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spections, and that now it was necessary to Stevenson, 2 November 1962 had not said it, but that the press gave an find new methods of monitoring that would

erroneous interpretation of his speech. confirm that the dismantling and removal [...] We raised the question that it was Stevenson and McCloy confirmed that of the missiles had begun (in McCloy's opin- necessary to write down in the form of a the USA are (is) ready to give a non-aggresion, the best solution would be aerial pho- protocol the important provisions that are sion guarantee to Cuba as it was mentioned tos along with a check on the ships remov- contained in the exchange of messages be- in Kennedy's letter, if an inspection in some ing the cargoes from Cuba on the open sea. tween N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy tak- form confirms that the Soviet "offensive" McCloy underscored that this monitoring ing into account the statement by Fidel armament is really removed from Cuba. should be formal— without inquiring into Castro. The Americans by all means were Stevenson and McCloy affirmed that the details of the missiles, which are secret). evading discussion of this question and try- the encampments where the Cuban exiles

3. McCloy spoke a lot about the future ing to bring the whole matter to the organi- had been training for an invasion of Cuba prospects of an American-Soviet collabora- zation of control over the dismantling and were currently closed. tion which would open up as a result of the withdrawal from Cuba of the Soviet mis- 2. During the conversation we resosettling of the Cuban crisis. In his view, it is siles. Nevertheless, in the course of con- lutely demanded the removal of the sonecessary

in the first place to reach an agree- versation they were obliged to answer our called “quarantine,” underlining that its conment on the cessation of nuclear testing, questions relating to the settlement of the tinuation in no way can help to create a suitwhich would make a huge impression on Cuban problem in general and disclosed able atmosphere for the solution of the Cupublic opinion. It would be good if this some of their positions that seem interest- ban problem and may only complicate the agreement could be signed by Kennedy and ing for further negotiations. To save space situation. In this regard we noted that the Khrushchev. Such a meeting would in this cable we omit our remarks during Soviet Union had complied with the request strengthen public faith that their personal the conversation. You may learn them from from U Thant for a temporary suspension contacts can be fruitful.

the transcript of the conversation which is of armaments' supplies to Cuba, but that the McCloy also believes it expedient to being sent separately.

USA had not stopped their “quarantine" for conclude an agreement concerning a renun- 1. Though reluctantly, the Americans at least some time, as it had been suggested ciation of the military use of outer space, agreed with the need to fix in documents by U Thant. and to sign a treaty on at least one bilateral the corresponding commitments, including McCloy and Stevenson evaded a clear agreement concerning the colonizing of the non-aggression commitment against answer to the question of ending the “quarouter space (for example, the launching of Cuba. In their opinion, these documents antine,” having limited themselves to a refa Soviet-American rocket aimed at Venus). must include: a statement by the Soviet erence that to the Soviet vessels going to

McCloy also reiterated several ideas Union on the completion of the missiles' Cuba would be applied the same procedure expressed earlier by Salinger and Thomp- evacuation; a USA statement saying they are as it was on October 25 regarding the tanker son (concerning in particular the issue of convinced of the withdrawal and giving cor- “Bucharest,” without an inspection on bases in Turkey-it may be possible, in his responding non-aggression guarantees to board, but with the help of a hailing-request view, to eliminate them in the course of “the Cuba; possibly also a statement by U Thant.

by radio. first stage of disarmament”—by way of “re- The statement by the Soviet govern- It is illustrative that in response to our distribution”). ment must be the first.

statement that in the event of dropping the 4. McCloy implied that he would play The texts of these statements will be practice of "quarantine" and giving our vesthe role of an unofficial intermediary in the coordinated in advance.

sels the possibility to visit Cuba without any preparation of a meeting between Kennedy It is foreseen that a corresponding state- obstacles some 10-15 days will be needed and Khrushchev, which in his view could ment will be made by the Government of to dispatch [from Cuba] all the armaments take place within a few months, if resolu- Cuba. All these statements must be pre- called offensive by the Americans, McCloy tions of the issues enumerated above have sented to the Security Council.

and Stevenson said that in their opinion it is been completed by that time.

