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newspaper Pravda featured a letter purportedly sent by Kadar and Imre Horvath to Dag Hammarskjold. The letter claimed that Nagy's submission of the Hungarian question to the UN had been illegal, and requested that all consideration of the issue cease. 177This brief session produced few results. The formal protocol for the session (in TsKHSD, F. 3, Op. 14, D. 73, L. 4) simply reads: “Defer consideration of the matter." 178Voroshilov's name is not listed among the participants, but the notes below indicate that he actively took part. 179Other documents recently declassified by the Russian government shed light on what occurred at this meeting. On 5 November an official from the CPSU CC international department, Vladimir Baikov, who had been sent to Budapest the previous day to maintain liaison with Kadar, sent a secure, high-frequency message back to Moscow along with the draft text of a statement prepared by Kadar. Baikov's message reads as follows: “At the request of Cde. Kadar, I am conveying the translation from Hungarian of an Appeal by the Provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party ‘To Hungarian Communists! To Loyal Members of the Hungarian Workers' Party!' Cde. Kadar requested that I transmit the views and observations of the Soviet comrades regarding the text of the Appeal by 10:00 a.m. on 6 November.” (See “Po VCh," APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 132.) The draft went to Mikoyan, who prepared a number of changes and suggestions before the Presidium meeting began. The most significant change was the addition of a reference to the "treacherous" activities of a “group of Imre Nagy, Losonczy, and Donath" after the condemnation of the “Rakosi clique.” (See the marked-up draft in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 136.) Kadar incorporated this change, though he dropped the mention of Ferenc Donath, referring simply to the “Nagy-Losonczy group,” which he claimed had committed treason" and inspired the "counterrevolution.” Other proposed changes also were included. The final text was released as a leaflet in Hungary on 6 November. It was published in the Szolnok newspaper Szabad Nep on 7 November and in Russian translation in the CPSU daily Pravda that same day. On 8 November it was published in Nepszabadsag. This was the first major programmatic statement by Kadar's government. 180 This is the same telegram that Kadar mentioned earlier. See Note 159 supra. 181The draft statement pledged that the HSWP would make a decisive break with the harmful policy and criminal methods of the Rakosi clique, which shook the faith of the broad popular masses in our party.” This was preserved in the final text along with other condemnations of “past mistakes." 182 Malenkov obviously is referring to a CC plenum of the HWP, not of the CPSU. 183Again, the reference is to a CC plenum of the HWP, not of the CPSU. 184 From exile in Moscow, Rakosi had made overtures about his possible readmission into the Hungarian Communist party. 785The topic discussed here was a telegram received on 5 November 1956 from the Soviet am

bassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, transmitting a formal protest by the Yugoslav government about the death of Milenko Milovanov, a Yugoslav embassy employee in Budapest who was struck by shots fired from a Soviet tank. The Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovic, accused the Soviet tank of having deliberately opened fire on the embassy even though the compound was clearly marked and the Soviet government had been informed by the Yugoslav side of who, other than Yugoslav diplomatic personnel, is in the Yugoslav embassy compound in Budapest.” See “Shifrtelegramma," 5 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 143144. To reinforce Popovic's complaint, a similar protest was delivered by the Yugoslav ambassador in adapest, Dalibor Soldatic, to the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov. Soldatic requested that the Soviet military unit alongside the Yugoslav embassy be pulled back. Andropov relayed this message by telephone to the Soviet deputy foreign minister Valerian Zorin, warning that “the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet military unit from the building of the mission is of a suspicious nature.” See “Telefonogramma," 5 November 1956, in APRF, E. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 130. These messages were discussed at the Presidium meeting not only by Zhukov and Shepilov (as indicated by Malin), but also by Khrushchev, who presented the draft of a cable intended for the Yugoslav government. Subsequently, the cable was transmitted via Firyubin to Popovic. 186The formal protocol for this session (“Vypiska iz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g.," in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 141) indicates that the Presidium “affirmed the draft response to the Yugoslavs in connection with the unfortunate case of an employee at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest.” The telegram, signed by foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovic, via the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest, Veljko Micunovic. It stated that the Soviet military commander in Hungary had been ordered to make a careful study of how the incident happened. The telegram also conveyed the Soviet government's “deep condolences” regarding the death of Milenko Milovanov, and promised assistance in transporting Milanov's body to Yugoslavia. The telegram said that the Soviet military government would take all necessary measures” to safeguard the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, and in a follow-on conversation with Micunovic, Shepilov indicated that the Soviet military command would comply with the Yugoslav request to “pull back the military unit next to the [Yugoslav) embassy compound.” See “O besede s poslom Yugoslavii v SSSR Michunovichem,” No. 486 (Secret), from D. T. Shepilov to the CPSU Presidium, 7 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, LI. 1-3. The investigation into the incident was completed by mid-day on 7 November. It concluded that the Soviet tank had come under fire from a house alongside the Yugoslav embassy. When the tank responded by firing back, one of the shots had strayed into the embassy, killing Milovanov. It is unclear whether this version of events is more accurate than the original Yugoslav account, but whatever the case may have been, steps were

