's party formation process would, of Soviet support by vigorously profess- military and political predicament and course, be of critical importance. ing his loyalty to “socialism” and mak- performance as of mid-summer 1977.
ing clear his readiness to serve Soviet The Soviet Union was remarkably | Cited in P. Margushin, “Sovetskii Soyuz aims throughout the Horn and in the uncreative in its efforts to deal with the v Afrike,” Novoe Russkoe Slovo, 4 October world at large. The documents occa- situation provoked by Siad Barre's at1979.
sionally reveal Soviet concern that tack on Ethiopia. Siad felt his way cau2
Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: Fam- Mengistu and his Derg associates were tiously at first, operating behind a faine, War, and Revolution in Ethiopia, (Tren- moving too fast, and these concerns cade of what he claimed were only guerton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1989), 21.
were sometimes expressed to him. But rilla operations. But by July 1977, So
Robert Patman, The Soviet Union in the as the Horn crisis developed, they be- malia was openly invading Ethiopia Horn of Africa (Cambridge, Eng.: Cam- came more concerned about preserving with regular military forces. 1 Neverbridge University Press, 1990), 193; Rene Mengistu's power than Siad's. The rea- theless, Somali officials adhered to the Lefort, Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution? son, undoubtedly, is that Ethiopia was pretense well into 1978 that the opera(London: Zed Press, 1983), 206.
a much more important country than tion was entirely the initiative of guer4 Giorgis, Red Tears, 35-36.
Somalia. The Soviets originally estab- rillas. Even though Soviet officials in 5
Ermias Abebe, “The Vanguard Party: Im- lished themselves in Somalia because both Somalia and Ethiopia had to be perial Instrument of Soviet-Third World they were unable to do so in Ethiopia. well aware of what was happening, Policy (1976-1986),” Ph.D. Dissertation, To those knowledgeable of the de- Moscow on the surface at least-per
— University of Maryland (College Park), tails of Ethiopian history during this sisted on the course adopted early in the 1994.
period, enthusiastic Soviet references to year: trying to bring the Somalis and 6
See EPRP founding member Kiflu the “decisive action” Mengistu took on Ethiopians together to compose their Tadesse's The Generation, (Silver Spring, 3 February 1977 are noteworthy. In differences. Long reports by Soviet MD: Independent Publishers, 1993), 98. spite of repeated protestations of peace- Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid 7
Bereket Habte Selassie, “Political Lead- ful desires, these references show that Ilychev of almost four weeks of meetership in Crisis: The Ethiopian Case” Horn Soviets had no reservations about ap- ings with a Somali delegation in Mosof Africa 3:1 (Jan.-Mar. 1980), 7.
proving violence as a means of settling cow from late July through the third differences. Though there are no ex- week of August chronicle an elaborate charade of negotiations. Unfortunately to provide Ethiopia support to defend tensified. We get no comparative evaluthe documents available to us here do itself against Somalia, but details have ations of officials with whom the Sovinot include parallel reports of dealings not been declassified. This, neverthe- ets were dealing in Mogadishu and with the Ethiopian delegation that was less, appears to be the point at which, Addis Ababa. in Moscow during the same period, but de facto, Moscow finally made an irre- The documents also lack any direct it appears that the Somalis and the
vocable decision to opt for Ethiopia reference to intelligence. It is hard to Ethiopians never even engaged in pre- over Somalia.
believe that Soviet officials did not reliminary face-to-face talks. The reason Whether or not Ambassador ceive extensive KGB and GRU reportwhy is easy to see in written statements Ratanov agreed with Moscow's contin- ing from agents in both Somalia and each delegation gave the Soviets of its ued insistence on further efforts to bring Ethiopia. There is, in fact, good reason country's position, for neither left any the Somalis and Ethiopians together in to believe that the Soviets were re-inroom for compromise or even discus- negotiations at the expert level," he suring themselves during this period by sion with the other.
followed Moscow's orders and repeated maintaining contacts with political While the independence of erst- this position as late as 23 August 1977 groups opposed to Mengistu in Ethiowhile French colony of Djibouti caused in a meeting with Cuban Ambassador pia as well as opponents of Siad Barre immediate worry, both Ethiopia and to Ethiopia Perez Novoa. The Soviets in Somalia. They, the East Germans, Somalia behaved with caution. Ratanov were even more hesitant on the ques- the Cubans, and perhaps other socialist did not react to an offer by Mengistu to tion of manpower, for the main purpose countries must also have had contacts support intervention in Djibouti. Ethio- of this meeting with the Cuban envoy among Eritrean factions. We do find pia lacked the strength to intervene was to chastise him for permitting Cu- tantalizing references to opposition to alone.