The unwillingness of the Americans to hardly possible from the technical stand5. McCloy asked us to pass on his sign a protocol, apparently, can be explained point to carry out the mentioned volume of warm greetings to N. S. Khrushchev and the in addition by the following thing: they do work in such a short period of time. Accordmembers of his family, from himself and his not want to put their signature side by side ing to McCloy, at least a month would be own family. with the Cubans'.

needed for that. The Americans underlined their readi- 3. There has been a detailed discussion 2.XI.62 G. ZHUKOV ness to include in their statement provisions of methods for control of the dismantling

based on corresponding wording from and removal of missiles. (Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, Kennedy's messages regarding the issue of Apparently, feeling the weakness of provided to CWIHP, and on file at National non-aggression guarantees for Cuba. their position and taking into account obSecurity Archive, Washington, D.C.; trans- When we mentioned that in the Ameri- jections on the part of Fidel Castro to perlation by John Henriksen.)

can press there has appeared a statement by mit verification on Cuban territory, McCloy

D. Rusk to the effect that Kennedy's state- and Stevenson declared in the course of disA.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU re 1 ment is not a non-aggression guarantee to cussion that the American side would be November 1962 Meeting with Cuba, Stevenson assured us that D. Rusk ready not to insist on verification methods foreseen in the message to N.S. Khrushchev tend to do so not immediately, but some time and was ready to look for some new meth- later?

Soviet Record of 1 November 1962 ods that would in essence give the Ameri- Stevenson said that he was not able to Dinner Conversation between CPSU cans the possibility to be certain of the give an answer to that question insofar as it CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan implementation of our commitment to with- is part of the competence of the OAS (Or- and White House envoy John McCloy draw the weapons.

ganization of American States). But perhaps and U.S. Ambassador to the United To our specific question what new we can consider the possibility of organiz

Nations Adlai Stevenson methods was he referring to, McCloy said: ing corresponding regional arrangements, the USA could limit (itself] to the continua- giving the necessary confidence to the coun

Secret. Copy no. 24 tion of their flights which give them confi- tries of the Caribbean. I hope that steadily dence that there has not resumed in Cuba we will succeed in eliminating antagonism an installation of the dangerous for them between Cuba and its neighbors.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION OF types of armaments. At the same time Stevenson made the

com. A.I. MIKOYAN If Castro is against a ground verifica- observation that currently the “antagonism" WITH JOHN MCCLOY AND ADLAI tion, continued McCloy, another thing could between Cuba and its neighbors is instigated STEVENSON AT A DINNER IN THE be done - a transfer of the lists of armaments by “subversive actions in this region, per- SOVIET MISSION AT THE U.N. withdrawn from Cuba, when they would be haps undertaken mutually.” McCloy noted

1 November 1962 removed, and of the corresponding informa- that “Cuba is the breeding ground of infection, which however would not disclose tion and Venezuela an example."

At the outset of the conversation A.I. Soviet technological secrets. We do know It was clear that in the immediate fu- Mikoyan poses a question about the lifting roughly how many missiles currently are ture the USA [is] not going to re-establish of the American blockade on the surroundsituated in Cuba. In this case we could man- diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba. ings of Cuba for the period of negotiations, age without ground verification. We are 5. Stevenson and McCloy stated that as it was proposed by U Thant in his first glad, - said McCloy, - that today our plane the USA refuse[s] point-blank to discuss the missive to com. N.S. Khrushchev and to had not come under fire when it had been question of liquidating the American base President Kennedy on 24 October this year. flying over Cuba. As far as we know the at Guantanamo.

A.I. Mikoyan says that the USSR acanti-aircraft missiles in Cuba are in the hands 6. In the course of the conversation cepted recommendation of the acting Genof your people, not the Cubans, although it's McCloy attempted to broach the subject of eral Secretary of the U.N., and the United possible that there are some Cuban person- an eventual evacuation from Cuba of the States did not. On 24 October U Thant pronel.

Soviet “ground-air” anti-aircraft missiles. posed that the Soviet Union would stop deMcCloy received a very firm response We have resolutely warded off this probing, livery of weapons to Cuba for the duration that the USA (has) no right to overfly Cuba declaring that such a question could not be of talks (2 to 3 weeks), and the United States and nobody can guarantee the security of raised and that we had sold these weapons during the same period would suspend the such illegal flights.

to a number of countries, including the blockade. The Soviet Union fulfilled the rec4. We raised the question of normaliz- United Arab Republic and Indonesia. ommendations of U Thant, but the United ing relations between the USA [and] their McCloy made the observation that “they are States did not. Latin American allies, and Cuba. We also good machines against attacks from air- McCloy remarks that U Thant seeks to asked what is their attitude to U Thant's plan space.”