taken to prevent further “unfortunate incidents.” 187 These notes were compiled by Malin's deputy, Vladimir Naumovich Chernukha, not by Malin himself. Hence, they are somewhat sketchier than other notes from this period. No list of participants in the session is given, but the formal protocol for the session (“Vypiska iz Protokola No. 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 27 noyabrya 1956 g.," in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, L. 181) indicates that, in addition to those listed here, the participants included Brezhnev, Shvernik, Furtseva, Belyaev, and Pospelov. The protocol does not mention Andrei Gromyko. 188 The Presidium is discussing a telegram that was sent on 26 November by V. F. Nikolaev, an official at the Soviet embassy in Bucharest. The telegram indicated that the Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej intended to seek toplevel negotiations with Yugoslavia as soon as possible to alleviate the dispute that Yugoslavia was having with the Soviet Union and Hungary about the fate of Imre Nagy. During negotiations with the Yugoslavs, Kadar's government had given assurances of safety for Nagy and his aides if they left the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. When Nagy's group went outside on 22 November, they were immediately arrested by Soviet military personnel. Soon thereafter, they were transported as prisoners to Romania. A senior aide to Gheorghiu-Dej, Emil Bodnaras, told Nikolaev that the Romanians "hadn't expected that the Yugoslavs would raise a fuss about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania. However, as you know, they presented a note of protest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. It's possible that this question might be raised at the UN, etc. We believe that we must be ready for different speeches and discussions regarding Imre Nagy. But first of all we believe it is necessary to discuss this matter with the Yugoslavs.” See “Shifrtelegramma,” 26 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, LI. 13-14. 189The formal protocol for this session ("Vypiska iz Protokola No. 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS," 27 November 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, L. 177) stated that “on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the session of the CPSU CC Presidium, Cde. Bulganin is instructed to hold negotiations with Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej.” Later that day, Bulganin had a telephone conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej, which he promptly recounted in writing for the other members of the CPSU Presidium: “I told Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest level with the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy and his group will not produce a good solution, since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this matter, and such a meeting might complicate the situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meeting with Imre Nagy and the others, which would hardly be worthwhile. ... Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej asked that I let the CPSU CC Presidium know that they are working via plenipotentiaries with Imre Nagy and his group. They have set out to persuade Imre Nagy and his group to issue a statement in which they would acknowledge their criminal actions and indicate that the only correct course at present is to support and consolidate the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government of Kadar, and to strengthen the re


gime of people's democracy. In this way, said

directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V. Gheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy.” See RESEARCH NOTES:

Stalin. It functioned for almost eight “Informatsiya,” 27 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, LI. 16-17.

years until it was abolished in accor190 This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagy


dance with a CC CPSU Presidium and his aides were arrested. A bus had been DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT:

Resolution of 26 June 1953—the same brought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, suppos


tumultuous meeting at which Beria was edly to transport the officials and their families