ban Gen. Ochoa to promise Mengistu the Derg and to the strain under which The biggest problem looming in that more Cuban technicians would be Mengistu found himself as a result. At the background of the discussions re- coming: “The decision to send Cuban times the Soviets seem to be more apported in these documents is Eritrea. It personnel to Ethiopia does not depend prehensive of Mengistu's staying power was already the most intractable prob- on Havana, but on Moscow." Ratanov than U.S. officials were at the time. lem of all for Moscow in its relations expressed the Soviet fear that a large- The final portion of Ratanov's 18 with Mengistu. Ethiopian military per- scale introduction of Cubans into Ethio- March 1977 meeting with Berhanu formance in meeting the Somali inva- pia could provoke the Eritreans or So- Bayeh sheds indirect light on attitudes sion was inhibited by the predicament malis to call in troops from supportive
malis to call in troops from supportive among the Ethiopian public. Major which Mengistu had got himself into in Arab countries such as Egypt.
Berhanu asks to have the Soviets arEritrea. The Soviets were not impressed Taken as a whole, these Russian range for a scholarship for his younger with the performance of Mengistu's documents seem to have been made brother to study in Moscow and exarmy in Eritrea. An East German docu- available to give a picture of a well-in- plains that the young man has been unment from December 1977 reveals what tentioned and relatively benign Soviet able to complete his work at a prestiappears to be Ambassador Ratanov's Union confronted with a situation it gious Addis Ababa secondary school irritation at Mengistu's intransigence on neither anticipated nor desired. The because, as the relative of a Derg memEritrea as well as the hope that some- Soviets are shown to be surprised by ber, he became the object of harassment how a basis for negotiation with the the crisis, reluctant to choose between by other students. Even at this relatively rebel movement there might be devel- Ethiopia and Somalia, and trying to early stage of the Derg's history, its oped. This became a major Soviet aim delay hard decisions as long as possible. popularity with the student population during the next decade and led to re- This does not fit with the general atmo- seems to have been quite low. peated East German efforts (and some sphere of Third World activism charac- Nevertheless, most of the basic Italian Communist attempts) to bring teristic of the Soviet Union at this time. questions about Soviet policies and calEritrean and Ethiopian Marxists to- While there seems to be no reason to culations during 1977 which I identigether.
question the authenticity of the docu- fied as still needing clarification in my In response to Mengistu's urgent ments themselves, there are obviously discussion of this period in a 1991 pleading, the Soviets agreed during July large gaps in this documentation. We study3 remain open so far as these docu1977 to send in urgently needed trans- find nothing about differing views ments go. The Russian documents stop, port equipment to enable the Ethiopi- among Soviet officials or various ele
for the most part, at the point when hard ans to utilize some of the tanks and guns ments in the Soviet bureaucracy, nor Soviet decisions about action and the Soviets had already provided as a about different interpretations of devel- implementation began to be made: at result of agreements reached during opments between the Soviet establish- the end of September 1977. For exMengistu's December 1976 and May ments in Mogadishu2 and Addis Ababa. ample, they shed no light on how these 1977 visits to Moscow, but the Krem- We see no reflection of options and decisions were arrived at and carried lin was still apparently hoping to limit courses of action that must have been out, or how risks were assessed. The its commitment. Politburo minutes of discussed in the Soviet embassies in the massive airlift and sealift of Cuban 4 and 11 August 1977 confirm decisions Horn and in Moscow as the crisis in- troops and equipment that startled the
world from November 1977 onward, or make them more amenable to Soviet EAST GERMANY AND THE the decision to send General V. Petrov manipulation. In its crudity, it is insult- HORN CRISIS: DOCUMENTS to Ethiopia to oversee operations ing to the intelligence of the Ethiopi- ON SED AFRIKAPOLITIK against the Somali forces, get scant ans. They did not take it seriously mention, as does Mengistu's "closed" enough to bring it to the attention of the By Christian F. Ostermann or secret trip to Moscow in October United States toward which they were 1977 at which the imminent Soviet showing some warmth at this very pe- The documents from the archives Cuban military effort was undoubtedly riod in hopes of getting previously or- of the former Socialist Unity Party of the chief topic of conversation. [Ed. dered military equipment and spare
dered military equipment and spare Germany (SED)—the Stiftung “Archiv note: Both are mentioned in passing in parts released. It is hard to believe that der Parteien und Massenorganthe 3 April 1978 Soviet Foreign Minis- a seasoned and experienced officer such isationen der SED" im Bundesarchiv, try background report on Soviet-Ethio- as Ratanov was not engaging in a cha- Berlin-included in the selection of pian relations printed below; a gener- rade in reporting this grotesque scheme Russian and East German materials on ally-worded Soviet report to the East and discussions of it with senior Ethio- the Horn of Africa crisis in 1977-78 German leadership on Mengistu's trip pian officials to Moscow.