start as soon as possible to check up Soviet for a UN presence in the Caribbean. The 7. McCloy and Stevenson agreed that vessels sailing to Cuba, by the forces of the Americans flatly rejected any inspection of it would be good for Soviet and American International Red Cross. their territory whatsoever and declared: delegations to try to reach preliminary agree- Stevenson says that the United States "You will have to trust our word."

ments over the issues to be discussed by the hoped that by the end of next week observAt the same time, Stevenson said that Security Council.

ers of the International Red Cross would be the USA aspires to normalize the situation 8. McCloy and Stevenson expressed able to begin their work in Cuba. Here apin the Caribbean, but under the condition of satisfaction over the exchange of opinions parently some sort of misunderstanding Castro's cooperation. We could in some and Stevenson underlined that the USSR and emerges. It was understood that the suspenform elaborate mutual guarantees, accept- USA positions “are not so far from each sion of the “quarantine” would be condiable to Castro and his neighbors. If Castro other.” Both of them were inquiring whether tioned on the simultaneous introduction of is afraid of them, they are afraid of him, too. I would stop on my way back [from Cuba). inspection. I consider, said Stevenson, that after the I said in response that for the moment A.I. Mikoyan objects that no such unCuban crisis is settled the tension in this re- I had no plans to do so but if necessary I derstanding took place. gion would be lessened. assumed it would be possible.

McCloy remarks that perhaps U Thant In this regard we put the question in

did introduce the proposal mentioned by A.I.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN Mikoyan, but the United States accepted not “Castro may ask me if the US [is]

his proposal, but the proposal of Chairman going to re-establish diplomatic and eco- (Source: AVPRF; trans. V. Zaemsky; copy Khrushchev in his letter to President nomic relations with Cuba? Maybe you in- on file at National Security Archive.) Kennedy.

this way:

Stevenson says that in fact the issue about immediate suspension of the “quarantine" is purely academic. Soviet ships will probably not reach Cuba until next week, and meanwhile he hopes that the inspection of the Red Cross will be already in force, and then, naturally, there will be no need for the "quarantine."

A.I. Mikoyan reiterates that N.S. Khrushchev accepted the proposal of U Thant and the Americans did not accept it.

Stevenson. We believe that a certain understanding was achieved in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy.

A.I. Mikoyan. This correct. What was envisaged in the letters must be implemented and will be implemented. However, had the United States adopted the same reasonable approach, permeated with good will, as was adopted by the Soviet Union, then they would have accepted the proposal of U Thant and would have lifted the blockade immediately.

McCloy. Would you make a stop on the way back (from Cuba) in New York?

A.I. Mikoyan. I have no definite plans on this score, but I would not exclude such a stop-over.

McCloy (in a jocular tone). But would Castro let you out?

A.I. Mikoyan. He and I are special friends and will work it out somehow

Stevenson. Perhaps you will bring him along over here?

A.I. Mikoyan. You showed such a poor hospitality to him, that he can hardly be convinced to come to New York again. Such a great power as the United States should be ashamed to mistreat such a small country. When Stevenson had not yet been the USA representative (in the United Nations trans.), he had good understanding of everything, but now apparently his official position makes him speak and act in a different way.

Stevenson. We learn in government office, but we forget nothing. We immediately accepted the proposal on inspection by the Red Cross. I do not know how many Soviet ships are approaching Cuba, but I would prefer that there will be more of them, so that they would sooner take away your missiles. I must tell you that we were very favorably impressed by the speed with which Soviet officers dismantle the missiles.

McCloy. I am struck by the speed of assembling as well as disassembling (of the

missiles - trans.).

A.I.Mikoyan. It is correct that there is A.I. Mikoyan. Those who can assemble sufficient amount of armament in Cuba, but fast, can also disassemble fast. Our military we already stopped sending it there. are men of discipline, they punctually ful- McCloy. Yes, but we cannot risk, when fill the order of N.S. Khrushchev. But there it may happen that some arms are being are not enough ships around Cuba to carry withdrawn and other arms are being shipped away the equipment which is the subject of in. When the missile equipment will be the understanding, so in addition other ships shipped off, the political atmosphere will will be necessary. And your blockade stands ameliorate and it will be easier to agree. You in their way to Cuba and, consequently, preferred U.N. inspections to an inspection hampers the withdrawal of missiles. In other of the Red Cross. We agreed to that. We are words, the "quarantine" turns itself against interested in your ships reaching Cuba soon, your own interests.

