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on China. We must be prepared for the possible bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and for attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas.

(3) Of the two issues, the first one is whether the Chinese troops would be able to defeat American troops in Korea, thus effectively resolving the Korean problem. If our troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the revolutionary front and China, even though the second question ([the possibility] that the United States would declare war on China) would still remain as a serious issue. In other words, the Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of American troops (although the war might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of [North] Korea for a long period). If this occurs, even though the United States had declared war on China, the ongoing confrontation would not be on a large-scale, nor would it last very long. We consider that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental to China's economic reconstruction already under way, and would cause dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely afraid of war).

(4) Under the current situation, we have decided, starting on October 15, to move the twelve divisions, which have been earlier transferred to southern Manchuria, into suitable areas in North Korea (not necessarily close to the 38th parallel); these troops will only fight the enemy that venture to attack areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops will employ defensive tactics, while engaging small groups of enemies and learning about the situation in every respect. Meanwhile, our troops will be awaiting the arrival of Soviet weapons and being equipped with those weapons. Only then will our troops, in cooperation with the Korean comrades, launch a counter-offensive to destroy the invading American forces.

(5) According to our information, every U.S. army (two infantry divisions and one mechanized division) is armed with

1500 pieces of artillery of various caliber ranging from 70mm to 240mm, including tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, while each of our armies (three divisions) is equipped with only 36 pieces of artillery. The enemy would control the air while our air force, which has just started its training, will not be able to enter the war with some 300 planes until February 1951. Therefore, at present, we are not assured that our troops will be able to annihilate an entire U. S. army once and for all. But since we have decided to go into the war against the Americans, we should be prepared that, when the U.S. high command musters up one complete army to fight us in a campaign, we should be able to concentrate our forces four times greater than those of the enemy (that is, to use four of our armies to fight against one enemy army) and to marshal firing power one and a half to two times stronger than that of the enemy (that is, to use 2200 to 3000 pieces of artillery of 70mm caliber and upward to deal with the enemy's 1500 pieces of artilleries of the same caliber), so that we can guarantee a complete and thorough destruction of one enemy army.

(6) In addition to the above-mentioned twelve divisions, we are transferring another twenty-four divisions, as the second and third echelons to assist Korea, from south of the Yangzi River and the Shaanxi-Gansu areas to the Long-hai, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Southern Manchuria railways; we expect to gradually employ these divisions next spring and summer in accordance with the situation at the time.4

Although the message was not pub5 lished in its entirety, the above text has made its importance self-evident. Since the late 1980s, Korean War historians have widely cited this telegram as main evidence to support the notion that by early October 1950, the Chinese leadership, Mao Zedong in particular, had made the decision to send Chinese troops to Korea,6

However, the opening of Russian archives in recent years indicated that Mao, via Soviet ambassador to China N. V. Roshchin, had sent a message to Stalin on 2 October 1950 that drastically differs from the above-cited Chinese version. The Russian version reads as follows:

I received your telegram of 1 October 1950. We originally planned to move several volunteer division to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.

In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large.

Many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send our troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.

Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war. We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea. We await your reply.' ,7

The obvious contradictions between these two versions of Mao Zedong's 2 October 1950 telegram to Stalin have inevitably raised serious questions concerning what really happened in Beijing and between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950. At a seminar held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. on 13 December 1995, and in his article in the Winter 1995/1996 issue of the Cold War Inter8 national History Project Bulletin, the Russian scholar Alexandre Y. Mansourov cited the Russian version of Mao's telegram to argue that the Chinese leaders were reluctant to send troops to Korea, and that they might have completely backed away from their original intention to send troops to Korea early in October 1950. Further, Mansourov questioned the authenticity of Mao's telegram published in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao. Comparing the styles and contents of the two versions, he pointed out that since the Russian version is a copy of an actual document kept at the Presidential Archive in Moscow, it should be regarded as more reliable than the published Chinese version, which, he argued, could be "unreliable, inaccurate, unsent, or perhaps misdated." He even stated that one cannot "exclude the possibility that the text was altered or falsified by Chinese authorities to present what they deemed to be a more ideologically or politically correct version of history."10

,,9

Mansourov's casting of doubt on the authenticity of the Chinese version of Mao's telegram was based on a simple, yet seemingly reasonable, deduction: because the contents of the two versions are drastically different, and because the Russian version appeared authentic, something must have been seriously wrong with the Chinese version.