demonstrate the usefulness of is also included.) Likewise these docu- Limited as they are in what they multiarchival research for an underments are devoid of reference to the reveal of the debates and actions of standing of Soviet and Cuban policy. decision to shore up Ethiopian forces Soviet officials in Ethiopia, Somalia, Given the difficulties with access to the by transferring South Yemeni armored and Moscow in 1977-78, these Soviet- Soviet and Cuban archives, the formerly units to Ethiopia in late summer 1977 bloc documents are worth more detailed top-secret documents from the East to blunt the Somali advance.
examination and analysis, a task which German Communist party archives, The most curious aspect of this I hope to undertake at greater length and among them high-level discussions bebatch of documents concern three that also encourage others to do. More such tween CPSU, SED and Cuban party opdeal with “Operation Torch"-an al- documents may eventually become eratives, help to understand Moscow's leged American plot to assassinate available, as well as a potentially rich and Havana's interests and actions, in Mengistu and attack Ethiopia from collection of Ethiopian materials from ways that usefully supplement and go Sudan and Kenya. Ethiopian leaders this period that has been assembled in beyond what is currently available from presented what they described as docu- Addis Ababa for use in the trial of those countries, in this regional flarementation of the plot to Soviet-bloc dip- former Derg officials (the future status up that become a superpower crisis. lomats in early September 1977, and of these documents is unclear, but it is The documents also provide new claimed that it was planned to be to be hoped that they will be made avail- insights into the East German role in launched on 1 October 1977. The text able to scholars). Access to these ma- the Cold War in Africa. By the midof the description of the plot, suppos- terials, as well as additional U.S. gov- 1970s, Africa had become an increasedly conceived and directed out of the ernment documents still awaiting de- ingly important arena for GDR foreign U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, reads like a classification and still-inaccessible Cu- policy. Prior to the "wave of recognifourth-rate pulp thriller. Nothing in it, ban and other sources, may enable a far tion” following the Basic Treaty beincluding the names of the American better understanding of the Horn of Af- tween East and West Germany in 1972, officers who were supposedly directing rica Crisis of 1977-78.
East Berlin's primary interest in Africa it, bears any relation to known or plau
was to enhance its international standsible facts. Perhaps the oddest feature
Though Siad told me on meeting with him in ing and prestige. The decolonization of “Operation Torch" is its lack of diMogadishu in September 1977 that Somalia had
process seemed to offer plenty of opno regular military personnel in Ethiopia, the rect connection with Somalia or with United States never took his claims seriously.
portunities for the regime of SED first Eritrean rebels.
Neither, so far as we can tell, did the Soviets. secretary Walter Ulbricht to undermine If the Soviets actually took this “re
2 Moscow had up to 4000 advisers in Somalia as and circumvent the "Hallstein docport" seriously, why did they not chalof the beginning of 1977. There was also a siz
trine," Bonn's post-1955 policy to conable Cuban presence in Somalia. lenge all the countries supposedly co
sider the establishment of diplomatic
Chapter 5, “Crisis and Degeneration", pp. 133operating in mounting it-Kenya, 167 in The Horn of Africa from War to Peace relation with the GDR by any third Sudan, and the United States? It bears (London/New York: Macmillan, 1991).
country to be an "unfriendly act" toall the marks of a disinformation op4 1 served as the officer responsible for Horn af
wards the Federal Republic. Grounded fairs in the U.S. National Security Council dureration of the kind that the Soviets (ofing this period. No scheme remotely resembling
in the belief that the West German govten through Bulgaria or Czechoslova
"Operation Torch” was ever considered by the ernment was the only government truly kia) frequently undertook during this U.S. Government.
representative of the German nation, the period. Whatever specific purpose it
"Hallstein doctrine" effectively manwas designed to serve is unclear. One
aged to deny the GDR international lepossibility is that it may have been in
gitimacy outside the Soviet bloc. tended to heighten the paranoia of
East German efforts to subvert the Mengistu and his Derg colleagues and
Hallstein doctrine in Africa by gaining