and we will not obstruct their way. McCloy. We would gladly let your A.I. Mikoyan. Arms were not provided ships pass in both directions, if they carry to Cuba to attack the United States, but as a all your missiles away. I would like to be on means of containment (sderzhivaiyuchego), the ship that would transport the last mis- so that there was no aggression against siles from Cuba, added McCloy in jest. Cuba. But since in his answer to the letter

A.I. Mikoyan (in a jocular way). So lift of N.S. Khrushchev J. Kennedy gave the the "quarantine" and then everything will assurance that neither the United States, nor be in order. Stevenson will become the one its Latin American allies would attack Cuba, he had used to be before he was nominated we declared our readiness to pull out some (to his position) in the UN.

types of armaments from Cuba. Stevenson. When do your ships arrive Stevenson. I do not think there is any in Cuba?

disagreement on the issue that Soviet ships A.I. Mikoyan. But you have not yet should enter the ports of Cuba. It is only lifted the blockade. Our ships are now in that the "quarantine" should be preserved the open sea, about 4-5 days away from until the establishment of the Red Cross Cuba. They should reach Cuba, disembark inspection. We are interested to see that there their load, then load themselves and leave. will be no new shipments of arms, and we This would, of course, require a certain time, hope you will understand us, no less than 10-15 days.

A.I. Mikoyan. We agreed with the proStevenson. We could agree on a sched- posals of U Thant and declared that we ule. Next week one might agree on an in- would not bring armaments to Cuba pendspection of the Red Cross; then the “quar- ing the talks. Those ships that are now at antine” might be lifted.

sea carrying no weapons at all. I must say A.I. Mikoyan. I would like to know if that Stevenson is a good diplomat: I am [the leadership of the United States think[s] pushing him in one direction of the talk, but that we should work out an agreement that he veers off. would seal what has been said in the ex- Then for some time the conversation change of letters between Kennedy and was focused on the issues of protocol naKhrushchev? Or you are interested only in ture. the dismantling and withdrawal of missiles? In the second half of the conversation Would you think that we should agree on the discussion of business resumes. other issues touched upon in the exchange A.I. Mikoyan. Yet I would like to pose of missives, and confirm the achieved un- the following question. Would the USA govderstanding in a written document?

ernment think to come to an agreement Stevenson. First of all we want to reach where all that was said in the exchange of understanding on the withdrawal of missile well-known letters would be fixed? I have equipment from Cuba and we do not want in mind the kind of document that would to tolerate that until the establishment of formulate the settlement of the crisis. We inspection by the Red Cross there would be think it is preferable to work out such a docuan uncontrolled flow of armaments into ment. Cuba.

V.V. Kuznetsov. The need in working McCloy. There is already too much out such a document stems from the underarmament there. We cannot tolerate its build- standing achieved between the sides about


the settlement of the crisis.



Stevenson. In our opinion, the sole sovereignty and territorial integrity of the spection would cover only its territory, if problem that confronts us - it is to work out Cuban Republic, observation of its territo- there were no analogous inspection coverconditions for inspection that should be car- rial inviolability, non-interference into its ing the territory of the other side, on the basis ried out by representatives of the Red Circle. domestic affairs. Castro demands it, and you of reciprocity. This is relatively easy task. One could set apparently do not want to give such assur- I must emphasize that if the letter of J. up two check-points at the approaches to

Kennedy had not told of guarantees of nonCuba's ports, in the South and in the North, Castro puts forward also a demand to intervention against Cuba, we would not where two ships of the Red Cross could be liquidate the U.S. base in Guantanamo. Why have agreed to dismantle and withdraw mislocated. These might be ships of neutral are you refusing to discuss this issue? While sile equipment from Cuba. But now it comes countries or any other ships, perhaps even pressing your demands, you do not want to out as follows: we are withdrawing weapsailing hospitals. On board there could be hear the legitimate demands of the other ons, and you are back-pedaling on your Red Cross inspectors who could check on side. Of course, this is an issue of Ameri- commitments. Castro does not have trust in ships going for Cuba, so that the character can-Cuban relations, but in any case this is- your word and he has a right (not to), since of this check-up would be via radio - inquir- sue must be discussed with Castro.

the territory of Cuba has already been ining on the ship's origins, where it goes

and The exchange of letters between N.S. vaded. It would be a different matter if there with what cargo. Inspectors would not board Khrushchev and Kennedy - this is in essence would be an official document enforced, ships. I think that such (a form of] inspec- already an agreement. But by itself the ex- containing appropriate guarantees for Cuba tion should not create problems. We would change of letters cannot be considered as a and approved by the Security Castro. be glad to hear from you which ships, in final document. One must carry out nego

