Handbook of New Institutional EconomicsClaude Ménard, Mary M. Shirley Springer Science & Business Media, 2008年6月27日 - 884 頁 New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research. |
搜尋書籍內容
第 6 到 10 筆結果,共 89 筆
... incentive to invest in new knowledge and in consequence will not induce rapid institutional change. Stable institu ... incentives) are crucial factors in the performance of economies. The organizations that come into existence will ...
... incentives that lead them to do so and that, to discover (and maintain) such a distribution of rights, the costs of their transference should be low, through clarity in the law and by making the legal requirements for such transfers ...
... Incentive Alignment Ex Post Governance Figure 1. The sciences of choice and contract relations ( contract implementation ) . Albeit related , these two are in tension . Thus whereas transaction cost economics locates the main analytical ...
... incentive intensity, (2) administrative controls, and (3) contract law regime. Spot markets and hierarchy differ with respect to these attributes as fol- lows: the high-powered incentives of markets are supplanted by low-powered incentives ...
... incentive limits and bureaucratic distortions, it is much more difficult to show that comparative cost consequences ... Incentives are unavoidably compromised8 and added bureaucratic cots are unavoidably incurred upon tak-. 50 Oliver E ...
內容
31 | |
40 | |
67 | |
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government | 91 |
Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle | 123 |
The Many Legal Institutions that Support | 175 |
Paul H Rubin 205 | 204 |
Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking | 229 |
Agricultural Contracts | 465 |
The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering | 491 |
The Institutions of Regulation An Application | 513 |
22 | 573 |
23 | 591 |
24 | 610 |
25 | 639 |
26 | 667 |
Legal Institutions and Financial Development | 251 |
A New Institutional Approach to Organization | 281 |
Vertical Integration | 319 |
Solutions to PrincipalAgent Problems in Firms | 349 |
The Institutions of Corporate Governance | 371 |
Firms and the Creation of New Markets | 400 |
Lessons from Empirical Studies | 433 |
27 | 700 |
28 | 720 |
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange | 727 |
29 | 788 |
30 | 819 |
Subject Index | 849 |