The situation, however, is more complicated. After the exposure of the Russian version of the telegram, party archivists in Beijing carefully searched Mao's documents at CCP Central Archives, and confirmed that the original of the Chinese version of Mao's 2 October 1950 message did indeed exist and

is kept there (this author was provided access to it). The telegram was in Mao's own handwriting and was longer than the version that was published in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (the published version did not include the sections about China's requests for Soviet ammunition and military equipment). However, the format of this telegram differed from that of many of Mao's other telegrams: while other telegrams usually (but not always) carried Mao's office staff's signature indicating how and when the telegram was dispatched, this telegram does not.11 So, while it is certain that the Chinese version of Mao's telegram is a genuine document, there exist reasonable grounds on which to believe that it might not have been dispatched.

At the same time, the party archivists in Beijing could not find the Russian version of the 2 October 1950 telegram in Mao's files at CCP Central Archives. This, however, does not mean that the Russian version is not a genuine document. One explanation of its absence in Mao's files might be found in the format of the document: It is not a telegram Mao Zedong directly sent to Stalin, but is a message included in Roshchin's telegram to the Soviet leader. Therefore, it is quite possible that Mao verbally delivered the message to Roshchin and authorized the Soviet ambassador to convey it to Stalin. Because the message may not have been in written form in the first place, it may not be so strange that one cannot locate a copy of it at the CCP Central Archives.

If the above analysis is correct, one must further ask a question: Why did

BROTHERS IN ARMS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SINO

SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945-1963

Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963, edited by Odd Arne Westad (Research Director, Norwegian Nobel Institute), contains a collection of essays by Russian, Chinese, and American scholars (as well as Westad) presenting new evidence from Russian and Chinese sources on the development and demise of the alliance between Moscow and Beijing in the early years of the Cold War.

For ordering information, contact: Odd Arne Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute, Drammensveien 19, 0255 Oslo, Norway, fax: (+47-22) 430168; e-mail: oaw@nobel. no

Mao draft one telegram (the Chinese version) but deliver another message (the Russian version) to Stalin via the Soviet ambassador?

If we put this issue into the context of the tortuous processes through which the CCP leadership reached the decision to send troops to Korea, we may find that a major reason for Mao not to dispatch the draft telegram to Stalin could lie in the fact that the Chinese leadership had not yet reached a consensus on this issue. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong had been carefully considering the question of sending troops to Korea. After the Inchon landing in mid-September, he seemed to have been determined to do so. However, according to the materials now available, the Chinese leaders did not formally meet to discuss dispatching troops to Korea until after 1 October 1950. The reality was that many Chinese leaders had different views on this issue. We now know that after receiving Stalin's October 1 telegram, Mao summoned a Central Secretariat meeting the same night. Attending the meeting were Mao, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. Unable to attain a consensus on sending troops to Korea, the group decided to continue to discuss the issue the next day at an enlarged Central Secretariat meeting (attendants would include high-ranking military leaders in Beijing).12 It was after this meeting that Mao sent an urgent telegram to Gao Gang, instructing him to travel from the Northeast to Beijing immediately. Mao also ordered the Northeast Border Defense Army to prepare to "enter operations [in Korea] at any time."13

According to the materials now available, as well as the recollections of those who had been involved, we are able to draw a general picture about the enlarged Central Secretariat meeting on the afternoon of 2 October. Mao Zedong emphasized at the meeting that it was urgent to send troops to Korea, and the meeting thus decided that Peng Dehuai should be asked to command the troops. Mao also instructed Zhou Enlai to arrange a special plane to pick up Peng in Xi'an (where Peng was then the military and Party head). However, the

meeting failed to yield a unanimous decision to send troops to Korea. It thus decided that an enlarged Politburo meeting would be convened to discuss the issue on October 4.14 Evidently, before the Party leadership had reached a final decision, it would have been impossible for Mao to give an affirmative response to Stalin's October 1 request. 15 In actuality, even at the October 4 enlarged Politburo meeting, which would last until October 5, the opinions of the CCP leaders were still deeply divided, with the majority, at one point, strongly opposing sending troops to Korea. The main tendency of the meeting was that "unless absolutely necessary, it was better not to fight the war."16