I would like to know your opinion your opinion, must be utilized for these tiations to work out such a final document about the guarantees. What can I tell Castro aims. I would like to repeat that one could on the basis of the exchange of letters, since when I meet him? We stem from the fact easily reach understanding on this issue. this issue has acquired a bilateral interna- that the letter from Kennedy already conThere is, however, one problem: mea- tional character.

tains a basis for an agreement on granting sures to check the fulfillment of obligations We suggest to conduct negotiations on to Cuba the guarantees of non-intervention. on dismantling and withdrawal of missile this basis and believe that the United States, This is a bilateral problem and both sides equipment from Cuba. As I understood from the Soviet Union, and Cuba should sign a must resolve it and fix it in an agreement. U Thant, Castro did not agree to UN inspec- protocol, with participation of U Thant. Such McCloy. In our opinion, the most imtions stipulated in the exchange of letters a protocol might fix all the basic premises portant thing) is to withdraw appropriate between J. Kennedy and N.S. Khrushchev. contained in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev (offensive - trans.) types of armaments from We hope that you will discuss this issue once and J. Kennedy.

Cuba as soon as possible. If it is not done, again in Havana.

I repeat, we think that you should con- the situation will worsen very much. One McCloy. I must emphasize that we do sider the proposals advanced by Castro. can speak about the assurances of Kennedy not accept the 5 conditions of Castro as the They are legitimate ones. You should also concerning non-intervention against Cuba, conditions for fulfillment of what had been consider the issue of the base in but Castro must not set new conditions on said in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev. Guantanamo. I see that you disagree with withdrawal of missile equipment. Mean

Stevenson. The problem that concerns Castro's demand, but it does not mean that while, Castro told U Thant that he would us most is that an inspection should be car- you should turn down any discussion of his not tolerate UN inspections. The Soviet ried out before you report to the Security demands. One cannot turn such a discussion Union and Cuba must agree between each Council about the completion of withdrawal down, when one wants to normalize the situ- other on what would be the form of inspecof missile equipment. Naturally, there ation.

tion. It is a matter of your relationship. We should be a check-up of how this undertak- I would touch on an interesting plan have only one interest: that the armaments ing is implemented. I think that such a advanced by U Thant; after an agreement on which we have achieved the understandcheck-up need not be difficult to carry out. among the parties involved, which could be

ing would be shipped away and that we In addition to that, of course, there is approved by the Security Council, one might would be convinced that they are really the issue of the form of USA assurance that agree on the presence of UN inspectors in shipped away. Cuba will not be subjected to invasion. This the area of the Caribbean Sea, including I do not think that there would be any also need not present any difficulties. Cuba, and on the South-East coast of the problems on the question of the access of

McCloy. And to a certain extent this is United States and the neighboring Latin ships and on the withdrawal of missile an answer to the question previously posed American countries. These inspectors could equipment from Cuba. The main thing is to by Mr. Mikoyan.

watch over implementation of the under- remove missile equipment. A.I. Mikoyan. You keep focusing all standing on mutual non-interference be- As to the question on granting the guarattention only on the issue of withdrawal of tween the United States and Cuba. This is a antees of non-intervention to Cuba, if you armaments from Cuba and on inspection. very important proposal and its implemen- think that what the President said is not However, the first-order question is to grant tation would give a change to fully settle enough, one could talk about some kind of to Cuba guarantees of non-intervention the conflict. One should take into account appropriate commitment (obiazatelstve). against it on the part of other countries of that Cuba is an independent state. It is im- You are posing a question about the the Western hemisphere, recognition of the possible to demand that some kind of in- possible presence of UN observers on USA


territory, so that there would be no invasion has the right of sovereignty and one must of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insist- seek its agreement on any kind of inspecing on that, there will be additional compli- tion on Cuban territory. It put forward five cations.

conditions, including the demand about liqA.I. Mikoyan. U Thant expressed this uidation of the American base in idea.

Guantanamo. However, beside the issue of McCloy. No, he did not suggest it. I the base, there are four more points in repeat: nothing will come out of it.

Castro's program, and these points are in full A.I. Mikoyan. Today in conversation agreement with what Kennedy wrote in his with me U Thant reiterated this idea and said letter to Khrushchev. Why don't you want that this issue should be discussed at the

to accept them? Organization of American States.

