 For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and...  The Principles of Psychology - 第 351 頁William James 著 - 1890完整檢視 - 關於此書
 | William Baird Elkin - 1904 - 352 頁
...remains the same throughout one 's life.1 "What then is the self ? ' ' For my part, ' ' says Hume,2 ' ' when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but a perception. "... | |
 | James Macbride Sterrett - 1904 - 136 頁
...down as an illusion of the imagination, without, however, accounting for imagination. Again he says: "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any... | |
 | Otto Weininger - 1905 - 660 頁
...ersten englischen Ausgabe, London 1739): »For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I cal! myself, I always stumble on some particular perception...anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not... | |
 | Abraham Wolf - 1905 - 184 頁
...distinction was overlooked by Hume when he expected to ' catch ' his Self in the same way as he could " stumble on some particular perception or other, of...light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure." (Treatise, i. iv. 6.) Similarly by asserting the reality of any empirical idea, or some particular... | |
 | Francis Ellingwood Abbot - 1906 - 350 頁
...existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it ? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . Setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind... | |
 | Francis Ellingwood Abbot - 1906 - 346 頁
...concept, because he had no scientific theory of universals. Granting, as Hume correctly maintains, that, "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,...light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, " — granting that " I never can catch -myself at any time without a perception," — it follows that... | |
 | Otto Weininger - 1907 - 646 頁
...philosophy, Sect. VI. Of personal identity, Vol. I, p. 438 f. (der ersten englischen Ausgabe, London 1739): »For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not... | |
 | Oliver Joseph Thatcher - 1907 - 484 頁
...existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it ? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long... | |
 | Oliver J. Thatcher - 2004 - 466 頁
...existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it ? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long... | |
 | Georges Dicker - 2004 - 280 頁
...in addition to these, some single item that one could identify as one's own self. As Hume puts it: For my part, when I enter most intimately into what...catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception. ... If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion,... | |
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