Within this context, it is easier to extrapolate what really happened with the Chinese version of Mao's telegram. It is quite possible that as Mao was willing to send troops to Korea, he personally drafted this telegram after receiving Stalin's October 1 telegram. However, because the opinions of the CCP leadership were still divided on the issue, and because the majority of Party leaders either opposed or had strong reservations about entering the war, Mao did not think it proper to dispatch the telegram. In fact, the Russian version of Mao's message mentions that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution." This indicated that the division of opinions among CCP leaders was a reason for Mao to send the message found in Russian archives, but not his personally drafted telegram, to Stalin. Of course, how, exactly, Mao changed his plans regarding the message is a question that might only be illuminated with further research, including the opening of additional archival materials in Moscow and, especially, Beijing.

Now, a question that needs further exploration is: Does Mao's message via Roshchin, as regarded by Roshchin and Stalin at that time, as well as currently interpreted by Mansourov, indicate that Mao was reluctant to send troops to Korea, or that the CCP leadership had changed its original stand on the Korean issue? This question should be answered in relation to Mao Zedong's

STALIN, MAO, KIM AND KOREAN WAR ORIGINS, 1950: A RUSSIAN DOCUMENTARY DISCREPANCY

by Dieter Heinzig

There is some evidence that Stalin and Mao, during the latter's stay in Moscow between December 1949 and February 1950, discussed the feasibility of a North Korean war against South Korea (cf. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War. The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], pp. 85-91). But what we are particularly keen on knowing is whether Stalin informed Mao Zedong about the fact that he, on 30 January 1950, gave North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, although in general terms, the green light for an attack on South Korea (cf. Kathryn Weathersby in the CWIHP Bulletin 5 [Spring 1995], pp. 3, 9).

At last I found strong evidence that he did not. It is contained in Mao's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on 31 March 1956, a version of which was published in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 164-7. In this version, on page 166 a part of Yudin's original record is omitted. It reads as follows (omitted part underlined):

"Important things which, evidently, to some extent strengthened Stalin's belief in the CCP, were your (my) information about the journey to China and the Korean War-the performance of the Chinese People's volunteers, although concerning this question, said Mao Zedong, we were not consulted in a sufficient way. Concerning the Korean question, when I (Mao Zedong) was in Moscow, there was no talk about conquering South Korea, but rather on strengthening North Korea significantly. But afterwards Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, where a certain agreement was reached about which nobody deemed it necessary to consult with me beforehand. It is noteworthy, said Mao Zedong, that, in the Korean War a serious miscalculation took place regarding the possibility of the appearance of international forces on the side of South Korea."

The source is contained in the documents on the Korean War declassified by the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) in Moscow which were cited by Kathryn Weathersby in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 30. It is Ciphered telegram; Strictly secret; Taking of copies forbidden; From Beijing; 20. IV. 56 (handwritten); Perechen III no. 63 kopii dokumentov Arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po teme: "Voina v Koree 1950-1953,” p. 157; list of the archival delo: 150; nos. of fond, opis, and delo not given. Before the text quoted above: "On 31 March I visited Comr. Mao Zedong," after "P. Yudin." The text quoted above is introduced by the handwritten insertion (...), and it ends with the same insertion. Evidently, the text was included in the Presidential Archive's collection as an excerpt as it is the only part of Yudin's record which has to do with the Korean War.

For the CWIHP version of Yudin's record three sources are quoted (see p. 167). One is Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 5 (1994), pp. 101-109. Responsible for this publication are A. Grigorev and T. Zazerskaia. Here no reference whatsoever is made indicating that something was omitted. I did not see the two other (archival) sources quoted in the CWIHP Bulletin. But obviously there is no reference to an omission either, otherwise this would certainly have been indicated in the Bulletin version.

The text quoted above not only adds to our knowledge about the decision-making process during the preparatory phase of the Korean War. In addition, the way the text was discovered shows that Russian censors are still active-not only by withholding documents, but also by offering incomplete documents.

considerations before and after October 2, as well as by comparing the contents of the Chinese and Russian versions of the telegram.