Stevenson. There is only one issue Stevenson. We believe that the ex- between the Soviet Union and the USA: change of letters between Kennedy and about full withdrawal from Cuba of certain Khrushchev contains concrete and clear for- types of armaments under conditions of inmulas. I think that there is no need for any spection and in the presence of the undernew understanding, except for resolution of standing that the supplies of this weaponry the issue about the inspection method. If we will not be resumed. Under these conditions fail to carry out ground inspection, let us the guarantees of Cuba's security on the part seek other means which would assure us that of the United States will be ensured. the armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise the Castro raised a number of other issues, danger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that, but they have nothing to do with Sovietwhen the atmosphere will clear up and the American relations. In our negotiations we missile equipment will be withdrawn from should begin to consider the issues that are Cuba, it will be easier to agree on other is- within the realm of Soviet-American relasues. Kennedy has already given appropri- tions, in the framework of the understandate assurances concerning non-intervention ing between Khrushchev and Kennedy. against Cuba, and we can confirm it.

A.I.Mikoyan. Speaking about the exWe would like to say clearly that any change of letters between N.S. Khrushchev discussion of the issue about liquidation of and J. Kennedy, you blow up only one asour base in Guantanamo is out of question. pect and maintain silence on the other. You It was given up (ustuplena) to us by the gov- dodge such issues as lifting of the blockernment of Cuba on a legal basis, and the ade, granting the guarantees of indepenAmerican people will under no circum- dence to Cuba. We believe that all this stances renounce it.

should be fixed (zafiksirovano) in the docuA.I.Mikoyan. But the government of ment where certain formulas should be reCuba puts forward this question, so it should iterated and specified. We believe that our be discussed.

negotiations should result in a document V.V.Kuznetsov. The government of registered in the United Nations and apCuba has put this question even earlier. proved by the Security Council. Otherwise,

McCloy. We will not concede on this. what is happening? The ink has not yet dried The position of Castro represents an obstacle up on the letter, but Rusk is already declaron the way to fulfilling commitments for- ing that the United States has not guaranmulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev. teed the independence of Cuba. It was pub

A.I.Mikoyan. Castro is not and will not lished in your newspapers, and I read about be an obstacle to fulfillment of these com- it on my way to New York. mitments. The armaments we are talking Stevenson. Rusk said nothing to disabout is Soviet weaponry and it will be avow the guarantees that have been granted evacuated. As for Castro, he has declared in Kennedy's letter. The press gave a wrong that he would assist the evacuation of these interpretation to his declaration. armaments.

A.I. Mikoyan. We are proposing to you McCloy. But he has 145 thousand sol- to prepare jointly an appropriate document diers against 10 thousand Russians. He can and introduce it jointly to the Security Counobstruct the dismantling (of missiles-- cil, then there will be no other interpretatrans.). Moreover, I think he is already ob- tions. structing it.

Stevenson. I would like to say a few A.I.Mikoyan. The government of Cuba words about the procedure. U Thant believes

that the operation could be finalized in two statements: the Soviet Union could make announcement about the end of withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba, and the United States would make an announcement that we made sure that these weapons are withdrawn from Cuba. Earlier it was supposed that the appropriate checkup should be done by the forces of the UN, but after Castro's refusal to let UN representatives into Cuba, the question emerged about the method of inspection.

After the withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba will be confirmed, the USA will declare the abolition of the “quarantine” and that it guarantees non-intervention of Cuba. I see no reason for any other treaties and documents. If the Soviet side has some draft proposals, it is desirable to obtain them, and the American side then will do the same thing.

A.1. Mikoyan. There is no time to consider this issue in detail. It seems to me we should think how to continue the talks.

V.V.Kuznetsov. If the American side agrees, we will discuss this issue.

A.I.Mikoyan. On our side we prefer to have a protocol.

Stevenson. The Soviet Union can and must ensure the withdrawal of the certain types of armaments and a verification that would satisfy the USA and Latin American countries.

The question, however, emerges on what form of inspection is feasible under current circumstances. Four days have already elapsed, and there is no inspection in sight. Therefore, now we should discuss possible forms of inspection. We do not want to constrain you by those formulas that were advanced concerning international inspection. If Castro does not want such an inspection, one can think of different forms of control.

McCloy. We should look at what is acceptable and feasible, but in any case the inspection should be introduced. Therefore we should adapt ourselves to the new situation.

In the first order, of course, we should, as they say, remove the pistol from the negotiating table, in other words to dismantle and withdraw the missiles.

Stevenson. I do not think that some kind of protocol will be necessary, besides the declarations that will be made in the Security Council.

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