EFFORT, 1946 to their apartments. It turned out that the bus was

arrested. Thus, the Special Committee's merely part of an elaborate plot devised by Ivan

activities covered a most important, forSerov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagy

by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov,

mative period of the Soviet atomic from the embassy. A Soviet military officer was

A. S. Stepanov

project, that is, the establishment and sitting in the bus, and others quickly approached. Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompany

growth of the USSR atomic-energy in

On 16 July 1945, the USA coning the Hungarians were forced out of the bus,

dustry, the development and testing of and the remaining passengers were placed under ducted the world's first test of an atomic

the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) arrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar's bomb, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, it

and early improved atomic bomb degovernment had given to the Yugoslavs. This

used the new weapon on Hiroshima and episode is recounted in detail in the note of pro

signs, and the development and virtual Nagasaki. The world faced the fact of completion of the first Soviet hydrogen test that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovic sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on the USA's monopolistic possession of

bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested 24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. the new, unprecedently powerful de5, LI. 19-26. See also “Telefonogramma,” Se

in August 1953. vice. The atomic bombardments of the cure High-Frequency Transmission, from

Considering and resolving all the Japanese cities, some believed, also Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, 23 November

most basic issues which arose in the 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, L1. 95-96. constituted a demonstration by

course of the early Soviet atomic 191 No title for this section is given, but the for- America's leaders of their readiness to

project, the Special Committee was mal protocol for the session (No. 60, as cited in employ these weapons later on as well. Note 187 supra) indicates that Point II dealt with

empowered to supervise

The events of 1945 forced the So"Questions of Hungary.” According to the Protocol, “the USSR Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and viet leadership to undertake emergency

all work on the use of atomic energy of the USSR Ministry of Defense (were] instructed measures to speed up the creation of the

uranium:- the development of scientific to prepare materials about Imre Nagy and his USSR's own nuclear weapons. It was group in accordance with the exchange of opin

research in this sphere;- the broad use clear that solving the problem of makions at the CPSU CC Presidium's session."

of geological surveys and the establish192 Nagy's surname is omitted in this line of ing the atomic bomb as soon as pos

ment of a resource base for the USSR Malin's notes. sible would require mobilization of all

to obtain uranium...;- the organization the country's resources, which had been

of industry to process uranium and to Mark Kramer, a scholar based at the Davis entirely directed to securing the victory

produce special equipment and materiCenter for Russian Studies at Harvard Uni- over fascist Germany and its allies.

als connected with the use of atomic enversity, is a frequent contributor to the Focusing all the country's forces on

ergy; and the construction of atomic CWIHP Bulletin. the solution of this complex problem

energy facilities, and the development called above all for the establishment

and production of an atomic bomb. 1 of a new state management body endowed with appropriate power. Such a

The Special Committee's decisions body, which was entrusted with practi

either were of unilaterally decisive charcally unlimited authority, was the Spe

acter or were made to support draft resocial Committee, headed by L. P. Beria

lutions and directions of the USSR Gov(a member of State Defense Commit

ernment previously submitted to Stalin tee and Vice Chairman of the USSR

for approval. Throughout the lifetime Council of People's Commissars) and

of the Special Committee, more than was founded by the USSR State De

140 sittings were held. The approxifense Committee's Resolution No.

mate volume of the Special GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. The

Committee's protocols is 1000 typeCommittee was founded under the State

written pages. The complete work of the Defense Committee, but after the State

Special Committee fills about 1700 Defense Committee was abolished in

dossiers containing more than 300,000 September 1945, the Special Commit

typewritten pages. These materials are tee functioned as a body of USSR Coun

currently stored in the Archive of the cil of People's Commissars (and after

President, Russian Federation (APRF). March 1946 as a body of the USSR

These materials, documenting Council of Ministers).

events from 1943 to 1953, constitute an In reality, the Special Committee

invaluable treasure of early Soviet was an independent state control body

atomic project history.