First of all, it should be emphasized that Mao Zedong felt that he was forced to make the decision to send troops to Korea. He fully understood that China's involvement in the Korean War would entail great difficulties. On this point, his views basically coincided with those of his comrades who opposed or had strong reservations about sending troops to Korea. In actuality, those reasons that Mao listed in the Russian version, such as America's technological superiority, the danger of an open war with the United States, and the possible negative domestic reactions, were all reflected in the Chinese version, though from a different angle. When Mao mentioned in the Russian version that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution," this does not mean that he had changed his own determination. A careful comparison of the two versions leads to a different conclusion: Mao did not change his goals but rather the tactics he would use to achieve them. Instead of replying directly and positively to Stalin's request, Mao adopted a more indirect and ambiguous response, so that he would be able to reconcile his own determination to enter the war with the disagreements still existing among other CCP leaders, while at the same time keeping the door for further communication (and bargaining) with Stalin open. This interpretation would explain why the CCP chairman specifically informed Stalin in the Russian version that "A final decision has not been made on this question. This is our preliminary telegram." It also explains why he proposed to send Zhou Enlai to consult with Stalin.

That Mao had not altered his determination to enter the war was most clearly demonstrated by his attitude at the October 4-5 Politburo meeting. Although the majority of CCP leaders attending the meeting continued to express strong reservations about entering the Korean War, Mao told them that "all of what you have said is reasonable, but once another nation, one that is our neighbor, is in crisis, we'd feel

sad if we stood idly by:"17 Mao finally port, especially air cover for Chinese

convinced his comrades of the need to send troops to Korea at the October 5 meeting. Once the decision was made, the Chinese leaders acted immediately. (It is unclear whether this decision was taken before or after Mao received Stalin's response-which strongly urged Chinese intervention in Korea, even at the risk of World War III-to his earlier telegram indicating doubt about entering the war.) After the October 5 meeting, Mao invited Zhou Enlai, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai to dine with him, and they further discussed some of the details. Mao also instructed Peng and Gao to travel to Shenyang to convey the Politburo's decision to division-level commanders of the Northeast Border Defense Army, preparing to enter operations in Korea by October 15. The next day, Zhou Enlai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which made concrete arrangements about how the troops should prepare to enter operations in Korea. 18

It should also be noted that there exists no irreconcilable contradiction between the Chinese leaders' previous agreement to send troops to Korea and Mao's expression that China would "refrain from advancing troops" in the Russian version. Scholars who believe that China had completely changed its stand have ignored an important condition, that is, every time the Chinese leaders mentioned that China would send troops to Korea, they made it clear that a crucial precondition for taking action was that the enemy forces crossed the 38th parallel. In Zhou Enlai's meeting with K. M. Pannikar, India's ambassador to China, early in the morning of October 3, the Chinese premier particularly emphasized that if the U.S. (not South Korean) troops had crossed the 38th parallel, China would 19 intervene. As of October 2, this precondition had not yet materialized.20

In addition to the above factors, Mao did not give Stalin a direct and positive response because he sensed the need to put more pressure on Stalin. An important condition for China to enter a war with the United States was that it would receive substantial military sup

ground forces, from the Soviet Union. By analyzing the two versions of Mao's telegram, a common point was that Mao believed that if China was to enter the war, it must win the war, and win it quickly. Only a speedy victory would solve all of China's difficulties and worries. In order to achieve a rapid victory, it was necessary that the Soviet Union, China's main ally, to provide the PRC with adequate military assistance, the air support in particular. However, Stalin, in his October 1 telegram to Mao, as well as in several other communications with the Chinese leadership before and afterward, failed to clarify this crucial issue. Without reaching clearly-defined and concrete agreements with the Soviets, Mao might have felt that it was better not to give Stalin's request a direct and positive response. This could have been the most important reason underlying Mao's proposal to send Zhou Enlai to the USSR to meet Stalin. And this also could explain why, under the circumstance that the Chinese leadership had already made the decision to enter the Korean War, Mao told Stalin on October 7 that China "would not be able to send troops [to Korea] at this moment, but would do so after some time."21 The key question had now become Soviet air support for Chinese troops that were to fight in Korea.

