Handbook of New Institutional EconomicsClaude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁 New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research. |
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第 6 到 10 筆結果,共 76 筆
... empirical work . In a paper written for a conference of the National Bureau of Economic Research , I explained why I thought this was so . This is what I said : " An inspired theoretician might do as well without such empirical work ...
... Empirical Testing The main engine from which the predictions of TCE are derived is that of discriminating alignment, according to which transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ ...
... empirical testing , the transaction cost theory of vertical integration invites and has been the subject of considerable empirical analysis . Both the theory of the firm ( Holmstrom and Tirole , 1989 , p . 126 ) and the field of ...
... empirical testing come in: ask each would-be theory to stand up and be counted. Why more economists are not insistent upon deriving refutable implications and submitting these to empirical tests is a puzzle. One possibility is that the ...
... Empirical Examination " . Rand Journal of Economics 15 ( 3 ) : 385–395 . Bajari , Patrick and Steven Tadelis . 2001. “ Incentives Versus Transaction Costs : A Theory of Procurement Contracts " . Rand Journal of Economics 32 : 387-407 ...
內容
31 | |
40 | |
67 | |
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government | 91 |
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle | 123 |
The Many Legal Institutions that Support | 175 |
Paul H Rubin 205 | 204 |
Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking | 229 |
Agricultural Contracts | 465 |
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering | 491 |
The Institutions of Regulation An Application | 513 |
22 | 573 |
23 | 591 |
24 | 610 |
25 | 639 |
26 | 667 |
Legal Institutions and Financial Development | 251 |
A New Institutional Approach to Organization | 281 |
Vertical Integration | 319 |
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms | 349 |
The Institutions of Corporate Governance | 371 |
Firms and the Creation of New Markets | 400 |
Lessons from Empirical Studies | 433 |
27 | 700 |
28 | 720 |
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange | 727 |
29 | 788 |
30 | 819 |
Subject Index | 849 |