Some particular items in the Spe- Minatom), the Russian archives, the August 1996 the Russian Federation cial Committee's documentary collec- Academy of Sciences, Ministry of De- Government decided to approve some tions deserve special mention. Besides fense, Federal Security Service, Foreign funding for preparing the compilations. the Committee's meeting protocols, Intelligence Service, and State Technol- Though the funding amount is not large, these are protocols and related materi- ogy Commission of Russia.

this decision will allow us to assure a als of meetings of the Technical (Sci- Since its establishment, the Work- more effective continuation of the entific and Technical) and Engineering ing Group has carried out a great commission's activities. By now the and Technical Councils which were ac- amount of work. It has specified sub- commission has reviewed the protocols tive in 1945-1946 within the Special jects of the collection sections and de- of the Special Committee's meetings Committee and then within the First cided to focus initial efforts on two ba- and basic resolutions and orders by Main Directorate of the USSR Council sic areas to complete the compilation State Defense Committee and USSR of Ministers; resolutions and orders of sections as quickly as possible:

Government from 1943 to 1948. the USSR Council of People's Commis

Anticipating the publication of the sars Council of Ministers on the atomic -on the history of the development of the historical documents pertaining to the issues; correspondence with First Main first atomic bomb and improved atomic Soviet atomic project history in the Directorate organizations and enter- bomb designs (during the period through compilation, we present below the full prises and other Ministries and agen- 1954) in the USSR;

texts of the two most important governcies; and important documents of the -on Soviet efforts to develop the hydro- mental resolutions of 1946 from the First Main Directorate. Among the gen bomb (during the period through APRF: USSR Council of Ministers Special Committee's materials are 1954).

(CM) Resolution No. 805-327 of 9 April unique documents signed by Stalin and

1946 (Issues of USSR Academy of Beria, and manuscripts by leading sci- The compilation section devoted to Sciences Laboratory No.2"), and USSR entists and administrators in the Soviet documents pertaining to the early pe- Council of Ministers Resolution No. atomic project, including its leader, riod of works on the Soviet atomic 1286-525 of 21 June 1946 (“On the Plan physicist I. V. Kurchatov.

project (1942-1945) is being prepared of the Works for Design Bureau No.11 For more than 40 years since the for publication.

of USSR Academy of Sciences LaboSpecial Committee's abolishment, its To prepare the compilation, docu- ratory No.2"). The latter resolution is documents have been practically inac- ments are being studied and selected in published with annexes No.1 and No.4 cessible for research. But an important various Russian archives. In addition (annexes No. 2 and 3, of a narrow ecostep toward the opening of these mate- to the Archive of the President, Russian nomic character, are omitted). rials, as well as relevant documents of Federation (APRF), great attention is USSR CM Resolution No. 805-327 other agencies, was taken on 17 Febru- paid to the archives of R. F. Minatom of 9 April 1946 is a historic act which ary 1995 with the issuance of Russian and Russian Federal Nuclear Center- established Design Bureau No.11 (KBFederation Presidential Decree No.160, All-Russian Scientific Research Insti- 11), the Soviet analog of the secret war"On the Preparation and Publication of tute of Experimental Physics (RFNC- time American nuclear weapons laboan Official Compilation of Archival VNIIEF). Valuable materials are also ratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico. Documents Pertaining to the History of located in the files of the Russia For- (Design Bureau No. 11 later became the Development of Nuclear Weapons eign Intelligence Service which has in- RENC-VNIIEF.) USSR CM Resoluin the USSR.”2 To produce an objec- dicated its readiness to present a large tion No. 1286-525 of 21 June 1946 tive account of domestic atomic-energy amount of intelligence materials for the specified the early missions of KB-11, industry growth and USSR nuclear commission.