1 See my paper, "China Was Forced to Enter the Korean War: Causes and Decision-making Process," prepared for "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia," international conference sponsored by the Cold War International History Project, University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996. 2 For Kim's letter to Stalin of 29 September 1950, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 110-111; the original is kept in the Archives of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), Moscow, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 46-49.

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clear that the text of the telegram published is
incomplete. In the original of the telegram, ac-
cording to Chen Jian, who based his description
on "interviews with Shi Zhe and Beijing's mili-
tary researchers with access to Mao's manu-
scripts," Mao also asked Stalin to deliver to the
Chinese large amounts of military equipment,
including tanks, heavy artillery, other heavy and
light weapons, and thousands of trucks, as well
as to confirm that the Soviet Union would pro-
vide the Chinese with air support when Chinese
troops entered operations in Korea. See Chen Jian,
China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of
the Sino-American Confrontation (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994), 177.
6 For examples of such citations, see the editor's

note in footnote 30 of Alexandre Y. Mansourov,
"Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to En-
ter the Korean War, September 16-October 15,
1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,"
Cold War International History Project Bulletin
6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), at 107.

7

Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov [Stalin], 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao Zedong, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 114-115.

For the article and accompanying documents, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/ 1996), 94-119.

Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's
Decision to Enter the Korean War," 107, fn. 30.
10
Ibid.

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17

Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai zishu [The Auto-
biographical Note of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing:
People's Press, 1981), 472-74.

18 Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang [The First Test of
Strength] (Beijing: Chinese Television and Broad-
casting Press, 1990), 24; Chen Jian, China's Road
to the Korean War, 185. For Stalin's reply (n.d.,
probably October 5 or 6) to Mao's earlier tele-
gram, see Stalin to Kim Il-Sung, 8 [7] October
1950, Cold War International History Project
Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116-17.

19
Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplo-
matic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: The Cen-
tral Press of Historical Documents, 1990), 25-27.
20

According to the intelligence reports the Chi-
nese leaders had received by October 2, only
South Korean troops had crossed the parallel. As
late as October 14, when U.S.-South Korean
troops had broken up the North Korean defense
line for Pyongyang, Mao, in accordance with the
intelligence reports from the Chinese military, still
believed that "it seems that the Americans are yet
to decide whether or not and when they would
attack Pyongyang... The American troops are now
still stationed at the [38th] parallel." Jianguo yilai
Mao Zedong wengao, 1: 559-61.

21 See Cold War International History Project
Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116.

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL
HISTORY PROJECT
WORKING PAPERS

#1: Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance
and China's Entry into the Korean War"
#2: P.J. Simmons, "Archival Research on
the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest,
Prague and Warsaw"

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Policy Towards Germany during the Beria
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gence and the Cold War: The 'Small' Com-
mittee of Information, 1952-53"

#5: Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the
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lations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961"
#6: Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and
the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)"
#7: Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham,
"Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on
the Cold War Period: Two Reports"
#8: Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in
Korea and the Origins of the Korean War,
1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian
Archives"

#9: Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M.
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jection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Re-
ports"

#10: Norman M. Naimark, "To Know Everything and To Report Everything Worth Knowing': Building the East German Police State, 1945-1949"

#11: Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback"

#12: Brian Murray, "Stalin, the Cold War,
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val Mystery"

#13: Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three
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#14: Ruud van Dijk, “The 1952 Stalin Note
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#15: Natalia I. Yegorova, "The Iran Crisis'
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Revolution and World Politics"

Shen Zhihua is director of Center for
Oriental History Studies in Beijing and
the author of Chaoxian zhanzheng jiemi
[Unmasking the Secrets of the Korean
War] (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu, 1995).
Chen Jian is an associate professor of #16: Csaba Békés, "The 1956 Hungarian
history at Southern Illinois University
and a senior fellow at the United States
Institute of Peace in Washington, DC
for the 1996-97 academic year. Among
his publications is China's Road to the
Korean War: The Making of the Sino-
American Confrontation (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994).

CWIHP Working Papers are available free on request to: CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Washington, DC 20560; fax: (202) 357-4439.

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