Contract and Property in Early Modern China: Rational Choice in Political Science

Stanford University Press, 2004年2月18日 - 408 頁
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Providing a new perspective on economic and legal institutions, particularly on contract and property, in Qing and Republican history, this volume provides case studies to explicate how these institutions worked, while situating them firmly in their broader social context.


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Applying Western Legal
A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar China
Why County
Property Taxes and State Protection of Rights
The Status of Contracts in NineteenthCentury
in Early Modern China
Managing Multiple Ownership at the Zigong Salt Yard
The Contracts
Financial Arrangements in
Contracting Business Partnerships in Late Qing
Chinese Names and Terms
List of Contributors

Supplemental Payment in Urban Property Contracts

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第 181 頁 - In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to the bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on (Coase (1960, p.
第 89 頁 - We may say that the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract.
第 175 頁 - ... proposals through the throne's secret memorial system, including a report by Governor-General Nien Keng-yao of Shensi, he recommended that provincial officials retain a fixed share of the taxes they sent to the central government. This retained share, referred to as a "meltage fee...
第 17 頁 - The penal emphasis of this law, for example, meant that matters of a civil nature were either ignored by it entirely (for example, contracts), or were given only limited treatment within its penal format (for example, property rights, inheritance, marriage). The law was only secondarily interested in defending the rights — especially the economic rights — of one individual or group against another individual or group and not at all in defending such rights against the state.
第 181 頁 - Indeed, if transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless contracting. But despite the growing realization that transaction costs are central to the study of economics,1 skeptics remain. Stanley Fischer's complaint is typical: "Transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical device . . . [partly] because there is a suspicion that...
第 114 頁 - ... simple peasants." Whatever the structural weaknesses of the Qing legal system, what made matters worse in the eighteenth century were the social tensions engendered by economic change. As Philip Kühn has noted, at the macroeconomic level the eighteenth century was a prosperous era, but the very economic changes that brought prosperity could be quite threatening to the ordinary peasant household. "From the standpoint of an eighteenth-century Chinese commoner, commercial growth may have meant,...
第 17 頁 - What really concerned the law — though this is to be surmised rather than explicitly read in the Chinese legal literature — were all acts of moral or ritual impropriety or of criminal violence which seemed in Chinese eyes to be violations or disruptions of the total social order.
第 17 頁 - China the initial stimulus for law was no more economic than it was religious. Economic growth, to be sure, no doubt played a role in transforming the society of feudal China to the point where it could no longer get along without a written law. When this law appeared, however, it was used neither to uphold traditional religious values nor to protect private property. Rather, its primary purpose was political : that of imposing tighter political controls upon a society which was then losing its old...
第 187 頁 - It is my thesis in this part of the paper that the emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities.
第 180 頁 - The Nature of the Firm' (1937) and The Problem of Social Cost...

關於作者 (2004)

Madeleine Zelin is Professor of History and East Asian Languages and Cultures at Columbia University. Jonathan K. Ocko is Professor and Head of the Department of History at North Carolina State University, and an Adjunct Professor of Chinese Legal History at Duke Law School. Robert Gardella is professor in the Humanities Department at the United States Merchant Marine Academy.