i.e. development of atomic bombs, weapons development, this Decree pro- In its activities the commission in- which were referred to in the resolution vides for the preparation and publica- tends to be guided by the principle of as “jet engines S,” in two versions, S-1 tion of archival documents pertaining maximum possible openness. The ba- and S-2 (abbreviated as RDS-1 and to the history of nuclear weapons de- sic restriction remains only the provi- RDS-2). RDS-1 meant the analog of velopment in the USSR up to 1954. To sions of the 1968 Nuclear Weapons the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion fulfill the decree's requirements, to Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bars type atomic bomb tested on 16 July study and compile the archival docu- the disclosure of information which 1945 in New Mexico (and of the U.S. ments and develop proposals for their would facilitate the spread of nuclear atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki declassification, in accordance with weapons. These provisions hamper the on 9 August 1945). This bomb was sucRussian Federation Government's Di- commission's work as most documents cessfully tested in the USSR on 29 Aurection No. 728-r of 24 May 1995, a are of a technical character and contain gust 1949. RDS-2 signified the analog Working Group chaired by Russian data whose review for publication re- of the uranium-235 gun type bomb exDeputy Federation Minister for Atomic quires thorough analysis.

ploded over Hiroshima on 6 August Energy, was set up. The Working Group Another difficulty is that thus far 1945. This bomb passed a design veriincluded representatives of the Minis- there is no special funding for the fication in the USSR, but was not tested. try of Atomic Energy (L.D. Ryabev, commission's activities. However, in Later the abbreviation RDS-2 was used to denote the improved plutonium-239 sponded to the maximum capabilities KB-11 construction and arrangement of implosion type atomic bomb tested in of that time.

works. 1951. During the period through 1954 The 21 June 1946 resolution set The measures taken for KB-11's the USSR verified and tested three more stringent control over the KB-11 works. creation and development, alongside the types of improved atomic bombs: RDS- I. V. Kurchatov, the scientific leader of huge complex of the measures to cre3, RDS-4, and RDS-5. The documents the Soviet atomic project, and P.M. ate an interconnected network of reflecting the development of the RDS- Zernov and Yu. B. Khariton, leaders of atomic-energy industry scientific re1, RDS-2, RDS-3, RDS-4 and RDS-5 KB-11, had to report to the Special search institutes and enterprises, alatomic bombs that will constitute the Committee on the progress of KB-11 lowed the USSR to solve the historic first part of the compilation being pre- works on a monthly basis.

problem of domestic nuclear weapons pared by the commission. The second The annexes to the 21 June 1946 development within a short time period. part will be composed of documents re- resolution contain detailed description Naturally, even a multi-volume flecting the Soviet work on the hydro- of the measures on preparation, arrange- compilation cannot contain all signifigen bomb, whose first version (referred ment, and support of the KB-11 works. cant historical documents reflecting the to as RDS-6s) was successfully tested According to Annex No.1, for KB-11 immense work on the USSR atomic on 12 August 1953.

construction in the Mordovia State re- project, which was indeed a major exReturning to the USSR CM reso- serve zone and Gorky (now Nizhni ploit of Soviet science and industry. The lution of 21 June 1946, readers should Novgorod) region a territory of roughly document sets, such as a complete colnote the extremely short duration of the 100 square kilometers was taken from lection of protocols of the Special Comwork phases set by that resolution. Thus the settlement of Sarov. KB-11 was mittee, and of the Technical and Engithe technical task orders for the RDS-1 transferred to Plant No. 550 in Sarov neering and Technical Councils of the and RDS-2 designs had to be developed which heretofore belonged to Ministry Special Committee, voluminous reports

, by 1 July 1946, the main unit designs of Agricultural Machine Engineering. about the work of the First Main Direcby 1 July 1947. The work on the de- The plant's buildings and equipment torate from 1945 to 1946 signed by B. sign development had to be conducted became the base of the KB-11 produc- L. Vannikov, A. P. Zavenyagin and I. V. in parallel with the establishment of tion zone. When the USSR CM Reso- Kurchatov, compilation of atomic intelspecial laboratories at KB-11 and ar- lutions of 9 April and 21 June 1946 were ligence materials, etc. are worthy of rangement of the works of these labo- adopted, the settlement of Sarov disap- special attention and might be published ratories (the first phase laboratories had peared from all geographic maps pub- individually. The obvious interest of to start functions in the period from lished in the USSR.

Russia and the international public in September to December 1946, the sec- The KB-11 laboratory received such historical materials allows us to ond phase laboratories in the period special dispensations and privileges of expect that eventually the problem of from January to June 1947).

many varieties. It was permitted to con- financial support of such publications The short duration and arrange- struct new buildings and facilities with can find a positive resolution. ment of the parallel works became pos- out previously approved projects and sible thanks to availability in the USSR estimated costs and make payments for Document I: USSR Council of Minisof intelligence materials about the de- the works according to actual expendi- ters Resolution of 9 April 1946 Estabsigns of the U.S. atomic bombs “Fat tures. Special attention was paid to so- lishing Design Bureau No. 11 Man" and "Little Boy," prototypes of cial issues. KB-11 workers received RDS-1 and RDS-2, Soviet atomic high wages, and enhanced food-stuff

Top Secret bombs, which the leaders of the USSR norms given in Annex No.4* (note that

(Special dossier) atomic project decided in 1946 should the ration card system existed in the USSR Council of Ministers be copied as closely as possible from USSR up until the end of 1947), and Order No. 805-327ss/op of 9 April 1946. the American designs.

reserved high-quality residences. A li- Kremlin, Moscow It should be emphasized that the brary was created which automatically availability of the intelligence materi- received copies of important literature Issues of Laboratory No.2 als could not substitute for independent on physics, chemistry, mathematics and experimental, theoretical, and design fiction published in the USSR, and spe,

1. Reorganize Sector No. 6 of USSR verification of the Soviet atomic bombs cial allocations of additional funding in Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 to which were being prepared for testing. foreign currency to obtain foreign books Design Bureau of USSR Academy of SciOwing to the extraordinary responsibil- and journals. Aircraft were allotted to ences Laboratory No.2 for jet engine (atomic ity of the leaders of and participants in KB-11, permitting regular aerial trans- weapon) design development and prototype the Soviet atomic project, RDS-1 was port links with Moscow.

manufacture. tested only after thorough confirmation Under the hard post-war condi- 2. Hereupon refer to the above Design of the available information and a full tions, including severe shortages of re- Bureau as Design Bureau No. 11 (KB-11) cycle of experimental, theoretical, and

sources, a great amount of materials and of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory design studies whose level corre- necessary equipment was directed for No. 2.

3. Designate:

C[omralde Zernov P.M., Transport Machine Building Deputy Minister, as KB11 Chief with release from his current Ministry duties;

Professor Khariton Yu, B. as KB-11 Chief Designer on jet engine prototype designing and manufacture.

4. Adopt the proposal by Commission composed of Vannikov, Yakovlev, Zavenyagin, Goremykin, Meshik and Khariton on location of KB-11 on the base of Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building Plant No. 550 and adjoining territory.

5. Assume the following as necessary:

a) involve USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics (Director Academician Semenov N. N.) in computations on orders by Laboratory No. 2 (Academician Kurchatov) relating to designing of jet engines, measurements of needed constants, and preparation and conduct of principal jet engine tests;

b) arrange at USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics development of theoretical issues for nuclear explosion and combustion and their application in engineering.

In this connection transfer all main forces of USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics to accomplishment of the above tasks.

6. Charge the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers (Mr. Vannikov) with (responsibility for] material and technical support of KB-11 and USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics.

7. Entrust Mr. Vannikov with consideration and solution in conjunction with Mr. Zernov of all the issues relating to adjustment of Plant No. 550 for KB-11.

8. Entrust Messrs. Vannikov (convocation), Zernov, Kurchatov, Khariton, Semenov, Pervukhin, Ustinov, and Zavenyagin with consideration of Academician Semenov's proposals on the measures to support the works with which the Institute of Chemical Physics is charged and within 5 days to develop and submit the draft decision on this issue.

Federation (APRF), Fond 3, Opis 47, Delo fueling stated in item la in versions S-1 and 29, Listy 105-106).

S-2, 5 copies for each version, and submit

them for testing by 1 September 1947. Document II: USSR Council of

3. That the following proposals of Ministers Resolution of 21 June 1946 on Cdes. Kurchatov, Khariton, Vannikov, Development of Soviet Atomic Weapons Pervukhin, and Zernov to conduct the fol

lowing preparatory works for RDS versions Keep in cipher

S-1 and S-2 according to the task orders of Top Secret KB-11, at Ministry of Agricultural Machine

(Special dossier) Building NII-6, NII-504, KB-47, USSR USSR Council of Ministers Resolution Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2, No. 1286-525ss/op of 21 June 1946. Ministry of Armaments KB-88, Ministry of Kremlin, Moscow

Transport Machine Building Kirov Plant KB

(Chelyabinsk) and USSR Academy of SciOn the plan of promoting the works of ences Institute of Chemical Physics be ac

Design Bureau No. 11 (KB-11) of cepted:
USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory a) at the Ministry of Agricultural Ma-

chine Building Research Institute No. 6

(leader of the works Cde. Zakoshchikov, USSR Council of Ministers ORDERS: NII-6 chief):

Accept the following proposals submit- - development of synchronous spark ted by Cdes.Kurchatov, Khariton, Vannikov, plug operation principles and design-by 1 Pervukhin, and Zernov on the Orders for October 1946; Design Bureau No. 11 of USSR Academy - refinement of diesel fuel compound of Sciences and the plan of promoting the charge elements—by 1 October 1946; works of the above Bureau:

- development basing on small-scale 1. That Design Bureau No. 11 (Messrs. models of a technique for studying maxiKhariton, Zernov) be charged with: mum compression of fuel mixture—by 1

a) development of two versions of “Jet January 1947; engine (atomic bomb] S” (“RDS” in abbre- - study basing on small-scale models viated form) under the scientific leadership of the compression rate—by 1 January 1947; of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory - development of the power supply sysNo.2 (Academician Kurchatov):with heavy tem—by 1 March 1947. fuel utilization (version S-1) and with light b) at the Ministry of Agricultural Mafuel utilization (version S-2);

chine Building Research Institute N0.504 b) submission of the first verified and (leader of the works Cde. Rassushin, Chief manufactured S-1 and S-2 versions of RDS, Designer): 1 copy of each version, to state tests in sta- - development of the automatic height tionary conditions: for the version S-1 by 1 controller-by 1 January 1947; January 1948, for the version S-2 by 1 June - development of the spark plug power 1948;

supply system-by 1 October 1946; c) submission of the first verified and c) at the Ministry of Agricultural Mamanufactured S-1 and S-2 aerial design ver- chine Building Design Bureau No.47 (leader sions of RDS, 1 copy of each version, to of the works Cde. Kulakov, Chief Designer): state flight tests: for the version S-1 by 1 - development of the RDS fairing and March 1948, for the version S-2 by 1 Janu- fastening case—by 1 October 1946;

d) at the Ministry of Transport Machine 2. That to secure accomplishment of Building Kirov Plant Design, Chelyabinsk the tasks stated in item 1, entrust Design Bu- (leader of the works Cde. Dukhov, Chief Dereau No. 11 (Cdes. Khariton and Zernov) to signer): be empowered to carry out the following - development of the diesel fuel comworks: a) development of the tactical and pound charge, fueling technique and autotechnical task orders for versions S-1 and mated system devices—by 1 October 1946; S-2 of the RDS design by 1 July 1946; b) e) at USSR Academy of Sciences development of the design of the main RDS Laboratory No. 2 (leader of the works Acaunits in versions S-1 and S-2 by 1 July 1947; demician Kurchatov): c) manufacture of RDS prototypes without - development of the power supply sys

ary 1949.

Stamp: USSR Council of Ministers General
Office Management of USSR Council of
Ministers Affairs.

(Source: Archive of the President, Russian

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